[wat0n]

The telegram to New York really. Who could possibly be listening.Just the people the Israelis possibly want to mislead. Really I struggle to laugh. As meaningless as a press release from Israel ministry of disinformation.

The telegram that was directed to Moshe Sharret, and was of a confidential nature? Sure, it's no different from one of those secret US embassy cables leaked by Wikileaks.

Is there any other nonsense you may wish to entertain us with?

[skinster]

Zionist militias were running around Palestine executing Palestinians in large numbers, resulting in many Palestinians fleeing the land: this caught Zionist officials by surprise.

[wat0n]

Zionist militias were running around Palestine executing Palestinians in large numbers, resulting in many Palestinians fleeing the land: this caught Zionist officials by surprise.

Actually it did, mainly because 1) the Arab exodus began before any relevant offensive by the Haganah and the other Zionist militias with 100,000 mostly upper class Arabs leaving before April 1948 and 2) because the Jews put up a better fight to try to hold land. The resistance presented by Jewish Kibbutzim and Moshavim, both before and April 1948, is well known - like the resistance in Degania against the Syrian army once it invaded the nascent Israeli state. The Zionists believed the Arabs would try to present a comparable resistance but they were wrong, especially about the upper classes who essentially abandoned their brethren right at the beginning of the conflict.

[skinster]

Yep, it's the Palestinians fault they were ethnically cleansed by European Jews, and their slow genocide that started back then and continues to this very day, that is also their fault.

Colour me convinced by what you say, waton. I take back everything I said about the benevolent Israeli state that is the only democracy in the Middle East, which seeks stuff like peace and not stuff like land (belonging to other people).

[wat0n]

Yep, it's the Palestinians fault they were ethnically cleansed by European Jews, and their slow genocide that started back then and continues to this very day, that is also their fault.

Colour me convinced by what you say, waton. I take back everything I said about the benevolent Israeli state that is the only democracy in the Middle East, which seeks stuff like peace and not stuff like land (belonging to other people).

Nice way of not answering the argument. I take it, then, that you have no real answer to the facts.

[pugsville]

hmm confidential cables in international politics , really the various agencies would just go scouts honor and NOT snoop? Really that is being a tad naive given the history of these things.

The Israeli forces drove out significant numbers, and stood around passing ammunition to extremists conducting massacres. and them prevented the refugees from going home when the fighting was over, then stole everything they owned. Every step there is deliberate considered policy.

Israel is solely and utterly responsible for the Refugees being unable to return to their homes. The Israeli policy was solely made basis that they wanted these people never to return, they were not obstructing their return for any other reason.

The Zionists leadership always wanted the Palestinians gone. They never wanted or even tried to deal with them on equal terms.

[wat0n]

hmm confidential cables in international politics , really the various agencies would just go scouts honor and NOT snoop? Really that is being a tad naive given the history of these things.

Who cares? Assuming they did, would have these agencies published anything on the matter in either a pro or anti-Israel direction?

Furthermore, embassies also use cables to discuss rather confidential matters. Am I to believe that all the cables leaked by Wikileaks are lies?

In any case, the cable wasn't meant to be for public consumption.

The Israeli forces drove out significant numbers, and stood around passing ammunition to extremists conducting massacres. and them prevented the refugees from going home when the fighting was over, then stole everything they owned. Every step there is deliberate considered policy.

Israel is solely and utterly responsible for the Refugees being unable to return to their homes. The Israeli policy was solely made basis that they wanted these people never to return, they were not obstructing their return for any other reason.

While there were expulsions, there is no real evidence to say that they were part of a master plan to that effect. In particular, there was inconsistent policy and field commanders seem to have used their own judgement when conducting expulsions, which is why some villages were emptied while other very similar ones, with the same ethnorreligious composition and in a nearby location, were not - different commanders were in charge in both cases.

The closest to a systematic expulsion was in the pocket of villages in the road between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, yet even then the explicit order was to leave in place and under military occupation those villages which surrendered their arms without a fight.

As for the return, I'd say this is also not so simple as any feasible return would entail setting a system to screen potential militants among returnees. Furthermore, Israel was dealing with its own refugee crisis as it had to take hundreds of thousands of European Jews who had lost everything after WWII, which made managing the return even harder.

That said, the Israelis definitely saw some clear advantages in the Arab exodus during the months after Sasson sent the cable, which is why the political echelon looked to the other side while some commanders applied a pro-expulsion criterion and is also one reason of why they didn't allow every refugee to return unhindered. But this seems to have been a realization that came as the war progressed rather than as a plan decided before the war or even during its early stages.

The Zionists leadership always wanted the Palestinians gone. They never wanted or even tried to deal with them on equal terms.

I don't recall that the Arab leadership ever offered to negotiate with the Zionists. I doubt the Zionists would have refused the offer, precisely because of the pragmatism of Ben Gurion.

[Heinie]

... Oh my god, you will all have to eat your words ...

I repeat, your claim that "there was no policy of wholesale expulsion of Arabs in the 1947-1949 war, Zionist officials were caught by surprise by the Arab exodus" is preposterous.
Firstly, according to your favored author, Benny Morris, it was very much the intention of the Yishuv military officials began implementing "Plan Dalet" in early April 1948 which was "the clearing hostile and potentially hostile forces out of the interior of the prospective territory of the Jewish state. ... As the Arab irregulars were based and quartered in the villages, and as the militias of many villages were participating in the anti-Yishuv hostilities, the Haganah regarded most of the villages as actively or potentially hostile." (Morris, B. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947--1949. [1988] p. 62. Cambridge Middle East Library) This was the basis of expulsions, according to Morris, "by front, district, brigade, and battalion commanders". (p. 63 op.cit.) "It was understood by all concerned that, militarily, in the struggle to survive, the less Arabs remaining behind and along the front lines, the better and, politically, the less Arabs remaining in the Jewish state, the better." (p. 289 op.cit.) There followed a well-documented campaign of terror against the Arabs to ethnically cleanse the future Jewish state.

Secondly, the claim of Morris that the Yishuv leadership was surprised is contradicted by himself. Why should this be, given Plan Dalet? As Morris notes, warnings were routinely issued to Arabs by Yishuv commanders to leave their homes and villages. Lt. Col. Yitzak Rabin issued an order on July 12 1948, "The inhabitants of Lydda must be expelled quickly without attention to age. ... Implement immediately." (Tikkun. p.19)
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B-5-JeC ... RSWDQ/edit
Why would the Yishuv leadership be surprised that their orders were being carried out?

[skinster]

"There was no wholesale expulsion, just an itty bit of expulsion here and there which included Palestinians being executed in large numbers..and then Zionist officials were caught by surprise when Palestinians who weren't killed, were fleeing the land. Oh how surprised they were!"

[pugsville]

The expulsion of the Palestinians was a necessary requirement for the Policy of the the Israeli leadership, without the expulsion there would have been a Palestinian majority in the new state of Israel. They didnt necessarily have to write it down and hold meetings. As Benny Morris said "transfer was in the air". Those involved knew for their vision of a greater Israel most of the Palestinians would have to go, to get it down to an acceptable minority.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1948_Pale ... _and_Ramle
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
" Once the Israelis were in control of the towns, an expulsion order signed by Yitzhak Rabin was issued to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stating, "1. The inhabitants of Lydda must be expelled quickly without attention to age.…",[10] Ramle's residents were bussed out, while the people of Lydda were forced to walk miles during a summer heat wave to the Arab front lines, where the Arab Legion, Transjordan's British-led army, tried to provide shelter and supplies.[11] Quite a few of the refugees died from exhaustion and dehydration. Estimates ranged from a handful to a figure of 350 based on hearsay, which is why the events are also referred as the Lydda death march.[12]

The events in Lydda and Ramle accounted for one-tenth of the overall Arab exodus from Palestine, known in the Arab world as al-Nakba ("the catastrophe")"
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

There you have in one single act of deliberate policy 10% of the entire exodus was brutally carried out. It was no some sort of accident it was deliberate policy executed on a somewhat ad hoc basis. The Israeli deliberately took immediate steps to make any return as impractical as possible. It wasn't just some temporary expulsion it was always intended to be forever.

[Rich]

Well apparently the Soviet Union murdered 5 million in the Holodomor by accident, so accidents do happen.

[wat0n]

I repeat, your claim that "there was no policy of wholesale expulsion of Arabs in the 1947-1949 war, Zionist officials were caught by surprise by the Arab exodus" is preposterous.
Firstly, according to your favored author, Benny Morris, it was very much the intention of the Yishuv military officials began implementing "Plan Dalet" in early April 1948 which was "the clearing hostile and potentially hostile forces out of the interior of the prospective territory of the Jewish state. ... As the Arab irregulars were based and quartered in the villages, and as the militias of many villages were participating in the anti-Yishuv hostilities, the Haganah regarded most of the villages as actively or potentially hostile." (Morris, B. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947--1949. [1988] p. 62. Cambridge Middle East Library) This was the basis of expulsions, according to Morris, "by front, district, brigade, and battalion commanders". (p. 63 op.cit.) "It was understood by all concerned that, militarily, in the struggle to survive, the less Arabs remaining behind and along the front lines, the better and, politically, the less Arabs remaining in the Jewish state, the better." (p. 289 op.cit.) There followed a well-documented campaign of terror against the Arabs to ethnically cleanse the future Jewish state.

Secondly, the claim of Morris that the Yishuv leadership was surprised is contradicted by himself. Why should this be, given Plan Dalet? As Morris notes, warnings were routinely issued to Arabs by Yishuv commanders to leave their homes and villages. Lt. Col. Yitzak Rabin issued an order on July 12 1948, "The inhabitants of Lydda must be expelled quickly without attention to age. ... Implement immediately." (Tikkun. p.19)
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B-5-JeC ... RSWDQ/edit
Why would the Yishuv leadership be surprised that their orders were being carried out?

You need to get on with the times, this is from Morris' 2004 edition:

...But there was no pre-war Zionist plan to expel ‘the Arabs’ from Palestine or the areas of the emergent Jewish State; and the Yishuv did not enter the war with a plan or policy of expulsion. Nor was the pre-war ‘transfer’ thinking ever translated, in the course of the war, into an agreed, systematic policy of expulsion. Hence, in the war’s first four months, between the end of November 1947 and the end of March 1948, there were no preparations for mass expulsion and there were almost no cases of expulsion or the leveling of villages; hence, during the following ten months, Haganah and IDF units acted inconsistently, most units driving out Arab communities as a matter of course while others left (Muslim as well as Christian and Druse) villages and townspeople in place; and hence, at war’s end, Israel emerged with a substantial Arab minority, of 150,000 (a minority that today numbers one million–and still constitutes (a restive and potentially explosive) one fifth of the State’s population).

At the same time, largely as a result of Arab belligerence and the Yishuv’s sense of siege, fragility and isolation, from early April 1948 on, ‘transfer’ was in the air and the departure of the Arabs was deeply desired on the local and national levels by the majority in the Yishuv, from Ben-Gurion down. And while this general will was never translated into systematic policy, a large number of Arabs were expelled, the frequency of expulsions and the expulsive resolve of the troops increasing following the pan-Arab invasion of mid-May 1948 that threatened the Yishuv with extinction. Yet, still, in July and again in October–November 1948, IDF troops continued to leave Arab communities in place; much depended on local circumstances and on the individual Israeli company, battalion and brigade commanders.

But if a measure of ambivalence and confusion attended Haganah\IDF treatment of Arab communities during and immediately after conquest, there was nothing ambiguous about Israeli policy, from summer 1948, toward those who had been displaced and had become refugees and toward those who were yet to be displaced, in future operations: Generally applied with resolution and, often, with brutality, the policy was to prevent a refugee return at all costs. And if, somehow, refugees succeeded in infiltrating back, they were routinely rounded up and expelled (though tens of thousands of ‘infiltrators’ ultimately succeeded in resettling and becoming Israeli citizens). In this sense, it may fairly be said that all 700,000 or so who ended up as refugees were compulsorily displaced or ‘expelled’. Yet it is also worth remembering that a large proportion of those who became refugees fled their towns and villages not under direct Israeli threat or duress. Tens of thousands –mostly from well-to-do and elite families –left the towns in the war’s early months because of the withdrawal of the British administration, the war-filled chaos that followed and the prospect of Jewish rule. And, in the following months, hundreds of thousands fled not under Jewish orders or direct coercion though, to be sure, most sought to move out of harm’s way as Zionist troops conquered town after town and district after district. And most probably believed that they would be returning home in a matter of months if not weeks, perhaps after the Arab armies had crushed Israel.

...

To what extent was the exodus up to June 1948 a product of Yishuv or Arab policy?

To be sure, the Haganah’s adoption and implementation during December 1947 –March 1948 of a retaliatory strategy against Arab militia bases –meaning villages and urban neighbourhoods –resulted in civilian flight. But the strategy, to judge from the documentation, was designed to punish, harm and deter militiamen, not to precipitate an exodus.

In early March, the prospect of pan-Arab invasion gave rise to Plan D. It accorded the Haganah brigade and battalion-level commanders carte blanche to completely clear vital areas of Arab population. Many villages served as bases for bands of irregulars; most had militias that periodically assisted the irregulars in attacks on settlements and convoys. During April–May, Haganah units, usually under orders from HGS, carried out elements of Plan D, each unit interpreting and implementing the plan as it saw fit in light of local circumstances. The Haganah offensives were in large measure responses to Arab attacks. In general, the Jewish commanders preferred to completely clear the vital roads and border areas of Arab communities –Allon in Eastern Galilee, Carmel around Haifa and in Western Galilee, Avidan in the south. Most villagers fled before or during the fighting. Those who stayed put were almost invariably expelled.

During April–June, neither the political nor military leaderships took a decision to expel ‘the Arabs’. As far as the available evidence shows, the matter was never discussed in the supreme decision-making bodies. But it was understood by all concerned that, militarily, in the struggle to survive, the fewer Arabs remaining behind and along the front lines, the better and, politically, the fewer Arabs remaining in the Jewish State, the better. At each level of command and execution, Haganah officers, in those April–June days when the fate of the State hung in the balance, simply ‘understood’ what was required in order to survive. Even most Mapam officers –ideologically committed to coexistence with the Arabs–failed to ‘adhere’ to the party line: Conditions in the field, tactically and strategically, gave precedence to immediate survival-mindedness over the long-term desirability and ethos of coexistence.

...

The months between the end of the First Truce (8 July) and the signing of the Israeli–Arab armistice agreements in spring–summer 1949 were characterised by short, sharp Israeli offensives interspersed with long periods of ceasefire. In these offensives, the IDF beat the Jordanian and Egyptian armies and the ALA in the Galilee, and conquered large parts of the territory earmarked by the UN for a Palestine Arab state. During and after these battles in July, October–November and December 1948 –January 1949, something like 300,000 more Palestinians became refugees.

Again, there was no Cabinet or IDF General Staff-level decision to expel. Indeed, the July fighting (the ‘Ten Days’) –the third stage of the exodus –was preceded by an explicit IDF General Staff order to all units and corps to refrain from destruction of villages and expulsions without prior authorisation by the Defence Minister. The order was issued as a result of the cumulative political pressure during the summer by various softline ministers on Ben-Gurion and, perhaps, was never intended to be taken too seriously. In any event, it was largely ignored.

But the overarching operational orders for operations Dekel, Dani, Yoav and Hiram –the main July–November offensives that resulted in Arab displacement –did not include expulsory clauses. However, from July onwards, there was a growing readiness in the IDF units to expel. This was at least partly due to the feeling, encouraged by the mass exodus from Jewish-held areas to date, that an almost completely Jewish State was a realistic possibility. There were also powerful vengeful urges at play –revenge for the Palestinian onslaught on the Yishuv during December 1947 –March 1948, the pan-Arab invasion of May–June, and the massive Jewish losses. In short, the Palestinians were being punished for having forced upon the Yishuv the protracted, bitter war that had resulted in the death of one, and the maiming of two, in every 100 in the Jewish population. The Arabs had rejected partition and unleashed the dogs of war. In consequence, quite understandably, the Yishuv’s leadership –left, centre and right –came to believe that leaving in place a large hostile Arab minority (or an Arab majority) inside the State would be suicidal. And driving out the Arabs, it emerged, was easy; generally they fled at the first whiff of grapeshot, their notables and commanders in the lead. Ben-Gurion said that this revealed a collective lack of backbone. In general, the advancing Haganah and IDF units were spared the need to face morally painful decisions to expel communities; to a large degree, Arab flight let the commanders off the moral hook, though, to be sure, many were subsequently, at the very least, troubled by the need to confront, and repel, would-be returnees.

Ben-Gurion clearly wanted as few Arabs as possible in the Jewish State. From early on he hoped that they would flee. He hinted at this in February 1948 and said so explicitly in meetings in August, September and October. But no expulsion policy was ever enunciated and BenGurion always refrained from issuing clear or written expulsion orders; he preferred that his generals ‘understand’ what he wanted. He probably wished to avoid going down in history as the ‘great expeller’ and he did not want his government to be blamed for a morally questionable policy. And he sought to preserve national unity in wartime.

But while there was no ‘expulsion policy,’ the July offensives were characterised by far more expulsions and, indeed, brutality than the first half of the war. Yet events varied from place to place. Ben-Gurion approved the largest expulsion of the war, from Lydda and Ramle, but, at the same time, IDF Northern Front, with Ben-Gurion’s authorisation, left mostly-Christian Nazareth’s population in place; the ‘Christian factor’ outgunned security and demographic concerns and was allowed to determine policy. And, in the centre of the country, three Arab villages sitting astride vital axes –Fureidis, Jisr az Zarka and Abu Ghosh –were allowed to stay, for economic and sentimental reasons.

Again, the IDF offensives in October–November –the fourth stage of the exodus –were marked by a measure of ambivalence in all that concerned the troops’ treatment of overrun civilian populations. In the south (‘Yoav’), where Allon was in command, almost no Arab civilians remained. Allon preferred Arab-clear rear areas and let his subordinates know what he wanted. In the north (‘Hiram’), where Carmel was in charge, the picture was varied. Many Arabs declined to budge, contrary to Ben-Gurion’s expectations. This was partly due to the fact that before October, the villagers had hardly been touched by the war or its privations. Again, Carmel’s hesitant, inexplicit expulsion orders, issued after the battles were over, contributed. So did the varied demographic make-up of the central-upper Galilee pocket. The IDF generally related far more benignly to Christians and Druse than to Muslims. Most Christian and Druse villagers stayed put and were allowed to do so. Many of the Muslim villagers fled; others were expelled. But many other Muslims–in Deir Hanna, ‘Arraba, Sakhnin, Majd al Kurum and other villages –stayed put, and were allowed to stay. Much depended on specific local factors.

During the following months, with the Cabinet in Tel Aviv gradually persuaded by Arab rhetoric and actions that the conflict would remain a central feature of the Middle East for many years, the IDF was authorised to clear Arab communities from Israel’s long, winding and highly penetrable borders to a depth of 5–15 kilometres. The result may be seen as ‘stage four and a half’ of the exodus. One of the aims was to prevent infiltration of refugees back to their homes. The IDF was also afraid of sabotage and spying. Early November saw a wave of IDF expulsions and transfers inland of villagers along the northern border. Some villagers, ordered out, were ‘saved’ by last-minute intervention by softline Israeli politicians. The following months and years saw other border areas cleared or partially cleared of Arab inhabitants.

The above doesn't suggest he believes the Zionists fought the war with a plan to expel the Arabs. On the contrary, what Morris is saying is that policy on the matter was made as time went by, and even then there was a lot of inconsistency on the matter, leaving much open to field commanders - including the very decision to expel Arabs. That's also why pugsville's attempt to claim that the events in Lydda and Ramla were representative of the overall Zionist policy are very misleading - for every Ramla and Lydda you can find a Nazareth.

And of course, in most cases Arabs fled - even in some instances in which the Zionists themselves asked them to stay put, as it occurred in Haifa in April 1948.

As for Plan Dalet, this is what it says regarding expulsion:

(b) Consolidation of Defense Systems and Fortifications

The following operations must be carried out if the fixed defensive system is to be effective and if the rear of this system is to be protected:

1. Occupation of police stations.6

2. Control of government installations and provision of services in each and every region.

3. Protection of secondary transportation arteries.

4. Mounting operations against enemy population centers located inside or near our defensive system in order to prevent them from being used as bases by an active armed force.

These operations can be divided into the following categories:

Destruction of villages (setting fire to, blowing up, and planting mines in the debris), especially those population centers which are difficult to control continuously.

Mounting search and control operations according to the following guidelines: encirclement of the village and conducting a search7 inside it. In the event of resistance, the. armed force must be destroyed and the population must be expelled outside the borders of the state.

The villages which are emptied in the manner described above must be included in the fixed defensive system and must be fortified as necessary.

In the absence of resistance, garrison troops will enter the village and take up positions in it or in locations which enable complete tactical control. The officer in command of the unit will confiscate all weapons, wireless devices, and motor vehicles in the village. In addition, he will detain all politically suspect individuals. After consultation with the [Jewish] political authorities, bodies will be appointed consisting of people from the village to administer the internal affairs of the village. In every region, a [Jewish] person will be appointed to be responsible for arranging the political and administrative affairs of all [Arab] villages and population centers which are occupied within that region.

The goals stated in the Plan are, however, defensive in nature:

( d) Operational Objectives

1. Self-defense against invasion by regular or semi-regular forces. This will be achieved by the following:

A fixed defensive system to preserve our settlements, vital economic projects, and property, which will enable us to provide governmental services within the borders of the state (based on defending the regions of the state on the one hand. and on blocking the main access routes from enemy territory to the territory of the state. on the other).

Launching pre-planned counter-attacks on enemy bases and supply lines in the heart of his territory. whether within the borders of the country [Palestine] or in neighboring countries.

2. Ensuring freedom of military and economic activity within the borders of the [Hebrew] state and in Jewish settlements outside its borders by occupying and controlling important high-ground positions on a number of transportation arteries.

3. Preventing the enemy from using frontline positions within his territory which can easily be used for launching attacks. This will be effected by occupying and controlling them.

4. Applying economic pressure on the enemy by besieging some of his cities in order to force him to abandon some of his activities in certain areas of the country.

5. Restricting the capability of the enemy by carrying out limited operations: occupation and control of certain of his bases in rural and urban areas within the borders of the state.

6. Controlling government services and property within the borders of the state and ensuring the supply of essential public services in an effective manner.

As for why Sasson was surprised about the exodus, why wouldn't he? Plan Dalet seems to have assumed that Arab civilians would generally stay put, though this isn't stated in the text as the assumptions deal with the behavior of militarized forces in the region rather than civilians.

[pugsville]

The wonder with Benny Morris is his sheer inability to draw the conclusion that his view of the evidence leads to,.

"Ben-Gurion clearly wanted as few Arabs as possible in the Jewish State. From early on he hoped that they would flee. He hinted at this in February 1948 and said so explicitly in meetings in August, September and October. But no expulsion policy was ever enunciated and BenGurion always refrained from issuing clear or written expulsion orders; he preferred that his generals ‘understand’ what he wanted. He probably wished to avoid going down in history as the ‘great expeller’ and he did not want his government to be blamed for a morally questionable policy. And he sought to preserve national unity in wartime"

* Ben Gurion wanted the Arabs out.
* Ben Gurion did not want any written or even clear oral orders recorded but operated on a nod and wink
* Ben had a Policy of expulsion he was careful to leave no documentary either written or oral. He wanted deniability.

[wat0n]

Ben Gurion wanted many things, but the truth is that it largely depended on the field commander. Since his wishes weren't translated into an order, it seems they used their judgement on that.

Furthermore, there was also strong opposition within the Cabinet, so commanders who simply refused to grant him his wishes could do so without worrying much - they'd just get a nod and wink from MAPAM ministers. That's also why the so-called transfer committees never took off - there was strong opposition within the Israeli government itself.

At last, it is also not so clear that Ben Gurion wanted this to be the result of expulsions - in fact, he saw that as an undesirable way of achieving demographic homogeneity for a host of reasons, which is why there was no pre-war plan to that effect and nodding and winking would not really help him to deal with the consequences either. That's also why he in particular was surprised to see that Palestinians simply weren't staying put in the first months of the war and regarded it as a historic chance.

[Zamuel]

As for why Sasson was surprised about the exodus, why wouldn't he? Plan Dalet seems to have assumed that Arab civilians would generally stay put, though this isn't stated in the text as the assumptions deal with the behavior of militarized forces in the region rather than civilians.

I'm afraid you're wasting your time on presenting facts and rational assessment of them. Certain people have decided that "Armed & Aggressive" Arabs = Refugees," Israeli defensive actions = "Executions," and "Voluntary Flight" = Expulsion. You're correct that the Israeli's assumed that the Arabs that wanted to leave had already done so. Many of the Arabs who remained had assumed they would never be threatened because Arab forces would overrun and slaughter the Jews in short order. An attitude that never really occurred to Israeli minds.

These "fuck the facts, death to Israel" posts illustrate that the problem still exists, and it's fairly easy to understand WHY the Israelis don't waste time responding to it any more. They've isolated the problem fairly well. Netanyahu was just reminding his people with his "Big Bad Mufti" story. Looks like it worked ...

Zam

[pugsville]

Ben Gurion wanted them gone, Ben Gurion was operating so as to not leave any real evidence. He was hinting and manipulating things so there were more expulsions than the military simply left to their own devices, It's quite clearly a policy of mass expulsion. It's not clear written out plan. It's not tidy and the results were mixed. But Ben Gurion was quite clearly enacting a policy, vague , slippery, but he had clear intent, there was a policy.

[wat0n]

Ben Gurion wanted them gone, Ben Gurion was operating so as to not leave any real evidence. He was hinting and manipulating things so there were more expulsions than the military simply left to their own devices, It's quite clearly a policy of mass expulsion. It's not clear written out plan. It's not tidy and the results were mixed. But Ben Gurion was quite clearly enacting a policy, vague , slippery, but he had clear intent, there was a policy.

I don't think that's how policy is generally formulated, much less when there's opposition within your Cabinet.

He even had trouble passing the actual policy of not allowing refugees to return unless as part of a peace agreement to be signed after the hostilities ended, which was itself a compromise with the MAPAM members of the Cabinet, and you think he was in a position to formulate a policy of wholesale expulsion? And this is disregarding the obvious foreign policy issues of such a policy.

Had evidence in the direction of a wholesale expulsion orders through winking and nodding emerged, MAPAM would have likely demanded that the Cabinet order it to stop or else leave Ben Gurion forced to enjoy forming a government with Begin.

[pugsville]

It's still 100% clear that Ben Gurion had a policy of encouraging the military forces to expel Palestinians for non-military reasons in order to adjust the demographics of the post war.

Ben Guroin conducted a policy of ethnic cleansing.


It's 100% inescapable conclusion from the very quotes you chose to post to support you case.

[layman]

Of course Israel ethnic cleansed though it was mostly the non-killing type.

Of course the arab forces that took villages in the 48 war expelled or killed all the jews too.

So we are back to the fact that the winner does more cleansing - shock!!

[pugsville]

There is an Israeli mythology of the 1948 war which is mostly wrong. They deny that there was much expulsion and the generally the Palestinians left or where told to by their leaders.(actually their Palestinians leadership mostly told them to stay) The reality is the Zionist forces were responsible for a large proportion of the refugees directly. Also it was the Israelis who invaded Palestine not the other way around, The Israelis also had military superiority in both numbers and equipment. Also not all Arab armies actually invaded at all, and their aims were mixed, with a large proportion involved in land grab and at the Palestinians expense rather than pushing Israel into the Sea. And afterwards each of the Arab regimes made some diplomatic move seeking peace (but via back channels not openly) which the Israeli leadership refused and kept quiet about, The Israeli mythology about 1948 has been very very successful. Even the Border war that followed, the Arab regimes tried mostly to stop Palestinian raids initially only changing when subject to brutal Israeli reprisals, and the Israeli offensive actions. The popularly accepted history is just wrong almost all the way down the line.

The Israelis go on about the most moral army in the world. They claim to be different and better.,
That said there is no shortage of bad behavior and while the Israelis were no angels neither was the other side. The History of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict they are many of all sides with plenty of innocent blood on their hands.

The Israeli mythology is used to make out that the Palestinians deserved what they got, that conflict is because the Palestinians are more violent , less civilized and behaved badly. There is an equally long record of Zionists terror, massacres and less civilized behavior.

The root cause of the conflict was Zionism. No people anywhere in the world would have behaved well when facing the installation of a foreign state intent on dispossession of the local population and suppressing their rights. To achieve the aims of Zionism the oppression and dispossession of the local population was absolutely required, and they were never going to take it well. It was always going to end in blood. The aims and goals of Zionism are very understandable and a fairly logical reaction to antisemitism, rejected by existing Nation states the appeal of forming their own is very understandable. But away from the abstract the only way to achieve Zionist goals was to break the golden rule (treat others as you wish to be treated yourself). A Zionist state could only be achieved by denying other people the very thing that Zionism was promising it's won people and expecting others to submit to something which you would not accept yourself.