[Politics_Observer]

Here is a good example of Game Theory Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and how it explains insincere voting on UN Security Council Resolutions by different nations.

[Torus34]

Here is a good example of Game Theory Subgame Perfect Equilibrium and how it explains insincere voting on UN Security Council Resolutions by different nations.

Hi, Politics_Observer.

I rarely take the time necessary to watch a video. The topic line for this thread, however, piqued my interest. Insincerity pops up all over the place once you start looking for it. The present day political palaver's a happy hunting ground. One classic was the Operation Chaos promulgated by the late Mr. Rush Limbaugh.

Regards, stay safe 'n well 'n remember the Big 5.

[Torus34]

@Politics_Observer.

Sir [Or Madam,] you appear to be someone undeterred by complexity. Given that, Games Theory and insincerity can be applied to our federal legislators with regard to their votes on the major issues de jour. The two columns of possibilities, should you also possess a wry sense of humor, can be labeled 'Benefits self' and 'Benefits country'.

Regards, and thank you for stirring up this poor old country mouse's brain this morning.

[Politics_Observer]

@Torus34

I am taking a graduate level course in Game Theory. I am almost finished with it. This Friday is the last day for that particular class. This was a very high pressure, stressful, tough, yet valuable class. It was a tough ass class. I had to do a lot of advanced math. For somebody who doesn't have an advanced math background, here are a few book recommendations I have for you:

• Game Theory 101 The Complete Textbook. A User-Friendly Introduction To Game Theory by William Spaniel
• Game Theory 101 Bargaining by William Spaniel
• Game Theory At Work by James Miller

Slightly more advanced book to read on Game Theory is also written by William Spaniel is "Game Theory 101: The Rationality of War."

Now a good advanced math textbook on Game Theory which involves a great deal of Calculus is "Game Theory" by Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole.

Insincere voting can help you in getting laws passed you want passed by insincerely voting for one thing or a candidate in the first round instead of your most preferred thing or candidate in the first round because you know by doing so, you won't get your most preferred outcome anyway.

So, you get like your second preferable outcome and so that when it goes to the second round, you can get your most preferred outcome that you would never be able to get in the first round even if you yourself voted for it. In the second round, the candidate you chose in that first round is voted on by that candidate or thing because that person will vote for what you really want in the second round that you would have never been able to get in first round even if you voted for it. Make sense? The first round you "insincerely voted" so to speak.

In Game Theory 101 Bargaining it goes over bargaining in economics or anything not economic or business related too and how you can use Game Theory to gain negotiation and bargaining leverage. It also goes over where bargaining power comes from and how to choose the best strategy from a mathematical perspective to get you the best payoff.

[Politics_Observer]

@Torus34

See part of bargaining in Game Theory is that you have to be able to make credible threats to strengthen your negotiating position. The other side has to see your threats as credible. In cases where both sides cooperate to get the best payoff each for themselves, their has to be a way for either side to punish the other for not cooperating and trying to get an easy higher payoff initially by causing them to get much lower payoffs afterwards as punishment. This is known as "tit for tat" and the "grim trigger" strategy. Enforcement mechanisms are also important in bargaining and negotiating, otherwise, you can't trust the other side to fulfil their side of the deal without some sort of mechanism to enforce the agreement. You got to have a credible enforcement mechanism for an agreement to be meaningful.

They can take advantage of you to get a higher payoff if you don't have a credible enforcement mechanism. They call this a commitment problem in Game Theory and so you use enforcement mechanisms to solve such commitment problems. However, when first learning Game Theory, the very first problem you should study is the "Prisoner's Dilemma" shown below. You learn to use a simple concept called strict dominance in more simple payoff matrices. You can eliminate strictly dominated strategies to find the Nash Equilibrium for both sides in a simultaneous game in this scenario.

[Torus34]

@Politics_Observer.

Hi again. Thank you for your extensive and informative responses. Math's no problem for me. I did a paper in an advanced class in Number Theory on the calendar. I prefaced it with a quote from the Bible -- the first verses of Ecclesiastes 3.

Now 88, I remain fascinated by both numbers and our remarkable, expressive metaphoric code commonly known as the English language. My only complaint is that I have so little time left [The actuaries are giving me the stink eye,] to learn more.

Regards, and the best to you and yours.

[Politics_Observer]

@Torus34

A lot of the theories we are studying in Game Theory were developed by mathematician John Nash. He is the subject for movie "A Beautiful Mind" in which Russell Crow plays John Nash in the movie. The movie does not accurately show Game Theory and it's vast complexities. Like we use derivatives from Calculus as part Comparative Statics of various strategies and their payoffs over time in Game Theory. Even though you are an older fellow, take the time to read over some of these things if you can. It's very interesting topic.

[Politics_Observer]

@Torus34

I don't mean to pester you, but this is a topic I enjoy and I think you actually might enjoy these two videos in regards to Game Theory and bargaining when their is uncertainty involved. People in a weak bargaining position have an incentive to bluff when the other side does not know their bargaining position. They have that incentive to misrepresent to get a higher payoff. However, if the other side knows their bargaining position and knows their position is weak, then the other side won't make them as a good of an offer. This is why knowledge is power.

Another thing that people bargaining have to consider is the cost of rejection in addition to the fact their might be uncertainty of other other person's bargaining position. If the cost of rejection is high and their is a lot of uncertainty, then the person making the initial offer will make a safer offer. If the cost of rejection is low, then the side making the initial offer will probably make a more aggressive offer because they know the cost of rejection is cheap for them if the other side reject.

However, once an offer is rejected, a weak person who misrepresented themselves as being strong, could try to go back to the person making the offer and lie some more and say, "hey, I was really in a strong bargaining position when you made that offer, you want to make another offer?" But you see, the person doesn't know if that person lied initially and could be lying again, hence why re-negotation is unwise in most cases.

Another thing to consider is that uncertainty can benefit somebody in a weak bargaining position because the other side doesn't know their position. So, the costs of uncertainty benefits the person with a weak bargaining position while costing the person making the initial offer in that the person in a weak bargaining position can get a much better deal than they otherwise would get due to that uncertainty and lack of knowledge by the other side.

[Politics_Observer]

So, when bargaining, if you don't know if the person you are making an offer to is in a strong or weak bargaining position, you base your offer on the probability of whether they are in a weak or strong bargaining position. You also want to take into account the cost of rejection too before making any offers and adjust your offer accordingly so you will likely get the highest payoff AND done deal that is not rejected. Of course, if the cost of rejection is cheap, you can also accept rejection and offer to somebody different who will accept and get you the highest possible payoff. Moreover, if the cost of rejection is high, you will have to make an offer that is a lower payoff to you but a higher payoff to who you are offering to in order to increase the probability they accept so you can avoid a high cost of rejection and still get a payoff.