- 08 Sep 2011 01:47
#13793565
I know this thread has been kind of dead for a while, but since it's still in the top 10, I might as well share my analysis.
I think at the root of the collapse was the inadequacy of the socialist system in fulfilling the needs of a modern state. I don't claim to know why exactly it failed (and here, if someone can fill in for me, please do so), but I do think that its failure was clearly manifest. The collapse of the state occurred when the system hit a dead end and there was simply no other way out.
The economic problems seem to have begun as early as 1960s, when the growth began to slow and various attempts at market-oriented economic reforms were made (e.g. the Liberman reform). For the most part, these attempts were short lived, silently abandoned due to the (legitimate) fear of destabilizing capitalist influence on the integrity of the state, as well as its ideological inconsistency with the Soviet doctrine. The reforms that were carried out were far insufficient and led to very short term gains. In 1970s the problems began to rapidly accumulate. Economic growth slowed again and in some Warsaw pact nations even sank into the negative by the end of the decade. In places where economic growth persisted, it did so at the cost of further declining labour efficiency and rising economic imbalances. The agricultural sector, for example, was a complete mess, requiring the largest grain basket in the world to import food from the West rather than being able to feed itself. The economic planning and distribution system began to visibly malfunction, causing critical shortages in many sectors, particularly consumer goods, leading to the infamous queues at product stores. As a consequence, the influence of the black market began to rapidly rise, creating a shadow economy and further depriving the state of the means of accurate economic monitoring and control. A radical reform or collapse of the system might have occurred right there and then, had it not been for the highly favorable international situation in the 1970s. The economic problems in the OECD countries (which were not anywhere near as severe as the Soviet problems, but they were problems nonetheless) as well as the social backlash of the Vietnam/Algeria wars allowed the Soviets to reach a detente with the West, giving them the opportunity to avoid having to engage in particularly costly arms races or military adventures. At the same time, the rising prices on raw materials, particularly oil, thanks to the Arab oil embargo and later the Iranian revolution, allowed the Soviets to continue exporting their main naturally abundant commodity and maintain a semblance of economic tranquility and even growth. When even that became insufficient in the 1980s, the eastern bloc countries resorted to the humiliating practice of excessive capital borrowing from the Paris Club of the OECD. Unlike China or Vietnam, for the Soviet leaders it was clear that Marxism was the very foundation of the state, without which the state could not exist. Therefore, they did their utmost to avoid having to face the reality that their ideology was going bankrupt.
In the meantime, the ethics of the population shifted. These could be partly blamed on the seeping cultural influence of the West, which physically could not be entirely contained, as well as on the natural changes in the human environment, such as the lengthening of lifetimes, rising cost of education and of labour, slowing rate of population growth, general improvement in literacy and wellbeing of the population, etc. This change in ethics had many practical implications for the eastern bloc, such as the decline of the revolutionary zeal and trust in state institutions, rising cynicism, rising value of human life, increasing individualism, and nationalism. All these things could be equally said of the capitalist world as well, and the capitalist world struggled with all of them in the same time period - some even predicted a crisis of democracy. But ultimately, it turned out to be much better equipped at dealing with them than the socialist East. When combined with the economic failures of the East, the results of the changing ethics were particularly disastrous as they led to rapidly increasing cronyism, bribery, alcoholism, and a general disrespect for the State and its ideology, exemplified by the large number of political jokes which emerged during that time period, all pointing to the inadequacy of the socialist order. There weren't nearly as many biting political jokes during the Khrushchev's Thaw.
Even the military situation progressively worsened. Every new war plan drawn up by NATO perceived less and less threat from the Warsaw Pact. If in the beginning of the Cold War, the Allies could only realistically hope to halt the Soviet invasion with the use of nuclear weapons, by the 1980s, they were much more confident in their ability to not only halt but repel the Communist forces using conventional weaponry. There was a relatively high demand for Soviet weaponry among countries who could not afford to buy western equipment for economic or political reasons, but the combat performance of the Soviet weapons was for the most part sub-par. Furthermore, the rise of nationalism and individualism meant that the Soviet state could no longer hope to maintain control of any territory by military means alone. If in 1956 it was possible for the Soviet army to enter Budapest alone and take control of the country despite active public resistance, in the 1980s this would have been a suicide mission. The troops would refuse to fire, the resistance would be overwhelming, the domestic pressure would be great, and the international outrage would be unbearable. Already in the year 1980, the Soviet KGB under Andropov admitted that the practice of armed intervention in the near abroad was effectively over as the consequence of intervention would be a total disaster. This was the real end of the Warsaw Pact, from there on it was just a matter of time.
So, on all fronts - in military, economic, and social spheres, the Warsaw Pact states (as well as USSR-aligned Yugoslavia) in the 1960s/1970s were losing control and rotting on the inside, all the while trying to maintain the appearance of normality. The Soviet Union was a paper tiger, and this became obvious in early 1980s, when the OECD countries began quickly recovering from their economic troubles and jumping back into the Cold War with fresh energy. The oil prices collapsed, the national debt began to reach worrying levels, while the arms race gained new momentum, and add to it all, the Soviets had a misfortune of getting stuck in a costly and bloody mess in Afghanistan. The Warsaw Pact economies were about to enter a deep recession, and the only possible end to the recession was radical reform. To avoid a catastrophic economic collapse, the communist states urgently needed more western credit and economic assistance. They could not afford any confrontation that could lead to even minor sanctions or armed conflicts against NATO-backed agents. Therefore, the Cold War was over. Now, with no more Cold War and no more Warsaw Pact, what is left? The USSR itself. But like the others, it simply could not afford pissing off the West, plus, as mentioned before, its army had become incapable of enforcing order in areas where it was not wanted. And in the circumstances of economic downfall, ideological bankruptcy, and the lack of credible Soviet military threat - there was nothing left that could tie the Soviet republics together in a union. All the Soviet Republics and their formerly socialist leaders saw this. Therefore, all the republics richer than Russia, especially those on its western border, began to quickly pursue independence and demand entry to the safe heavens of the EU and NATO. The republics poorer than Russia, close to it culturally, or far away geographically from EU and NATO could still be persuaded to stay in, but why would Russia want this kind of union? The union of 8 poor nations leaching on to and demanding subsidy from the Russian economy, while flooding it with immigrants and having an absolutely disproportionate degree of control over its politics (e.g. equal representation for each republic in the upper house of Soviet parliament regardless of their population, territory, or economic size) - it's the last thing the Russian people wanted. It's the last thing any country would want. Therefore, when it became clear that there was simply nothing the Union authorities could do to convince the richer republics to stay in, Russia silently declared itself independent and the Soviet Union was over. Russia then actually encouraged many states to adopt separate currencies, border controls, and militaries, as soon as possible.
Notice that I used very few actual names of prominent political figures in my analysis. That is because I don't believe that particular leaders were of much importance to this. What happened had to happen, regardless of what any particular individual wanted. Unfortunately, I don't think that the Soviet Union had a chance of survival even if the radical economic reforms had been introduced much sooner. Maybe though, at least the post-collapse economic hardship might have been not as painful as that of 1990s.