In this post - viewtopic.php?p=14085577#p14085577 - a while back, Eran wrote:Phred,
I am very interested in your notion of natural rights. The rights you claim to derive logically from objective facts of human existence are basically the same as the rights that I derive from what I consider to be subjective values. If you could persuade me of your position, I'd be a happier person. This is a rare occasion in which I am highly receptive to a different view from my own.
I'll start with your "tight" definition:
"Rights" are those actions performed by humans in the presence of other humans which other reasonable humans - when observing them - recognize as representing no threat to their own ability to exercise their own set of similar actions.
That is a fine definition, but it really isn't enough to identify what such rights might be.
And?
For example, I could present a consistent world-view within which people have no rights whatsoever, or in which people's rights are restricted to speech, but in which they have no property rights (including no rights over their own bodies). Such a world-view would still be consistent with your definition.
So?
Look, the first part of any debate is to define one's terms. I did so.
This sounds a lot like saying that an act is a violation of someone's rights if it is a violation of the NAP, formulated in terms of property.
Probably. Does this surprise you?
2. That makes this description, like the conventional NAP, dependent on the concept and definition of "property". How do you define property, and how do you justify that definition?
First of all, I presented both definitions with the goal of defining the concept "rights". Both definitions are meant to do nothing more than to identify the concept under discussion - "rights". Clearly, in order to work out a just moral system, it is also necessary to define "property". But you have done so on so many past occasions I didn't feel the need to reinvent the wheel. I have no problems with your definition of "property". When you use it, I know you are referring to the same concept I myself term "property".
3. No theory of rights is complete without giving some motivation for why it is wrong to violate other people's rights.
True. But I wasn't proposing a theory of rights, I was merely clarifying what is being discussed when the word "rights" pops up. I supplied a definition, not a theory.
In my mind, the notion of rights is an inherently normative one. Neither your short nor your longer reference explains why it is wrong to violate other people's rights.
That's because both of my definitions are just that -
definitions. That's all they are. If we aren't all talking about the same thing when we try to develop a theory of rights, there is no point expending the effort. Step one is to make sure when any of us use the term "rights", the others know what is being discussed.
While it is undoubtedly true that humans, as a matter of objective reality, require certain natural resources (food, water, etc.) to survive, it is far from a matter of objective reality that they require control over the sources of those resources, nor that they require more than a certain minimum level of those resources to survive.
Your point being?
It is hard then to see what is normatively wrong with a society in which people's minimal survival needs are provided by society, but in which they are otherwise stripped of any rights.
On the contrary. It is dead simple to see what's wrong with such a society: for one thing it is impossible to define "minimal". For another, the needs of these humans are not being provided by "society", but by other humans. The master-slave paradigm.
In other words, why is it wrong to enslave (while feeding and otherwise caring for) other humans?
Because rights are universal. What is a right for a specific human is a right for any human. In a situation in which there are slaves and masters, the rights are not universal. Some humans have more rights than others.
Phred