[Smilin' Dave]

IDF crossing plan targets are to encircle the 2nd & 3rd armies.

There you go confusing strategy and tactics again. Note that I said Israel, not the IDF. Israeli national goals tend to trump IDF designs.

am limiting my post to the exact 1973 war & its direct resulting negotiations events.

So you don't think IDF withdrawal and the tenuous position of 3rd army figure into that? Arbitrary boundaries of discussion are weak to begin with, but yours don't even invalidate what I stated.

Direct negotiation was approved to be done between Military representatives. Sadat clearly stated prior to these that Egypt was going to open routes of resupply by force to its cut-off 3rd army if IDF plans a seige. IDF permitted resupply to the 3rd army on the 27th of OCT. So the cutting off of the supplies lasted only for 3 days. This actually reflects IDF assessment regarding the resuming of the War activities.

Amazing. You didn't mention Hafez Ismail (and you can't factor out the Egyptian government, since they were the ones to make final negotiations) at all. You also seem to assume that Sadat wishing something to be so (resupply of 3rd Army) automatically makes it a fact. You again seem to skip over facts that don't suit you and again your own course of events doesn't quite add up.

Israel seeked political goals out of the crisis with Egypt were the following:-
- Egypt should commence in re-construction of Canal cities ( to assure the end of hostile activites & create a good shield againest war).
- Egypt should delete the War status with Israel.
- Egypt should permit Israel suez canal crossing.
- Egypt should cancel the commercial, political boycot of Israel.

You have missed the most blindingly obvious point, which is physical security. Israel ultimately demonstrated in the peace negotiations that what it wanted most from Egypt was peace and stability of it's southern border.

transfer of the initiative to the Egyptian side

Egypt lost the military initiative when Israel crossed the Canal (more correctly initiative was lost when Sadat decided he had to help Syria out). The diplomatic initiative probably fell to the U.S and the Soviet Union more than anyone else. So I don't see how you can claim Egypt had the initiative.

It is not only two sections.

All the more reason why your claim that it was 'pro-Israeli' rings hollow.

It is the final war conclusion about the war by US official analysts. Further western identical war conclusions exist for your reference if needed.

Are you perhaps planning to make an 'eastern' conclusion of similar academic value available to us (Dupuy hardly being an eastern perspective)? Or are you simply content to deride any material you didn't provide as biased.

I am strictly objective.

This is demonstrably untrue, considering your continued evasion of events that don't conform to your desired line. You haven't even demonstrated full knowledge of the other side of the conflict.

Provide your reasons & sources for proving the opposite if you are not guessing.

My sources on your behaviour are your posts and I have shown my reasoning. To claim otherwise is just another example of your willful ignorance to facts that you find inconvinient.

[Sayed Zakerya]

There you go confusing strategy and tactics again. Note that I said Israel, not the IDF. Israeli national goals tend to trump IDF designs

Your post asking for goals was in response to my statement regarding the Egyptian Army War goals. Her is your demand:-

In attempting to portray a total Egyptian victory, you have compared objectives with results (good move). You however have not done this from the Israeli perspective.

Actually, the way I answered you is more related to the War than your new request.

You didn't mention Hafez Ismail (and you can't factor out the Egyptian government, since they were the ones to make final negotiations) at all

Havez Ismaeil was Sadats advisor. He made several negotiations with US personal & Kissinger. He never attended Egyptian/Israeili negotiation.

You also seem to assume that Sadat wishing something to be so (resupply of 3rd Army) automatically makes it a fact. You again seem to skip over facts that don't suit you and again your own course of events doesn't quite add up.

In addition to Sadats threat, the respective forces positions on ground, caused the re-opening of the routes of suuply after 3 days of its closure by IDF.

You have missed the most blindingly obvious point, which is physical security. Israel ultimately demonstrated in the peace negotiations that what it wanted most from Egypt was peace and stability of it's southern border.

Prior to 1973 War, Israel turned down all the peace offers that was submitted by Egypt which included Stability & buffer zones. During that time Israel was building Settelments & harbours in Sinai.One of IDF defeat reasons in that war is that they never believed that Egypt will attack them. They thought they are secured intheir fortifications on the canal shore which was defined by Dayan as " Safest natural defence line in history". Israel stand prior to the war is unmistakenly summarized as " no need for any agreements, we feel ultimate secure".
Egyptian army crossed the canal & demolished the line with its defenders together with Israel security.

This is demonstrably untrue, considering your continued evasion of events that don't conform to your desired line. You haven't even demonstrated full knowledge of the other side of the conflict.

My sources on your behaviour are your posts and I have shown my reasoning. To claim otherwise is just another example of your willful ignorance to facts that you find inconvinient.

These are closed empty circuits of accusations & claims that you are deriving againest my posts without sound argument.

[Smilin' Dave]

Your post asking for goals was in response to my statement regarding the Egyptian Army War goals.

Yet the text you quoted specifically refers to Israel, a state, not the IDF, a military body. My intention was perfectly clear.

Actually, the way I answered you is more related to the War than your new request.

You can't divorce the war from the resulting peace that easily (which isn't a new concept I introduced, I've been fairly consistant on that point). Particularly since the Egyptians started the war with later peace negotiations in mind. You also continue to evade the simple fact that 3rd Army was effectively cut off when hostilities ended, which is not a military victory for the Egyptians, which spoils your war victory thesis.

Havez Ismaeil was Sadats advisor. He made several negotiations with US personal & Kissinger. He never attended Egyptian/Israeili negotiation.

Maybe there is a misunderstanding here, but Ismail was a government representative. Hence why government negoitations were raised and why your original point about initial military ceasefire negotiations were not really relevant.

In addition to Sadats threat, the respective forces positions on ground, caused the re-opening of the routes of suuply after 3 days of its closure by IDF.

Again you ignore fairly overt pressure by the US for the Israelis to re-open supply. In turn US pressure was partly prompted by the threat of Soviet intervention (hence my later point on who had the initiative). Israel did not allow supplies through due to a threat of military force, otherwise why would they allow the resupply of yet another military threat in the form of the 3rd Army?

Out of interest, what forces did Saddat have left on the west bank of the Sinai to effect such a breakthrough?

Prior to 1973 War, Israel turned down all the peace offers that was submitted by Egypt which included Stability & buffer zones.

This point still doesn't mitigate the fact that you ignored/neglected to mention physical security in Israeli strategic objectives. If Israel had only wanted political and economic objectives as you suggested, why would it have bothered to continue to occupy the Sinai in the first place?

Further, in what sense was Egypt genuinely offering stability during the War of Attrition, which was during this earlier negotiation period? Nor could the offer of a buffer zone be taken seriously in context of the collapse of buffer zones in the lead up to 1967.

Egyptian army crossed the canal & demolished the line with its defenders together with Israel security.

But Israeli security wasn't as utterly demolished as the Bar Lev Line, was it? Israel had demonstrated by the end of the war it could still hold its own (if not win a decisive victory) in a two front war. By crossing the Canal Israel also demonstrated it could still launch an effective offensive, which was the cornerstone of their operational/stratgic view.

These are closed empty circuits of accusations & claims that you are deriving againest my posts without sound argument.

You keep saying this, but provide no evidence or logic in support. You are correct in that it is a closed circuit of sorts, but I don't have any other material from which to draw my conclusions. Lack of sources shouldn't prevent enquiry into a subject.

Well on the upside at least in your latest post you dropped the ridiculous claims of academic bias.

[Sayed Zakerya]

In 1972, Golda Meir said there is no such thing as Palestinians.


The above photo shows IDF soldiers seeking shelter with two Egyptian POW (Hands held behind their backs)

This article is Published in Israeli Haartz Newspaper http://info.jpost.com/C003/Supplements/30YK/art.25.html

’The fact that society insisted on calling it a defeat is because it shattered a lot of the dreams and fantasies Israelis had about their own society following the Six Day War, as well as the notion that somehow Jews were safe here,’

The war, argues reserve colonel Ya’acov Hisdai, a military investigator for the Agranat Commission that investigated the Yom Kippur War, put an end to the ’Israeli-ness’ that was so dominant up to that time.
’The Israeli self-confidence, the optimism, the feeling of the justice of the cause, all that fell apart on Yom Kippur,’ he says

Hebrew University psychology professor Amia Lieblich, whose book Tin Soldiers on Jerusalem Beach dealt to a large extent with the effects of the war on soldiers, says the war ’made us more vulnerable, more believing that something bad could happen here.
’Something very basic in society broke down,’ she says, ’our view that our strengthcan prevent all bad.’

’The debate over the morality of holding the territories only began in earnest after the 1973 war, says Hisdai. In the years between 1967 and 1973, he says, only a few people on the extreme Left — such as Yeshayahu Leibowitz — questioned the morality of holding on to the territories. In 1972, Golda Meir said there is no such thing as Palestinians. These questions were not raised at all. After ’73 they were raised with a passion.’ WHILE the war ended the dreams and fantasies many Jews had held beforehand, it bred new ones to replace the old.

These are parts of the results of the Egyptian Army Victory in 1973.

[Oxymoron]

These are parts of the results of the Egyptian Army Victory in 1973.

I love it how the Egyptians fail to realise they were fighting part of the IDF, and that the fighting came to a standstill even after the Egyptians had the full element of suprise on their side. Yes the Egyptians managed to gain their territory back barelly,for which they had to deal with Israel and sigh a lasting peace deal. The Egyptians managed to gain back some sort of manhood, after they were owned in the six day war but to claim victory is just lying.

[Sayed Zakerya]

Oxymoron states

The Egyptians managed to gain back some sort of manhood, after they were owned in the six day war but to claim victory is just lying

Oxy.,beside being Zionism supporter, I do not know your background. The following Well known Military Historian Trevor N. Dupuy, statement in his valuable book "Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974" may be useful for you:-

if war is the employment of military force in support of political objectives, there can be no doubt that in strategic and political terms the Arab States - and particularly Egypt - won the war, even though the military outcome was a stalemate permitting both sides to
claim military victory.

love it how the Egyptians fail to realise they were fighting part of the IDF

What a wrong excuse. After the 9th of Oct. Egyptian army was fighting against huge replacements of weapon & men that was performed by US. Here is a US document describing the events
Operation Nickel Grass
Airlift in Support of National Policy
Capt Chris J. Krisinger, USAF

The airlift to Israel lasted 32 days. Though not as large as the Berlin airlift, which carried more than 2 million tons of supplies to that city, the US airlift of 22,305 tons to Israel was impressive, nevertheless.
The C-141s flew 421 missions to Israel, delivering 11,632 tons of equipment and supplies, while the C-5s flew 145 missions and delivered 10,673 tons of cargo. Some 48 percent of the total tonnage was moved on Galaxy flights, yet they flew only 25 percent of the missions.

The Soviet airlift to Arab allies pales in comparison: Best estimates of the Soviet effort were that their 935 missions, over a distance of 1,700 miles, moved in about 15,000 tons during a 40-day period.

In short, MAC airlifted one-fourth more cargo with a little more than one-half the missions over a route that was three times greater.

The effectiveness of US support was not inly due to the volume of replacements but the closeness of the landing airports to the fighting fields as well ( Al Arish airport located 100 Kms away of the front was deployed). Added to the above parameters, the classified types of the transported supplies added to the value of Nickel Grass operqation

Another example of the impact of the airlift on the war was the effectiveness of the TOW and Maverick missiles. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency, these weapons were responsible for the majority of Israeli tank kills (Arab losses were estimated at 1,900 tanks during the war). Since the TOW and Maverick were not present in the Israeli inventory in any significant numbers before the war began, it is apparent that the missiles delivered by airlift the difference

Israel Can not win a war by spreading Propaganda. Facts remain solid & challenging.

[Oxymoron]

What a wrong excuse. After the 9th of Oct. Egyptian army was fighting against huge replacements of weapon & men that was performed by US. Here is a US document describing the events
Operation Nickel Grass
Airlift in Support of National Policy
Capt Chris J. Krisinger, USAF

Right because the Egyptian army magically regained strenght in less then a decade gained new AA systems,training,tanks,anti tank weapons. I mean it had nothing to do with the USSR nothing at all.

Not only did the Egyptians have superior arms and more of them, they had the element of suprise, and caught Israel during its most holy of holy days, while the Syrians attacked from another front.

If any one won politically it was Israel securing peace with Egypt and Jordan, and scarying the shit out of the Syrians who didnt sign a peace treaty but never even thought about attacking Israel again.

[Igor Antunov]

Israel achieved a hollow victory.

That is to say they ultimately won but at the same time any benefits that could have been gained from their victory were taken away from them by the superpowers at the time. So the agressors got off scott free and got to show that israels military wasn't invincible at least initially when caught with it's pants down.

It was a military victory but without the political victory to go with it, since that was denied to them.

Having said that egypt and it's allies didn't achieve any sort of tangible victory, besides maybe some moral reinforcement for being able to at least once conduct an attack and win the intial few battles. (The fact that it was surprise that helped them most in this endeavour should take nothing away from the arabs, since surprise is a valid and critical element of war-besides war isn't meant to be fair).

[Sayed Zakerya]

Israel achieved a hollow victory.

what are your reasons to maintain such a result??. How on earth an army looses his positions over 180 Km length front ( canal shores) but you strongly describe this as Victory.
A War that ended with the Dismissal of , Israel prime minister, Defense minister, Chief of staff, Intelligence chief, Intelligence deputy chief & South front commander but you call this a victory for Israel. How subjective.
(Review Agranat commission decisions.)

[Smilin' Dave]

Since you have dredged up this thread Sayed Zakerya, you can address my last post. Otherwise comments like:

How on earth an army looses his positions over 180 Km length front ( canal shores) but you strongly describe this as Victory.

Holds absolutely no water. You seem to add nothing new, repeat the same misleading point, continue to rely on a fairly limited base of evidence and close by insisting your facts are somehow superior.

[starman2003]

A few comments on above posts: Mendler did not die on the 8th. He was killed on the 13th, by Egyptian fire. The IDF failed to take the Talata or Missouri position on the 21st, but by then it had widened the corridor significantly, having overrun the Chinese Farm (does anyone else have the wargame by that title btw? ).
Militarily Egypt lost but it's important to emphasize that this defeat was not inevitable; it was mainly due to the extremely poor strategic "leadership" of Sadat. Flying in the face of near unanimous expert advice, he forced the Egyptian army into disaster on the 14th. That, and two other blunders, led directly to defeat. Had Shazly made he decisions from the 6th onward, Egypt would've fared much better.

[Sayed Zakerya]

then it had widened the corridor significantly, having overrun the Chinese Farm (does anyone else have the wargame by that title btw?

what it the width of the corridor after widening ?. If Missory has no threat on the passage then why was the insistance of occupying it?

Militarily Egypt lost

State your reasons for this opinion in view of the war results.

it was mainly due to the extremely poor strategic "leadership" of Sadat. Flying in the face of near unanimous expert advice, he forced the Egyptian army into disaster on the 14th.

The 14th assault was executed mainly by one armoured division the 21st & small support by the 4th armoured division. The total Egyptian tanks losses including that day was still less than IDF tanks losses from the 6th till the 14th. Is this what you call Egyptian army disaster? It is much more less in results than IDF 8th of October counter attack disaster. At the end of the 8th of october , IDF realized it will not be able to push the Egyptian army to the west across the canal. This is the moment marking the IDF strategy plan change against the Egyptian army in that War. The effort was now changed to concentrating attacks to fullfill a break through to cross the canal & surround both the 2nd & 3rd egyptian armies. IDF did not expect the forces ground locations that were resulted by the War end.

[starman2003]

According to Rabinovich the corridor was widened to about five miles following the partial Egyptian pullback on Missouri after the battle on the 21st. Not every Israeli thought Missouri should be taken; Sharon felt it was unnecessary and a waste of his forces.
Militarily Egypt lost because its casualties/tank/jet etc losses were greater, it suffered a net loss of territory and its 7th and 19th divisions were isolated on the east bank.
Shazly himself completely opposed the attack on the 14th, which was more costly to Egypt than Israel's setback on the 8th. According to Rabinovich the two failed attacks near Hizayon cost only about 20 tanks; total Egyptian losses on the 14th were about ten times greater.

[Sayed Zakerya]

According to Rabinovich the corridor was widened to about five miles following the partial Egyptian pullback on Missouri after the battle on the 21st. Not every Israeli thought Missouri should be taken;

This is exactly the reason behind IDF general command centre insistence to occupy Missori. Any type of Egyptian artillery can vanish anything moving through this passage. As this passage was the only pass of the logistic supplies from Sinai to Israel 3 armored divisions west of the Canal, yu may understand the critical status of these divisions in case of any Egyptian counter attack.

Not every Israeli thought Missouri should be taken; Sharon felt it was unnecessary and a waste of his forces.

Sharon was a division commander in the War. The war planning was executed by the Central command staff which insisted on clearing Missouri for the abve reasons. Sharon is considered by many analysts as responsible for the waste of many territories to the Egyptian army & the loss of many IDF soldiers lives for a little gain.

hazly himself completely opposed the attack on the 14th, which was more costly to Egypt than Israel's setback on the 8th. According to Rabinovich the two failed attacks near Hizayon cost only about 20 tanks; total Egyptian losses on the 14th were about ten times greater.

Sorry. What do you mean with 20 Tanks? The 8th of October marks the loss of 300 IDF tanks that brought the total IDF tank losses to 400 in the War first 3 days. Together with the severe man loss, IDF rate this day as the worst in IDF history. Here are paragraphs of Oballance book describing that day:-








Also Dr Gawrich Book [ The ararb Israeli 1973 book] that was published by US army centre of military history:-






In addition her is Eyal Wiesman lecture
http://urban.cccb.org/urbanLibrary/html ... 024-C.html


I hope now the events of the 8th are clearer to you .The 14th was a set back for the Egyptian Army ( No as the 8th for IDF) but it did not steal its accomplishments.

[starman2003]

Egyptian artillery harrassed IDF troops and supplies in the crossing area, inflicting considerable losses, but it was still not decisive. Egypt no longer had much ability to counterattack the crossing area after the disastrous failures of the 17th, in which the 21st armored division was badly mauled and the 25th brigade practically destroyed.
Sharon has been credited with the initial probing which discovered the unguarded area in the 16th division's deployment just south of Tirtur road. His brigades also handily repelled the 21st's 14th and 1st brigades on the 14th, depriving the Second Army of the strength it needed to decisively resist the subsequent crossing operation.
I think Adan's total losses on the 8th were about 50 tanks; those lost near Hizayon weren't all that day. But even if Israeli losses in tanks on the 8th were 80 or more, that was still less than the 180 knocked out October 6-7 (according to Rabinovich).
By the way, do you post in the Egypt subforum of the Iran defense forum? Plenty of interesting Egyptians--and Israelis-there. You may also wish to have a look at this blog, and comment:

http://starvisions.blogspot.com/

[Igor Antunov]

Israel may have been able to completely subjugate egypt and it's allies, which would have resulted in the soviets intervening and dismantling israel, which would have forced the US to fight the soviets directly, which is why the US told israel to stop or be stomped by the US itself.

Within these 2 superpower confines it was a psychologcial victory or at least consolidation for the arabs, and a psychological blow to Israel. The arabs achieved a few initial victories, and when the things turned around and defeat looked probable, Israel was forced to stop by outside actors. The arabs played it well.

[starman2003]

Israel may have been able to completely subjugate egypt and its allies

Iraqi intervention prevented this happening to Syria. Late in the war, the Syrians weree contemplating a major counterattack. It probably wouldn't have succeeded but there was adequate strength to hold out in their positions. The IDF might've destroyed the whole Egyptian military had the war continued, alhough General Tamari doubted Israel could take on the Second Army.

which would have resulted in the soviets intervening and dismantling israel

They couldn't do that with conventional weapons, or it would've been prohibitively costly.

the arabs played it well

They could've done MUCH better without Sadat, who wrecked much of his country's military and, having done that, was too slow to seek a cease fire.

[Igor Antunov]

They couldn't do that with conventional weapons, or it would've been prohibitively costly.

Of course they could have, refering to israel on it's own, but it would have brought them into conflict with the US and it's allies, something neither they nor the US wanted.

[Smilin' Dave]

Of course they could have, refering to israel on it's own

Logistics wise it would have been hard to deploy Soviet troops, especially if they wanted to bring heavy equipment, to the Middle East. In this time period Turkey and Iran were not particularly supportive of the Soviets or the Arabs, which puts a stop on the most direct route. Soviet paratroops were certainly put on alert, but it's not clear what they could have done.

[Sephardi]

I can't believe how ignorant you are Sayed.

Israeli Troops: 415,000
Arab Troops: Over 980,000

Israeli Deaths: 2,700 dead
8,000 wounded

Arab Deaths: 20,000 dead
9,000 wounded

And this was an Israeli war of defense that started on a day when all the troops were celebrating Yom Kippur.

Arab cowards.