[RonPrice]

The New York Times began publishing excerpts of what came to be known as the Pentagon Papers on 13 June 1971. The first article in the series was titled "Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study Traces Three Decades of Growing US Involvement". The name Pentagon Papers arose during the resulting media publicity. Street protests, political controversy and lawsuits followed helping to bring the war in Vietnam to an end.

On 30 June 1971 the Supreme Court decided that the press of the nation had been prevented from publishing this important document. Five days later, as precisely as I can calculate after the passing of 40 years, my first wife and I flew from Canada to Australia to take up teaching positions in Whyalla South Australia and help with the teaching work in the last years of the Baha’i Nine Year Plan: 1964 to 1973.

Today I was reflecting on the 40th anniversary of the release of these excerpts of the Pentagon Papers. The National Archives and Records Administration announced that the Papers would be declassified and released, all 7000 pages, to the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum in Yorba Linda, California yesterday, on 13 June 2011. The papers were also released to the Nixon, Kennedy, and LBJ Libraries, as well as the Archives office in Bethesda, Maryland. The full release was coordinated by the Archives' National Declassification Centre as a special project to mark the anniversary of the report. –Ron Price with thanks to Wikipedia, 14 June 2011.

I was really too busy to take it all in1
back then in the last half of June ’71.
That encyclopaedic history of the war
in Viet-Nam in 7000 pages-47 volumes
written while I was selling ice-cream,
teaching Inuit kids, and then recovering
from teaching Inuit kids, then driving an
armoured truck, doing security work and
finally teaching in that primary school in a
Cherry Valley southern Ontario. They were
all pioneering ventures from home towns
in the Golden Horseshoe so very long ago.

1 In June 1971 Daniel Ellsberg leaked this top-secret study of US decision-making in Vietnam. The documents became known as the Pentagon Papers. At the time, Ellsberg was a top US military analyst employed by the RAND Corporation & he and the Pentagon papers were just names in the news.

Ron Price
14 June 2011

[Dave]

Much of what was in the Pentagon Papers was wrong, but the media never bothered to state this. Their only concern, apparently, was subverting the US war effort in Viet Nam.

Ellsberg committed a serious felony which undermined the Viet Nam war effort, yet the media treats him as if he's a hero. Imagine, a country's own media undermining its war effort. How can this be tolerated?

This shows that the Espionage Act should be used more aggressively against subversives.

[Suska]

Much of what was in the Pentagon Papers was wrong

Can you explain this?

[Dave]

Can you explain this?

Basically, it comes down to the paper stating that the Viet Cong was not a North Viet Nam puppet and enjoyed the genuine support of the Vietnamese people, and that the war was unwinnable. Of course the Viet Cong was a North Vietnamese puppet, and its support was based on brutal terror (the massacre at Hue comes to mind). ARVN (with US help) went on to largely defeat the Viet Cong, and South Viet Nam was defeated not by guerrillas by a conventional armored offensive by the NVA.

The essential American-ARVN victory of the original Viet Nam War resulted in North Viet Nam shifting focus, and thus the Easter Offensive was launched in 1972. This was repulsed by ARVN with major support by US airpower. After the Watergate fallout resulted in Congress terminating all our obligations to South Viet Nam, North Viet Nam seized the opportunity and launched a new offensive in 1975 which resulted in the conquest of the Republic of Viet Nam.

I am not aware of the New York Times, or other organs of the MSM, ever coming out and writing anything like this. They seem to think they're heroes for causing us to lose a war.

[Smilin' Dave]

Of course the Viet Cong was a North Vietnamese puppet

The VC became more of a proxy over time, in much the same way as the ARVN, or the south Vietnamese government in general, became more of a US proxy over time. The VC started fairly locally with an assortment of disaffected interest groups, including religious sects and criminals who were hardly dyed in the wool socialists. Saying it was a simple puppet all along is misleading.

its support was based on brutal terror (the massacre at Hue comes to mind).

This is true, though your example is poor: Hue was fairly uncharacteristic of VC operations up to that point in the war. You also need to resolved whether the VC were still, despite all their thuggery, more popular than the south Vietnamese government, which wasn't above terror when it could manage it.

ARVN (with US help) went on to largely defeat the Viet Cong

Despite this, the US campaign in South Vietnam was no closer to ending after the Tet Offensive. The US/South Vietnamese government could win all the campaigns it wanted... but it wasn't going to actually achieve all its strategic aims though, and hence couldn't 'win'. Its quite possible that had the VC not been frittered away during the Tet Offensive, that the US wouldn't have even been able to claim a significant victory in the counter-insurgency campaign, its not like they were on the cusp of meeting that objective before hand.

This was repulsed by ARVN with major support by US airpower.

The NVA wasn't completely driven back, and the years leading up to the final Ho Chi Minh offensive was marked by skirmishing by both sides for position, the south never got it all back. The Easter Offensive 'total defeat' narrative is repeated to strengthen the argument with the south was unfairly abandoned/betrayed.

I am not aware of the New York Times, or other organs of the MSM, ever coming out and writing anything like this. They seem to think they're heroes for causing us to lose a war.

Funnily enough, governments stuggle to sell open ended wars without clear sustainable victories. Is the press 'losing' the war when it points this out? I mean it wouldn't have worked (or sold papers) if people didn't basically agree with it.

[Dave]

Man, I knew that post was pure Smilin' Dave bait.

The VC became more of a proxy over time, in much the same way as the ARVN, or the south Vietnamese government in general, became more of a US proxy over time. The VC started fairly locally with an assortment of disaffected interest groups, including religious sects and criminals who were hardly dyed in the wool socialists. Saying it was a simple puppet all along is misleading.

As far as I know the core VC began as southern Viet Minh who had resettled in the North after Geneva, and then returned with arms and training. Membership was then predominantly Southern until the late 1960s. I am sure socialism had quite little to do with it, just as socialism really didn't have much to do with the Viet Minh. North Viet Nam may have been red, but the spirit was nationalist. After Tet so many of the southern VC were dead that the VC that did existed were mostly NVA regulars posing as guerrillas.

To me this sounds like a puppet, but I suppose definitions matter. Was UNITAS a US puppet?

This is true, though your example is poor: Hue was fairly uncharacteristic of VC operations up to that point in the war. You also need to resolved whether the VC were still, despite all their thuggery, more popular than the south Vietnamese government, which wasn't above terror when it could manage it.

Very fair point, and there was some terror from US forces. I often say that the legitimacy of a government is based upon it being better than the available alternative.

Despite this, the US campaign in South Vietnam was no closer to ending after the Tet Offensive. The US/South Vietnamese government could win all the campaigns it wanted... but it wasn't going to actually achieve all its strategic aims though, and hence couldn't 'win'. Its quite possible that had the VC not been frittered away during the Tet Offensive, that the US wouldn't have even been able to claim a significant victory in the counter-insurgency campaign, its not like they were on the cusp of meeting that objective before hand.

But the Tet Offensive did happen, and the Pentagon Papers were not completed until after Tet and they were not leaked until 1971. Certainly the US campaign was not ended after Tet, but it became feasible to pursue "Vietnamization" which was certainly not the case in 1966.

The NVA wasn't completely driven back, and the years leading up to the final Ho Chi Minh offensive was marked by skirmishing by both sides for position, the south never got it all back. The Easter Offensive 'total defeat' narrative is repeated to strengthen the argument with the south was unfairly abandoned/betrayed.

Fortunately I stated repulsed rather than total defeat. Are you thinking of Kissinger? I seem to recall some revisionism from him. But yes, North Viet Nam took control over Quang Trị, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, and Quang Tin. I don't think this changes the fact that the goals of the offensive were not met, the offensive was costly for North Viet Nam, and South Viet Nam remained viable. A Korean-style stalemate seemed very much within the realm of possibility at that time.

Funnily enough, governments stuggle to sell open ended wars without clear sustainable victories. Is the press 'losing' the war when it points this out? I mean it wouldn't have worked (or sold papers) if people didn't basically agree with it.

I'm aware, which is why I think the press should either be more patriotic (which they did try to be initially, in fairness) or simply be censored. It would be one thing if the press contributed to improvement of US strategy and military doctrine, sorely needed, but this did not seem to be the case.

[Smilin' Dave]

Man, I knew that post was pure Smilin' Dave bait.

On the upside, this thread is no longer about the "everything relates back to the Ba'hai"...view... of history

But the Tet Offensive did happen, and the Pentagon Papers were not completed until after Tet and they were not leaked until 1971.

But on the other hand, the Pentagon Papers never professed to be anything other than documents between 1945 and 1967. How that was misinterpreted or spun doesn't have much to do with the accuracy of the documents themselves. You've yet to state the case for the Papers being incorrect, only that the media might have misrepresented them. Given these were government documents, that would suggest the problem went much higher than the impact on public opinion.

Fortunately I stated repulsed rather than total defeat.

Repulsion implies that they were pushed back, victory through reversal... but the NVA were not pushed all the way back despite the addition of US aerial firepower. The South didn't achieve its aims as a result.

...South Viet Nam remained viable

Not really. It showed that South Vietnam couldnt sustain itself without significant US intervention. In the aftermath ARVN reserves were stretched to breaking point and many of the faillings that stood out from the Ho Chi Minh campaign were exhibited in this conflict, like mass desertion in the ARVN.

I'm aware, which is why I think the press should either be more patriotic (which they did try to be initially, in fairness) or simply be censored. It would be one thing if the press contributed to improvement of US strategy and military doctrine, sorely needed, but this did not seem to be the case.

On the other hand, information is important to good decision making which in a democracy includes the general population. Besides censorship/patriotic reporting only built up the credability gap which made the shock of Tet all the more significant.

[Dave]

On the upside, this thread is no longer about the "everything relates back to the Ba'hai"...view... of history

On the downside, I didn't realize immediately that the thread had been moved to your playground. But yes, removing the Ba'hai from this thread is a positive event.

But on the other hand, the Pentagon Papers never professed to be anything other than documents between 1945 and 1967. How that was misinterpreted or spun doesn't have much to do with the accuracy of the documents themselves. You've yet to state the case for the Papers being incorrect, only that the media might have misrepresented them. Given these were government documents, that would suggest the problem went much higher than the impact on public opinion.

The documents themselves made inaccurate strategic predictions, which is fine as analysts muck things up all the time and there were plenty of competing analyses. That US policy was not fundamentally altered by them shows that policy makers were not held captive by the Pentagon Papers.

The trouble was exactly the media, which was the focus of my initial post.

Repulsion implies that they were pushed back, victory through reversal... but the NVA were not pushed all the way back despite the addition of US aerial firepower. The South didn't achieve its aims as a result.

Fair enough SD, I retract that term.

Not really. It showed that South Vietnam couldnt sustain itself without significant US intervention. In the aftermath ARVN reserves were stretched to breaking point and many of the faillings that stood out from the Ho Chi Minh campaign were exhibited in this conflict, like mass desertion in the ARVN.

I am not an expert on the subject, but did anyone seriously think South Viet Nam was viable in the absence of US support anymore than RoK was? One could turn this on its head and state that North Viet Nam was not viable without support from the larger Communist world (USSR, PRC).

On the other hand, information is important to good decision making which in a democracy includes the general population. Besides censorship/patriotic reporting only built up the credability gap which made the shock of Tet all the more significant.

I have no faith whatsoever in the ability of democracies to make good decisions with or without good information.

Credibility gap is a more serious concern, something which was not helped by constant claims of how close we were to victory. The population obviously should've been prepared for a long war (once the decision to commit was made).

[Smilin' Dave]

The documents themselves made inaccurate strategic predictions, which is fine as analysts muck things up all the time and there were plenty of competing analyses.

To be fair they only seemed inaccurate with hindsight. In 1967, prior to the Tet Offensive, things were looking a lot more bleak, returning somewhat to my earlier point that counter insurgency had been pretty successful otherwise. Projecting forward from the information available in 1967, the analysis wasn't entirely baseless.

That US policy was not fundamentally altered by them shows that policy makers were not held captive by the Pentagon Papers.

Correlation does not imply causation . An equally valid theory to why, despite the gloom cast by assessors, government policy didn't change would be arrogance and/or stupidity at the upper echelons of government. For example, if they were told that the current strategy wasn't working thats fine... but if they can't think of a better solution the odds are they will continue with the previous policy, as they certainly were not willing to back down.

The trouble was exactly the media, which was the focus of my initial post.

Not entirely:

Much of what was in the Pentagon Papers was wrong

You've now back-peddled a bit, noting it was the analysis that wasn't entirely sound.

Fair enough SD, I retract that term.

I am not an expert on the subject, but did anyone seriously think South Viet Nam was viable in the absence of US support anymore than RoK was?

I would have thought the ROK was in relative terms still in a more sound position on its own than South Vietnam, but have little to base this on.

One could turn this on its head and state that North Viet Nam was not viable without support from the larger Communist world (USSR, PRC).

I'm not so sure about that. The North with limited foreign aid (and dubious political support) to achieve some of its own goals earlier in the piece. The successor unified state managed fine against "Kampuchea" and later even handled the PRC. And all of this was accomplished without the Soviet Navy or PLAN having to role out the aircraft carriers (which is good given their deficiencies in the area ).

I have no faith whatsoever in the ability of democracies to make good decisions with or without good information.

I have even less faith in a democracy being able to make good decisions based on poor information, which leaves us at something of an impasse.

[Dave]

To be fair they only seemed inaccurate with hindsight. In 1967, prior to the Tet Offensive, things were looking a lot more bleak, returning somewhat to my earlier point that counter insurgency had been pretty successful otherwise. Projecting forward from the information available in 1967, the analysis wasn't entirely baseless.

Most such things only seem inaccurate with hindsight. As the press released the papers after Tet, perhaps they should've pointed out that things didn't turn out so bad as the papers predicted. To my knowledge they did not do so, one of many black marks on this country's media organs.

Correlation does not imply causation . An equally valid theory to why, despite the gloom cast by assessors, government policy didn't change would be arrogance and/or stupidity at the upper echelons of government. For example, if they were told that the current strategy wasn't working thats fine... but if they can't think of a better solution the odds are they will continue with the previous policy, as they certainly were not willing to back down.

One of my favorite quotes:

The prestige of the Soviet Union demands that Finland be defeated.

The Pentagon Papers themselves explicitly gave the desire to avoid an embarrassing defeat as one reason for continued involvement in Viet Nam, and indeed the loss of Viet Nam did damage the prestige of the United States and resulted in many challenges to American power all over the world. This ultimately culminated in the taking of American hostages at our embassy in Tehran.

Unfortunately I couldn't find the Youtube video, but I watched an HBO documentary on Ronald Reagan a few months ago which showed some of his campaign ads from 1980. One of them alluded to (seeming) American weakness during the 1970s, and asked the questions, "Would the Soviet Union really have invaded Afghanistan if Ronald Reagan was President? Would American hostages really have been taken in Iran if Ronald Reagan was President?"

As it happens, strategy did change. Westmoreland's "search and destroy" tactics were replaced by Abrams' "maximum pressure" strategy, a major shift which basically saw the Army copying the successful tactics of the Marines and Australians. Unfortunately I don't know enough about the period to tell you why this took place.

You've now back-peddled a bit, noting it was the analysis that wasn't entirely sound.

And does a focus preclude mentioning something else? Indeed the Pentagon Papers weren't entirely sound, and as part of my criticism of the media I think they failed in not noting this.

I would have thought the ROK was in relative terms still in a more sound position on its own than South Vietnam, but have little to base this on.

For starters the RoK was behind one of the world's most heavily defended borders, and it did not have porous jungle land borders from which it could be easily infiltrated. Hence North Korean commandos resorted to tunnels and small boat landings. So yes, they probably were more secure but that security definitely required major US assistance. Massive foreign aid, troops in country, and enormous military presence in nearby Japan, the Philippines, and Guam.

I'm not so sure about that. The North with limited foreign aid (and dubious political support) to achieve some of its own goals earlier in the piece. The successor unified state managed fine against "Kampuchea" and later even handled the PRC. And all of this was accomplished without the Soviet Navy or PLAN having to role out the aircraft carriers (which is good given their deficiencies in the area ).

How far would North Viet Nam have gotten without Soviet and ChiCom military and economic assistance? This didn't just include all the weapons they needed, but whole factories, technical experts, and even hundreds of thousands of ChiCom soldiers performing non-combat roles to free up more men for combat. It was also alleged by numerous defectors that the USSR strongly funded the peace and antiwar movements in Western Europe and the United States, which may have been North Viet Nam's most powerful weapon.

I have even less faith in a democracy being able to make good decisions based on poor information, which leaves us at something of an impasse.

To be even more blunt, I'm not confident that democracies make decisions at all. They certainly don't operate exactly the same as authoritarian states, but in general it seems that elites rule them and manufacture public consent through the education system and the media. An interesting tidbit from Peru recently emerged about how powerful the media is.

http://fsi.stanford.edu/publications/ho ... s_in_peru/

Peru has in place the full set of democratic mechanisms: a constitution, opposition parties, regular elections, a presidential term limit, safeguards for the independence of the judiciary, and a free press. In the 1990s, Peru was run, in the name of President Alberto Fujimori, by its secret-police chief, Vladimiro Montesinos Torres. In the course of exercising power, Montesinos methodically bribed judges, politicians, and the news media.
Montesinos kept meticulous records of his transactions. He required those he bribed to sign contracts detailing their obligations to him. He demanded written receipts for the bribes. Strikingly, he had his illicit negotiations videotaped.
In what follows we use Montesinos’s bribe receipts and videotapes to study the breakdown of checks and balances. Montesinos and Fujimori maintained the façade of democracy—the citizens voted, judges decided, the media reported—but they drained its substance. We discuss how they went about undermining democracy: the negotiation and enforcement of the secret deals, the workings of covert authoritarianism.
Of the checks and balances that underpin democracy, which is the most forceful? We use the bribe prices to quantify the checks and balances. The size of the bribes indicates how much Montesinos was willing to pay to buy off those who could have checked his power. The typical bribe paid to a television-channel owner was about a hundred times larger than that paid to a politician, which was somewhat larger than that paid to a judge. One single television channel’s bribe was five times larger than the total of the opposition politicians’ bribes. The strongest of the checks and balances, by Montesinos’s revealed preference, was television.

Food for thought.

[RonPrice]

It has been more than four months since I posted the initial item on the Pentagon Papers. I'd like to thank all those who replied to what, in the end, is a complex issue. It is an issue which only those with a keen interest in the subject, its context in history, and have read some of the best writers who have contextualized the subject from different perspectives. I am not that informed.

I wish you all well in dealing with the information-print glut, to say nothing of the image-glut, that we all have to deal with.-Ron in Australia