They will probably become something like the Kurds in the north are politically.
I would bet against that. The are important differences here -
1. The Druze are nowhere near numerous enough to fight for their own state, they don't even have such ambitions, nor do they already have a quasi-state nearby that is ready to help them out, like the Kurds in the north do (with the Iraqi Kurdish region as well as PKK from the Turkish Kurdistan). If the Druze decide to go their own way, they will be all on their own as well, and that is just not something that they can afford really. They won't be able to defend themselves should the push come to shove, they need serious help.
2. The infancy of Rojava included the government peacefully ceding control over Kurdish territory to PYD along with weapons, and it did so for complex reasons - presumably because it realized that it could no longer maintain a solid presence alone in an area so far away from the capital, and because it wanted to create a distraction for the rebels and for Turkey to struggle with, in the form of Kurdish nationalism. Concerns like these do not exist in the Jabal al Druze region. It is very close to the capital - Damascus, and granting de-facto independence to the Druze is not likely to produce much of a headache either to the rebels or to Jordan which supports them - so why bother? According to one article, a Druze delegation recently went to Damascus to ask for just that sort of arrangement, they wanted to create their own autonomous militia with the help of the government weaponry. But Bashar gave them a cold shoulder. He said - either join the army, or NDF, or don't bother asking.
3. In war, either your country is neutral, or you create your own country that is neutral, or you are not neutral. And indeed, the Druze have not been neutral. They didn't join the rebellion, they allowed the government to use their territory as a base for shelling and bombing the neighboring rebel regions, they paid taxes, they voted in the presidential election, and indeed - many have joined the armed forces and even led the armed forces - some of the prominent regime generals are Druze. The rebels aren't just going to forget this.
4. Unlike the Syrian Kurds who are at least 99% Sunni, the Druze are of a different religion, which is often linked to Shi'ism as an added bonus. This automatically puts them at odds with all kinds of Sunni Islamists, be they radical or not so radical. I'm pretty sure that in choosing between Bashar and, say, Army of Islam, they'd prefer the former. Same with Ahrar ash-Sham. And the two groups I just listed were heavily involved in the brigade 52 offensive. And by the way, although Nusra apparently "no longer coordinates" with the Southern Front, they're still present in the south in pretty decent numbers. They are in fact an important component of the rebel southern frontline, and until they are physically expelled from the south, they're a significant long term threat to consider. Given that Nusra and other islamists (many from the FSA) have had such a huge problem with the Kurds from the very beginning and as you know they still do, (the Kurds had to fight to defend themselves initially from a Nusra-FSA onslaught) - it's hard to imagine that their treatment of the Druze would be any more tolerant.
Given the above, I'd bet against the Druze becoming their own autonomous region akin to the Kurds.
I guess bombing Ahrar/JaN in favor of ISIL is still objectively worse for the Syrian people
Yeah well, in addition to what Potemkin said, in my opinion no one sitting comfortably 2000 or 10000 kms away from Syria has either the capability or the right to determine what is and what isn't objectively worse for the Syrian people. Unfortunately, that's not a very popular opinion in the West at the moment. Perhaps when the collective military spending of NATO drops from the first place on earth to at least the second or the third, my opinion will become more popular. That'll probably happen about the same time as you get sick of hearing Beijing lecture you about what is and what isn't objectively good for Croatia, and send fleets and impose sanctions should the Croats happen to disagree.