[Fasces]

The whole thing is pretty interesting. Apparently, early on, Stalin attempted to get a grand alliance going with the UK and France to defeat Hitler before he was a major threat. It was only when France and the UK spurned him that Stalin made a non-aggression pact with Hitler (source).

Strangely, the same is true of Mussolini. One wonders, if, in an alternate world where France and the UK put their pride aside and worked with the states of Europe, whether a German resurgence could have been wholly prevented.

[Cookie Monster]

Strangely, the same is true of Mussolini. One wonders, if, in an alternate world where France and the UK put their pride aside and worked with the states of Europe, whether a German resurgence could have been wholly prevented.

Most likely yes. It was mostly France's frantic quest for an ally against Germany and Britain's unwillingness to commit itself a priori to such an endeavour which created the orphan compromises and the vacuum in which German resurgence could present itself.

[Smilin' Dave]

What were the alternatives? Expand into Persia, China and Romania?

Persia, China and Romania wouldn't really be alternatives to a tsarist pattern, since Tsarist Russia did intervene in those states and the Soviets followed similar policies (invasion of Northern Iran and attempt to attack same to Azerbaijan, the previously mentioned annexation of parts of Romania to create Moldova and arms to China while fussing over railway concessions).

What would be a genuine alternative would be to not expand. Its not like the Soviet Union desperately needed a lot of these expansions, contrary to the idea that the Soviets were always strictly rational actors in foreign policy. Indeed some of these actions proved counter-productive, like the attack against Finland effectively ensuring Finnish support for Barbarossa.

[Potemkin]

Indeed some of these actions proved counter-productive, like the attack against Finland effectively ensuring Finnish support for Barbarossa.

Realistically, the Finns were always going to support Barbarossa, Winter War or not. Finland had been under the Tsarist yoke for generations before breaking free during the chaos following the Russian Revolution, and the Bolsheviks regarded themselves as having a de facto right to re-absorb surrounding territories which had been part of the Tsarist Russian Empire. The Finns would've been crazy to have sided with the Soviet Union during WWII, and remaining neutral was not a realistic option for them. Stalin's Winter War did not force the Finns into the arms of the Third Reich; they were always going to end up there anyway.

[Smilin' Dave]

Realistically, the Finns were always going to support Barbarossa, Winter War or not. Finland had been under the Tsarist yoke for generations before breaking free during the chaos following the Russian Revolution, and the Bolsheviks regarded themselves as having a de facto right to re-absorb surrounding territories which had been part of the Tsarist Russian Empire. The Finns would've been crazy to have sided with the Soviet Union during WWII, and remaining neutral was not a realistic option for them. Stalin's Winter War did not force the Finns into the arms of the Third Reich; they were always going to end up there anyway.

You've kind of missed the point I was making... you've stated the case for history as it occured, I was talking about how a different policy might have resulted in a different outcome. A dubious desire for reacquiring Tsarist properties alienated the Finns? Precisely, which is why a policy that didn't default to Tsarist policy might have resulted in Finland remaining neutral. Finland wasn't exactly an obvious choice for belligerent state to begin with. Its clear the Finns didn't want to pursue a war with the Soviets unless they felt they had to, hence their rather limited offensives during the 'Continuation War' and their attempts to make a seperate peace with the Soviets starting in 1943. Similarly Finland probably wasn't unaware of the risks of aligning with Nazi Germany, the results of which became clear during the Lapland War.

[Potemkin]

You've kind of missed the point I was making... you've stated the case for history as it occured, I was talking about how a different policy might have resulted in a different outcome.

So was I; I just didn't realise you were going so far back.

A dubious desire for reacquiring Tsarist properties alienated the Finns? Precisely, which is why a policy that didn't default to Tsarist policy might have resulted in Finland remaining neutral.

...or joining the Axis Powers as a co-belligerent anyway. Remember, Finland was strategically important during WWII because of its proximity to Leningrad, the second city of the Soviet Union. You think Stalin should simply have trusted the Finns not to side with their enemies?

Finland wasn't exactly an obvious choice for belligerent state to begin with.

It was a very obvious choice: its geographical location so close to Leningrad, for one thing, the fact that it was part of the Russian Empire just a couple of decades earlier, for another, and the fact that it was ruled by a reactionary government which had suppressed an attempted workers' revolution, for a third thing. Some degree of hostility between the Soviet Union and Finland was pretty much inevitable.

Its clear the Finns didn't want to pursue a war with the Soviets unless they felt they had to, hence their rather limited offensives during the 'Continuation War' and their attempts to make a seperate peace with the Soviets starting in 1943. Similarly Finland probably wasn't unaware of the risks of aligning with Nazi Germany, the results of which became clear during the Lapland War.

I absolutely agree - Mannerheim was very conscious of the political and military risks involved, and actually handled the situation masterfully. Even Stalin admired Mannerheim, and often said so. His personal respect for Mannerheim, and the fact that the Finns had waged the Continuation War as a primarily defensive war, is what induced Stalin to be so lenient to Finland after the Soviet victory.

[Smilin' Dave]

I think we need to clarify something: the OP is by its nature speculative. I'm well aware of why events took the course they did, the point of the discussion however is not simply to repeat what happened but to consider whether any alternative path was possible and if so, what might have been.

You think Stalin should simply have trusted the Finns not to side with their enemies?

Perhaps anyone but Stalin probably would have. Somehow for all the 'reasons' Finland was a threat to the Soviet Union etc. they didn't actually go to war with each other for much of their mutual history.

Finland didn't actually have a good reason to join the Axis powers... except of course for protection from the Soviet Union. Finland wasn't even in the situation Eastern Europe found itself in, with little choice but to join an alliance, their position was reasonably sound. If their goal is to avoid an invasion by the Soviets, an alliance with Nazi Germany is probably not a good way to avoid it. But the Soviet Union invades, and as I've noted, they felt they had no other choice. Hence why Stalin's decision to invade was not particularly rational, and hence why another course may have been viable.

Some degree of hostility between the Soviet Union and Finland was pretty much inevitable.

Sure. War between the two however was not inevitable.

[Potemkin]

I think we need to clarify something: the OP is by its nature speculative. I'm well aware of why events took the course they did, the point of the discussion however is not simply to repeat what happened but to consider whether any alternative path was possible and if so, what might have been.

Which is precisely what I was doing - I was speculating as to what might have happened if Stalin had not started the Winter War against Finland. My conclusion was that things would probably have proceeded as they did in actual history, with the important difference that the Finnish border would have been much closer to Leningrad during WWII.

Perhaps anyone but Stalin probably would have. Somehow for all the 'reasons' Finland was a threat to the Soviet Union etc. they didn't actually go to war with each other for much of their mutual history.

Most nations are not at war with each other for most of their mutual history, but they are often mutually hostile. This hostility meant that Finland could not be trusted by the Soviet Union (and vice versa, of course).

Finland didn't actually have a good reason to join the Axis powers... except of course for protection from the Soviet Union. Finland wasn't even in the situation Eastern Europe found itself in, with little choice but to join an alliance, their position was reasonably sound.

Actually, it wasn't. Hitler invaded Norway because of its strategic significance; either he or Stalin might have been tempted to do the same to Finland.

If their goal is to avoid an invasion by the Soviets, an alliance with Nazi Germany is probably not a good way to avoid it. But the Soviet Union invades, and as I've noted, they felt they had no other choice. Hence why Stalin's decision to invade was not particularly rational, and hence why another course may have been viable.

As I pointed out before, Finland was not pushed into the arms of the Axis Powers by Stalin's invasion during the Winter War - the logic of their position would have forced them into the arms of the Axis Powers anyway.

Sure. War between the two however was not inevitable.

When mutual suspicion reaches a certain level, war does indeed become almost inevitable.

[Smilin' Dave]

I was speculating as to what might have happened if Stalin had not started the Winter War against Finland. My conclusion was that things would probably have proceeded as they did in actual history, with the important difference that the Finnish border would have been much closer to Leningrad during WWII.

My contention was a little bit more complicated than "don't invade Finland". For example the rising tensions between the Soviets and Finns can be linked to the threat to the Baltic states, another move in the Tsarist mold.

Most nations are not at war with each other for most of their mutual history, but they are often mutually hostile. This hostility meant that Finland could not be trusted by the Soviet Union (and vice versa, of course).

Your stated reasons for mutual hostility could be applied to many neighbouring countries around the world, I'm yet to be convinced of the dire straits that Finland and the Soviet Union were supposed to be in that made the Winter War inevitable that don't trace back to Soviet foreign policy. Your reasons for Soviet hostilities could be applied to a number of neighbours they didn't invade.

Even the history of Finland crushing communist rebellion isn't particularly compelling, the government equally opposed the rightist Mantsala rebellion.

Actually, it wasn't. Hitler invaded Norway because of its strategic significance; either he or Stalin might have been tempted to do the same to Finland.

Norway was invaded because of its position relative to Sweden and thus Germany's iron ore supplies. Norway keeps the British out of the Baltic, so job done for Nazi Germany. The Soviet Navy doesn't even come close to being a threat relative to the Kriegsmarine, even with the inclusion of Finland, so they don't have a particularly good reason on that basis either.

Finland appeals to Nazi Germany as a route for invasion, but the Finns don't actually want to invade the Soviet Union (more so prior to the Winter War), and Finland is a less attractive staging point if it is not a willing ally. Similarly the Soviets fear the Finns will let the Germans stage from Finland, but I've yet to see any reason they should believe this beyond Stalinist paranoia, or why such a state of affairs could occur without a direct Soviet threat to Finland.

Finland was not pushed into the arms of the Axis Powers by Stalin's invasion during the Winter War

So why didn't they align with Nazi Germany sooner? This 'inevitable' process seems to have been accelerated by Soviet action, rather than wholely a shift in Finnish policy.

the logic of their position would have forced them into the arms of the Axis Powers anyway.

This has yet to be demonstrated. Finnish armed neutrality had worked up to that point, you haven't adequetely explained why the Finns needed to ally with the Nazis beyond security concerns which were of course magnified by Soviet invasion.

[William_H_Dougherty]

This is a very difficult question.

I think you should consider that the Stalin of 1939 was not the Stalin of 1941.

In 1939 France and the United Kingdom, supported by the Commonwealth Nations, had on paper Armed Forces which were, at the very least, a match to Germany.

In 1941 Germany had effectively wiped out the continental opposition.

The Stalin of 1939 was expecting a long drawn out war between the "capitalist nations". He feared, if anything, that Germany and the Allies would quickly resolve their differences and soon the Soviet Union would face a "capitalist encirclement". To prevent this, well step one was the non-aggression pact. Step two were the many economic treaties between the countries which Stalin felt bound Germany to the Soviet Union for quite some time. He expected the German economy to become overly reliant on Soviet resources over the course of this war, as the Allies, with superior navies, would no doubt attempt a blockade of Germany as they had in the Great War.

The Stalin of 1941 had just watched Germany hand defeat after defeat to country after country with *seeming* ease. The only main competitor to Germany was an air and naval power, which seemed more intent on fighting the Italians in Africa than Germans in France. The occupied populations in this time period were *seemingly* accepting German rule and Stalin was convinced that the only hope for democracies was starting a fight between the Soviet Union and Germany. Worse, the Soviet Union had just humiliated itself by being unable to easily defeat a minor power (Finland).

So would Soviet Russia have attacked Nazi Germany? Not ceterus paribus. There would have to be a major change in the status quo in Europe before Stalin would even think about such an idea. He expected hostilities to one day break out, yes, but I'm not sure he was specifically referencing the Soviet Union attacking Germany along a single front.

- WHD