[cowofzot]

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Rommel requested 12th SS Panzer Division be moved from near Evreux to Isigny at the mouth of the Vire River, placing it only nine miles from Omaha Beach and in a position to immediately counterattack and drive U.S. forces back into the sea. However, von Rundstedt disagreed and Hitler denied the request.

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/the-p...-june-1944.htm

[MB.]

Why are you spamming this rommel fetish wwii history channel sillyness, cowofzot?

Von Rundstedt was right, the 12th SS Panzer would have been destroyed by allied air attack if it had been "only nine miles from Omaha Beach and in a position to immediately counterattack".

What is your motive for posting this?

Furthermore, your link is 404 not found

[Siberian Fox]

the 12th SS Panzer would have been destroyed by allied air attack if it had been "only nine miles from Omaha Beach

Or by naval artillery.

"... such were the losses sustained by the panzer divisions in the Odon battles - particularly from the 16in naval guns offshore[*] - that the commander of Panzer Group West (Geyr) and subsequently von Runstedt himself proposed withdrawing out of naval artillery range and evacuating parts of the front north of the Orne including Caen where the river divided the city north and south."[1]

Hitler had them both dismissed shortly afterwards for their defeatist heresy.

*In this instance, H.M.S. Rodney.
[1]Roger Edwards, 1989. Panzer: A revolution in warfare 1939-1945, pp 213.

[MB.]

SF, do you happen to have any information about the coordination of the post-Neptune naval bombardments? I recall from popular historian (and noted plagiarist) S. E. Ambrose that prior to and during the actual amphibious assault the battleships were involved in shelling strategic targets some distance inland. Presumably the quotation you provided refers to more general destruction of the panzer divisions operational capability from naval bombardment of significant locations (headquarters, barracks, armories, fuel depots, etc?) after the landings (apparently the battle for Odon took place on June 26th during the breakout), rather than a pre-planned targeting of locations known to be occupied by the specific divisions? Or do I have that completely backwards? In other words, was this a 'tactical' deployment of battleship cannon?

[Siberian Fox]

Yes this was a tactical deployment. I'll have to look later for specifics for you, but as I recall, on the 30th H.M.S. Rodney shelled German forces in the field directly, not just their support facilities. IIRC H.M.S. Warspite was involved in a tactical bombardment also, being called away from her planned bombardments in support of the Americans on the 11th(?).

Prior to D-Day the Royal Navy undertook bombardment training in improve accuracy, and in battle bombardments were co-ordinated by a combination of aircraft and land-based spotters.

[MB.]

Reminds me of the use of naval artillery during the Dardanelles campaign. Likewise coordinated in some cases with RNAS spotters and fired against coastal fortifications and turkish divisional positions and formations.

SF, what do you think objectively of the Rommel lionization and the case of Overlord specifically? I don't know for sure, but I imagine, as this thread seems to suggest, that the Allied landings are an ample target for counter factual 'what if' suppositions.

[Siberian Fox]

On naval artillery in Normandy...

According to Alan Raven and John Roberts, 1976, British Battleships of WWII, Arms and Armour; which has an entire section on bombardments by Britain's Battleships:
Few direct hits were made on fortified batteries, and such batteries were quite resilient, requiring a lot of continuous fire to keep them suppressed. The real success of the Battleships was in destroying open area targets like troop concentrations, vehicle columns, open batteries, anything spread out.

Warspite was diverted to help the Americans on 10th June. She returned to the British sector on June 11th and broke up an intended German counter-attack around Arromanches while it was still forming.

The aforementioned bombardment by Rodney on the 30th June was again to prevent a counter attack near Arromanches. The German force was hit 17 miles inland and was completely scattered.

Nelson, Ramillies, Malaya and the monitors Erebus and Roberts were all also involved in shore bombardment.

Because of the ability to correct fire, it's tactical use could be very accurate and much more menacing than area bombing. Raven and Roberts also point out the for shorter range targets cruiser bombardment could be just as effective because of the higher rate of fire.

On Rommel...

Seriously, I think he does deserve his dues as an audacious commander (perhaps at worst reckless - he did make his fair share of mistakes too). He wasn't the only 'good man' in German command, but his hero status obviously makes him the figurehead for the anti-Nazi plotters. However, Rommel really was not the rebel, and his only betrayal of Hitler was actually to do nothing when he had information of the plot against him. While not a Nazi, he was thoroughly loyal to Hitler before that, which aided his promotion. I also think he was lucky not to be tainted by the war in the U.S.S.R. by being deployed to North Africa.

To try and stay on topic, the failure in the West was in part due to Hitler not deciding who was really in overall command early enough, creating a disjointed effort that led to units not being committed decisively. But, if they had I don't know if it would have made any difference. Allied bombing prior to D-Day was intense, and it made troop, vehicle and supply movements very difficult for the Germans. Long night marches and diversions to avoid air attack or necessitated by destroyed infrastructure meant that even if Rommel had a free hand to move armour, it wasn't going to get to where he wanted it intact in a timely manner.

I think Rommel's theory that the invasion had to be stopped on the beach was sound though. Allied war material built up so fast once the beachheads were secure that any subsequent inland battles would just be fighting against the tide. Obviously Germany did not have the available material to realise the 'fortress Europe', but I wouldn't blame Rommel for trying. As mentioned, the fortified positions there were available took real work for the allies to overcome. For what it's worth, IMHO, more infantry and infantry support weapons were what would have been more useful to reach that aim. Without the ability to contest allied air superiority tanks were not going to smash the beachheads. Still, a near impossible task.

[cowofzot]

[quote][/quote]

No fetish, but thanks for low rent insult MB. History channel is not Armchair General. If the subject matter is not of interest to you, pass on it instead of being an ass to no good purpose. Basic ettiquette hint.

The subject matter itself is very interesting to military buffs the world over.

What is my motive for posting? Same as always, to have a discussion about the subject. See other points of view, learn more about it perhaps etc.

What is your motivation for crapping on other persons threads?

[MB.]

My motive for critiquing your initial post was to attempt to encourage you to engage in some historiography. Specifically, Rommel, Omaha and Normandy are frequent targets for counterfactualization from popular authors and grognards (and its true, actual military historians).

Presumably you posted this because you believed Rommel could have thrown the Allies into the sea if only he had been authorized to deploy the 12th SS Panzer division 9 miles inland from Omaha beach. There is probably some narrative you're writing back to but I wouldn't want to hazard a guess.

Re, SF,

Few direct hits were made on fortified batteries, and such batteries were quite resilient, requiring a lot of continuous fire to keep them suppressed. The real success of the Battleships was in destroying open area targets like troop concentrations, vehicle columns, open batteries, anything spread out....Raven and Roberts also point out the for shorter range targets cruiser bombardment could be just as effective because of the higher rate of fire.

This is more or less what I had gathered from my own readings on Normandy. I admit I haven't payed much attention to the specifics (I'm no grognard!) but then again it figures that shore-bombardment planners would have to weigh (pun!) caliber, accuracy, and target priority thoroughly and specify the correct weapons for the right targets.

The German force was hit 17 miles inland and was completely scattered.

The range itself is impressive in these cases. 17 miles is a significant distance to consider with regard to littoral bombardment of formations. The use of monitors for extremely near shore naval gun support is another feature seen at the Dardanelles.

[cowofzot]

Your presumption is incorrect. & style is negative. I don't believe you encouragement to engage in historiography comment.

[MB.]

Rommel requested 12th SS Panzer Division be moved from near Evreux to Isigny at the mouth of the Vire River, placing it only nine miles from Omaha Beach and in a position to immediately counterattack and drive U.S. forces back into the sea.

Presumably you posted this because you believed Rommel could have thrown the Allies into the sea if only he had been authorized to deploy the 12th SS Panzer division 9 miles inland from Omaha beach.

Your presumption is incorrect.

Cowofzot did not write 1st comment.

Edit: If you had properaly sourced your opening post (with a functioning link), and used the quote code this confusion might have been avoided.

[cowofzot]

Incorrect, Cowofzot did not write 1st comment.

[Smilin' Dave]

Incorrect, Cowofzot did not write 1st comment.

This isn't the first time your intent has apparently confused by your direct quoting of other materials. If you were to use the quote function properly etc. this could be avoided. Speaking of which, your link does not appear to be working. I should also mention that another user, Sandokan, was carded in past for constantly copying and pasting material without acknowledgement or his own commentary. I would recommend you try to at least add your own thoughts to such material.

Focus on the topic people. Further nonsense will be deleted.

[William_H_Dougherty]

Yeah, I think we've been pretty much through this.

Rundstedt and Rommel had a strategic disagreement, Hitler tried to compromise between the two plans (meet them on the beaches vs. meet them in the plains inland away from air cover) and this resulted in a poor strategic situation being impossible.

Nobody will know for sure which plan would have worked best because of the above.

- WHD

[Tailz]

The disadvantage Rommel aimed to counter with placing the Panzers close to the beaches, was their exposure to destruction by Allied air power when they tried to move into attack position (which is what happened). The counter to this was pointed out by von Runstedt that being so close to the coast put the Panzers at risk of naval guns, plus having the Panzers back gave better flexibility to move to face an invasion at different points.

Both have their advantages and benefits. The wild card to the argument is: Had the Panzers been positioned closer to the beaches, how would they have been positioned to avoid destruction by bombing, naval guns, or even detection? And since this didn't happen, it is a moot point.

[Siberian Fox]

Had the Panzers been positioned closer to the beaches, how would they have been positioned to avoid destruction by bombing, naval guns, or even detection?

One would not be able to position too close initially without knowing in advance where the invasion would be.

it is a moot point.

Quite. Just to add to the impossibility of Rommel's armour plan saving the day, here's a word from the man himself:

"He [Rommel] reported to O.K.W. on 11 June: 'The guns of most enemy warships have so powerful an effect on areas within their range that any advance into this zone dominated by fire from the sea is impossible.'" - W. Tute, J. Costello & T. Hughes, 1974, D-Day (1975 revised ed.). Pan Books. pp239.

Basically, prior to D-Day the Germans totally underestimated the effect of naval artillery and planned without giving it the consideration it deserved.

[Tailz]

One would not be able to position too close initially without knowing in advance where the invasion would be.

This is very true, and I think one of Rundstedt's points for holding the Panzers back so as to be able to consolidate and then thrust towards the landing zones. But on the flip size, the Germans were not stupid, they could work out the possible landing areas themselves. Although they had a vast stretch of coast line to defend, the defences concentrated on the key landing areas that could facilitate the landing of the vast array of materials and supplies they knew would be needed for a European invasion. That alone meant that defence went from guarding the whole coastline, to guarding areas that could handle large scale landings. But still that left a large area to be defended. Lets not forget the landing could have come anywhere on the coast of France, Norway, and the "tough old gut" of the Italian boot.

The curious thing is, the Germans had worked out correctly which possible landing zones on the French coastline the Allies were going to use: Normandy or Pas-de-Calais. The problem we have looking back on this issue is that we don't know how the armour or local defence forces such as Panzer groups would have been stationed in the area. I don't think they would have just been parked in forest or just out in the open, waiting to get bombed or pre-registered from when the navy shows up to blast them. Considering the amount of concrete being poured, the werks that were made, I could easily see some kind of bunker system, or underground werk to house local reaction panzer groups.

Quite. Just to add to the impossibility of Rommel's armour plan saving the day, here's a word from the man himself:

"He [Rommel] reported to O.K.W. on 11 June: 'The guns of most enemy warships have so powerful an effect on areas within their range that any advance into this zone dominated by fire from the sea is impossible.'" - W. Tute, J. Costello & T. Hughes, 1974, D-Day (1975 revised ed.). Pan Books. pp239.

Basically, prior to D-Day the Germans totally underestimated the effect of naval artillery and planned without giving it the consideration it deserved.

It was the advance into and through that zone that Rommel wanted to avoid. But I agree completely, of all the German Generals up to the point of the Normandy landings, Rommel was one of the few who has the experience of having seen the power of Allied Air Power and sea power. Lets not forget the Royal Navy harried the coast of North Africa. Thus why I think, Rommel had a point, driving to engage Allied forces meant exposure to Allied air power - and thus destruction even before getting to the battlefield - while Rommel wanted too, somehow, limit the time being exposed to air power before hitting the allied forces. For once engaged in close quarters, the Allies would not be so willing or so able to bring such force into action once German and Allied troops are so close, if not, intertwined.

But the argument is academic, it just didn't happen.