Welcome to the forum! I hope this alternate view helps and feel free to ask for further clarification.
Here are a few other threads that you may also enjoy.
The South China Sea: a Global Power Play ~
A Growing PRC , Cause for Concern? &
SCS Conflict Analysis: The Economic Foundation of WarBIW wrote:1) The U.S justifies it's build-up in the SCS as a response to China's increased defense spending. How do they answer when asked (presumably) if they have a double standard when per capita spending is taken into account? I have never seen a U.S official asked this, yet alone answer. Yet it is the first thing anyone would notice. It reminds me of the Missile Crises when the U.S had missiles in Turkey but Cuba was unacceptable.
2) I understand why countries such as Viet Nam, Philippines et al want the U.S there as a counterweight to China's SCS claims, but is S Korea and Japan's concern strictly (and only) historical ? If so, does Japan address the issue that they were, in fact, the aggressor in WW2, or do they say that issue is irrelevant because they now have a very small military, compared to 1935?
3) A bit unrelated so thanks for your indulgence- I haven't read anywhere that justifies China's claim on Taiwan. In fact, I have seen just the opposite (they gave it over to the Japanese after the Japanese-Sino war and Mao confirmed it not being a part of China in 1935 though, true, he wasn't in power yet). So do they claim this as evidenced by their living on it throughout history i.e there was no treaty signing it over to them?
I am going to split each of these up into parts.
1.
A:
The U.S justifies it's build-up in the SCS as a response to China's increased defense spending.
This seems more of a declaration than a question. I would agree that the USA has concerns regarding China's increased defense spending, however that is only one small part of the build-up being seen in the SCS.
There are several groups of islands in the South China Sea. The Spratly Islands are claimed in whole or in part by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan. The Paracel Islands are claimed by China, Vietnam and Taiwan. Scarborough Reef and Macclesfield Bank are claimed by China, the Philippines and Taiwan. The Pratas Islands are claimed only by China and Taiwan.
This puts Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan at the forefront of an issue that China considers a "Core Issue"
China defines a core issue as: Territorial Sovereignty Is Indivisible.
If Chinese leaders see maritime sovereignty as indivisible from sovereignty over land territory, it follows that territorial disputes cannot remain unresolved indefinitely. China Needs Armed Strength to Seize Disputed Territories.
Accordingly, if the South China Sea is a core interest to be upheld under any circumstances, then China must amass the wherewithal to defeat outsiders’ efforts to make today’s status quo a permanent political reality. Beijing ultimately needs sufficient capacity to seize all disputed territories, whole and intact, while warding off adversaries intent on reversing Chinese gains.
China is positioning itself to take control of the SCS both militarily and economical. Besides for the economical repercussions that this would have for the USA this would drastically affect the members of ASEAN. China would be in control of not only the waters of the SCS but also of its natural resources and points of communication. This would be at the cost of all other members of ASEAN and would cripple all of the member Countries.
This would in effect make the whole of ASEAN dependant on China for most of their needs and therefore would be in control of their prosperity. Such control would allow China to use the member states of ASEAN as pawns in whatever capacity they desire, just as they are now doing with North Korea, Cambodia and Myanmar.
Then there is the issues involving Japan, South Korea and India.
This places America in the thick of the situation for several reasons.
Here is the official posture:
After observing that the United States has “extensive interests throughout East
and Southeast Asia” the 2006 National Security Strategy Statement of the United
States of America (NSSS) points to the need to have sustained U.S. engagement,
“maintaining robust partnerships supported by a forward defense posture supporting
economic integration through expanded trade and investment and promoting
democracy and human rights.” The NSSS also calls for institutional frameworks to
be built on “a foundation of sound bilateral relations with key states in the region.”
The NSSS also states that South and Central Asia constitute “a region of great
strategic importance where American interests and values are engaged as never
before.”
The USA is gathering forces in the SCS because of many reasons, among them are: Freedom of navigation, to ensure
sea-container shipping commerce and major Sea Lines of Communication. (
SLOC)
Right of passage is important to the USA in this area, as losing free passage would separate the 7th fleet with the 5th fleet and would reduce the ability of International emergency response in the SCS and surrounding areas.
Then there is the natural resources in the area and though this does not normally include America, it does effect them via various treaties that it holds with several Countries in the area.
These treaties take many forms, the main ones to consider are as follows: Peace - Friendship - Commerce and Navigation, Relations Act's and Mutual Defense Treaties.
Since the USA holds said treaties, with every single Country involved with almost all aspects of the SCS situation, it stands to reason that there would be extensive US involvement.
Brunei Relations between the United States and Brunei date from the 1800s. On April 6, 1845, the USS Constitution visited Brunei. The two countries concluded a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in 1850, which remains in force today.
This particular agreement and others of its type, are not of a defensive nature but all have this clause "This Agreement may be amended at any time by written mutual consent of the Parties."
This shows a long standing cooperation between these Nations and gives credence to answering their call of need.
Malaysia,
Agreement relating to eligibility for United States military assistance and training pursuant to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.
Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (U.S.–Philippines 1952) South East Asia Collective Defense (U.S. - France - Australia - New Zealand - Thailand - Philippines, 1955)
Several of the Islands in question outlying this area actual are owned by the USA, [url]TREATY BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATE FOR CESSION OF OUTLYING ISLANDS OF THE PHILIPPINES[/url]. (San Francisco Peace Treaty)
The only one that really matters is the one in dispute, that being the Scarborough Shoal.
Vietnam Treaty of amity and economic relations. Agreement relating to investment guaranties under section 413 (b)(4) of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as amended. Agreement relating to the disposition of equipment and materials furnished by the United States found surplus to the needs of the Vietnamese armed forces. Agreement relating to Viet-Nam as supplementary military assistance.
Taiwan Taiwan Relations Act.
Japan U.S.-Japan (Mutual Defense Treaty, 1960)
South Korea .U.S.-Republic of Korea (Mutual Defense Treaty, 1954)
India Agreement relating to military assistance. Exchange of notes at New Delhi January 13, 1965 Entered into force January 13, 1965.
16 UST 33; TIAS 5753; 541 UNTS 107. and the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership.
These treaties are in place and are kept ready via yearly drills, respectively: Talisman Sabre with Australia, Balikatan with the Philippines, Keen Sword/Keen Edge with Japan and Cobra Gold in Thailand and Rim of the Pacific with multiple Nations.
B:
How do they answer when asked (presumably) if they have a double standard when per capita spending is taken into account?
I have outlined above how China's increased defense spending is only part of the matter, a small part even, thus I think that per capita spending should be of little consequence.
C:
I have never seen a U.S official asked this, yet alone answer.
Of course the US could not answer an unasked question..
D:
Yet it is the first thing anyone would notice. It reminds me of the Missile Crises when the U.S had missiles in Turkey but Cuba was unacceptable.
The US had agreed to withdraw the Jupiter missiles in Turkey in exchange for the Soviet missiles not to be placed in Cuba. The project was agreed on and was already underway when the Soviet ships headed to Cuba. Kennedy was understandably alarmed that the Jupiter missiles were already, or in the process of, being noncomed while Russia was preparing a new strike location.
2:
A:
I understand why countries such as Viet Nam, Philippines et al want the U.S there as a counterweight to China's SCS claims, but is S Korea and Japan's concern strictly (and only) historical?
South Korea and Japan have combined interests in this area, the first being the Japan-Korea Joint Development Zone. The basis of their claims revolve around 2 points in the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
Article 74 wrote:Delimitation of the exclusive economic zone
between States with opposite or adjacent coasts
1. The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with
opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of
international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time,
the States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV.
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States
concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every
effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during
this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final
agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final
delimitation.
4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned,
questions relating to the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone shall be
determined in accordance with the provisions of that agreement.
&
Article 83 wrote:Delimitation of the continental shelf
between States with opposite or adjacent coasts
1. The delimitation of the continental shelf between States with
opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of
international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time,
the States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part XV.
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States
concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every
effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during
this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final
agreement. Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final
delimitation.
4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned,
questions relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf shall be
determined in accordance with the provisions of that agreement.
The UN has made a ruling in a similar matter issued on 17 September 2007 regarding Guyana/Surinam.
The outcome boiled down to: There exists an obligation for parties to make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature. This obligation is designed to promote interim regimes and practical measures that could pave the way for provisional utilization of disputed areas pending delimitation. In the view of the Tribunal, this obligation constitutes an implicit acknowledgment of the importance of avoiding the suspension of economic development in a disputed maritime area, as long as such activities do not affect the reaching of a final agreement.
These findings and the spirit of the other articles in the Law of the Sea show the same overall slant towards the party showing the least aggression.
As for their actual claims:
The only reason any island group, shoal, reef or other raised area is a matter of importance, is the economic areas and resource advantages given within 200 nautical miles of them, thus allowing for deep seabed mining and other marine technologies.
Japan and South Korea do share coasts with each other and a few economic and regional maritime ares do overlap, of course China disputes all these areas as their soul province and conflicts ensue.
One such conflict is cover the Northern part of the East sea between China, Japan and South Korea. The conflict started in regards to the 1998 Agreement on the 28th of November, on Fisheries between South Korea and Japan establishing a Joint Fishery Zone between them.
China opposed that Agreement but it came into force on the 22nd of January 1999.
B:
If so, does Japan address the issue that they were, in fact, the aggressor in WW2, or do they say that issue is irrelevant because they now have a very small military, compared to 1935?
I do not see how this applies in the given situation. Could you please show a correlation?
3:
A:
A bit unrelated so thanks for your indulgence- I haven't read anywhere that justifies China's claim on Taiwan. In fact, I have seen just the opposite (they gave it over to the Japanese after the Japanese-Sino war and Mao confirmed it not being a part of China in 1935 though, true, he wasn't in power yet). So do they claim this as evidenced by their living on it throughout history i.e there was no treaty signing it over to them?
This is a difficult
issue, mostly because China makes it one. China claims that Taiwan's sovereignty was transferred to China during the San Francisco Peace Treaty, but neither the PRC nor ROC was a signatory to any such treaty, making the treaties irrelevant with regard to Chinese claims.
Since that issue was not going well, China switched gears and went to the Treaty of Taipei. China makes the claim that said treaty also transferred sovereignty of Taiwan to it, however the US State Dept. disagreed with such an interpretation in its 1971 Starr Memorandum and the UN backed it.
Past that, Taiwan had been de jure part of Japan when the ROC was established in 1912 and thus was not part of the Chinese republic. Furthermore, they point out that the Instrument of Surrender of Japan was no more than an armistice, a "modus vivendi" in nature, which served as a temporary or provisional agreement that would be replaced with a peace treaty.
Therefore, only a military occupation of Taiwan began on October 25, 1945, and both the Treaty of San Francisco and Treaty of Taipei hold legal supremacy over the surrender instrument.
These treaties did not transfer the title of Taiwan from Japan to China.
According to this argument, the sovereignty of Taiwan was returned to the people of Taiwan when Japan renounced sovereignty of Taiwan in the
Treaty of San Francisco in 1951, based on the policy of self-determination which has been applied to "territories which detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War" as defined by article 76b and 77b of the United Nations Charter and also by the protocol of the Yalta Conference.
According to International laws regarding war time occupation, Taiwan was in the possession of Japan during the time of the USA's occupation, this then would bring Taiwan legally under US jurisdiction.
That case is still pending a final outcome with the UN.