ingliz wrote:Once again, the sleight of hand consists in the equivocation between what should be two distinct functions of a word.
Semantics is your only recourse now, but it cannot help you.
ingliz wrote:Let the word be 'Saturn' (We will use 'Saturn' when mentioning the word and Saturn when designating the concept for which the word stands). The word 'Saturn' must be understood to mean sense (or 'mode of presentation') of the concept Saturn. But in order to be interesting (as opposed to blandly tautological), the word 'Saturn' must be understood to mean the referent of the concept Saturn. Once this is understood, it become clear that the considerations that make it true to say that Saturn cannot be posited independently of the conditions of its positing (ie. the conditions for the proper use of the concept), do not make it true to say that Saturn cannot be posited as non-posited (ie. that Saturn cannot exist unless there are conditions for the proper use of Saturn).
You don't need to explain (again) the notion of objects "out there" (
referents) and the conceptual instantiation (
referens) in realist epistemology, but this distinction is irrelevant, because you still need to explain how you know that the referents exist "out there" independent of referens, which is still the claim. I understand the realist distinction, in fact that is what I am challenging.
You repeat the problematic issue again here:
ingliz wrote:But when I say Saturn exists un-posited I am not making a claim about a word or a concept; my claim is rather that the planet which is the referent of the word 'Saturn' existed before we named it and will probably still exist after the beings who named it have ceased to exist, since it is something quite distinct both from the word 'Saturn' and the concept Saturn.
[Note Section in Bold]This is what you need to prove, if something exists independent of your conceiving of it, or of your referring to it, you need to prove so, but that is exactly the crux of the dilemma.
You cannot argue for a
referent without a recourse to a
referens; the argument is circular. I am asking you to prove the
referents independent of the
referens, because so long as you use a
referens you are failing to meet the burden of proof to show that something independent of
referens (our conceiving) exists.
The referent-Saturn must be proven to exist independent of referens-Saturn, that is, independent of any idea, instantiation, percept, or concept of saturn, the true saturn in-itelf is said to exist. You said you have and can prove this, do it.
If you cannot do so without recourse to conceiving, you have failed to show how such
actually exists independent of a mind.
You can claim that mind-independent things exists, you are permitted to do so like a fideist is permitted to claim God exists, but this claim is not only improvable, its unintelligible. Its fideism and it has no place in debate.
Idealism is established.
I win.ingliz wrote:No.
To claim that X exists independently of our minds is not to claim X exists beyond the reach of our minds.
Independence is not inaccessibility.
You can make the former claim, but its content is meaningless, improvable, and unintellgible.
You make a distinction without a difference, if X exists independent of our minds, knowledge of it sufficient for proof requires at least a basic apprehension (accessibility); hence, unless you can demonstrate a mind-independent object X (without recourse to conceiving, perceiving, etc) then X being mind-independent can only be taken to mean that X is also inaccessible, because its by definition unknowable.
You've stepped in it my friend. Take your toys and go home.