[Ombrageux]

In modern history, there are many examples of remarkable decline or "failed modernity" of certain nations, which dramatically changed world history and lessened their place in the world. These things are often not understandable, as far as I can see, either in terms of traditional "imperial overstretch" or great power politics. It seems more a question of the national base of the country losing its dynamism and falling behind. I think the qualities leading to this kind of decline, especially if they are outliers, can be described as "decadence."

Examples:

Spain

Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor and lord of more than you care to remember.

Went from explorer and conqueror of the New World and the Spanish Armada of 1588, to being an objectively backward husk of an empire, waiting to preyed upon by France and the Anglo powers. Friedrich List blamed the stifling hold of the Catholic Church in retarding intellectual life. Did this, with the expulsion of Arabs and crypto-Jews, make the country less apt at modernization?

Poland-Lithuania

Russian Tsar Vasili IV kneels before the Polish King, inspiring nostalgia to this day.

Arguably the Polish empire's decline from having the largest territory in Europe and occupying Moscow in 1610, to being carved up into provinces of Prussia, Austria and Russia, can be explained by great power politics. But what about domestic problems? Was the problem the elective monarchy, leading to gradual State disintegration and foreign influence? The liberum veto? What role did Poland's relatively high diversity play?

France

It's great for quality of life, as long as your faster-breeding neighbors don't get any ideas.

With the work of monarchs over 1000 years, France gradually consolidated into a State that was simultaneously strong and reasonably liberal. For much of this period, French culture had a powerful prestige, dominating European elites' culture, in no small part because the country's population was so big, typically almost as big as all the other West European powers put together. However, starting in the late 18th Century, France missed the demographic explosion of its neighbors (whose populations tripled or quadrupled), while France's increased by only about 50%. This alone was enough to turn France from a hegemonic power, to a great power, to a mere middle power. To this day I have not come across any particularly convincing explanation for why this happened, perhaps it having to do with dominant Parisian France's individualist culture, accentuated by the French Revolution. France's economic performance was also mediocre compared to the UK, the U.S. or Germany, but very good by Latin standards and respectable on the whole.

Argentina



In 1900 Argentina, a vast European settler-nation comparable to Canada or Australia, was almost as wealthy as the U.S. and was by any standards a "developed country." After World War II, it totally disconnected. Why? Something about the stock of immigrants (mostly Italian)? Peronism? Part of a wider trend of Latin inaptitude to modern economics (compare: Chile, Portugal, Spain, much of Italy)? The comparison with France is also interesting: The French period of Nation-Statism coincided with full modernization (for a time overtaking and then equalizing with the UK) while the Argentine period of Peronism coincides with the disconnect (although there's no sharp break from Argentina's previous trend, so maybe it's just the country's normal history?).

The flip side would be to look at the remarkable success of certain nations. The Anglo-Americans in particular have been remarkably dynamic and the Japanese were exceptional in Asia.

Ideas?

[Atlantis]

A good starting point is a close comparison of the sociopolitical structures in Spain and the UK at the start of the industrial revolution. Due to its colonies and the "gold of the Americas", Spain was far richer than the UK. However, the Spanish elite preferred the idle life of the nobles, educating its offspring to become bureaucrats or lawyers instead of engaging in productive labor as in the the North of Europe.

The following quote from the 17th century Spanish nobleman Alfonso Nuñez de Castro illustrates this attitude well:

Let London manufacture those fabrics of hers to her heart's content; Holland her chambrays; Florence her cloth; the Indies their beaver and vicuna; Milan her brocades; Italy and Flanders their linens, so long as our capital can enjoy them; the only thing it proves is that all nations train journeymen for Madrid and that Madrid is the queen of Parliaments, for all the world serves her and she serves nobody.

This disdain for productive labor characterizes much of the Southern nobility's attitude and explains the different industrial development in the North and the South even today.

That arrogance is mirrored in today's debate about the sovereignty of EU members which completely ignores the technological and industrial realities of the world as if sovereignty and nationalism were enough to make a nation great.

[Doomhammer]

Philosophical arguments: Hubris & tragedy, vicissitudes of virtu, life cycles of civilizations/nations.
Political "science" arguments: Religious obstacles to modernization
Economic arguments: Imperial overstretch, backward economic systems
International relations: Structural realism: balancing failures, hegemonic wars, and failures of emulation and internal capacity building.

I don't know enough about Argentina to comment on that, but French decline can be explained by devastating wars and social strife in a 30 year period - that's probably why France was not able to recover as quickly in the 19th century as the other great powers; Polish decline is a product of underbalancing against the Habsburgs and Russians while simultaneously balancing against Ottoman Empire, which helped to keep the other two at bay.

As for Spain, the phenomenon is not limited to the Iberian penninsula but applies to the entire Mediterranean world. Somewhere around the late 16th century, they all began to decline. It was because the rising Atlantic powers pretty much took over global trade, thus reducing the profitability of traditional trade routes (i.e. Silk Road, Istanbul, Alexandria, Ragusa, Venice, Genoa, and other Mediterranean ports. Spain and the Ottomans also had the misfortune of becoming hubristic powers whose bureaucracies began to decline, while status quo ideologies became entrenched. The only difference between the Spanish and the Turks: the latter could fight and win wars on occassion.

[Thompson_NCL]

This disdain for productive labor characterizes much of the Southern nobility's attitude and explains the different industrial development in the North and the South even today.

Their attitudes are not much different to those of British, German and Dutch aristocracy then. The industrial revolution had very little to do with the nobility.

[layman]

I think you have summed up many of the factors pretty well. French power was largely based on population as you say. At times it was 4x or 6x as populas as England I beleive.

Pre-Industrial countries are very dependant on their population size for power. This is because labour heavy work like agriculture dominated the economy and armies required large supluses of young fighitng men and food.

Spain could never really compete and was punching above their weight really. It had a modest population and fairly poor quality agriculture, in terms of volume. The big advantage they had was the border with france which was basically impassable for a serious invasion. They also had the royal ties and empire which gave them access to Italian, german and dutch mann power.

Like with Britain, the real suprise is how long they managed to hold on in my view.

[Rich]

Its hard to say that France really declined when they were the number one winners of world I, although they couldn't have done it without Russia, Britain or the United States and probably not without Italy.

[layman]

It is a relative decline. In the early modern period, France was a beast that required constant coalitions to keep them in check.

[Thompson_NCL]

Its hard to say that France really declined when they were the number one winners of world I, although they couldn't have done it without Russia, Britain or the United States and probably not without Italy.

France didn't come out of WWI a winner in any material sense. France declined as a result of the event of 1812-1815. Once Napoleon was defeated, French expansion was checked.

[fuser]

France declined as a result of the event of 1812-1815. Once Napoleon was defeated, French expansion was checked.

Only in Europe. And except for Prussia and later Germany (and Italy) none of the countries were actually expanding into Europe itself after Napoleonic wars.

And as per Poland I think her ddecline basically begun after The Deluge. The Swedish onslaught on Poland which can make Nazi invasion of Poland look puny. Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth never seem to have recovered from the loss of over a quarter of her population.

[layman]

none of the countries were actually expanding into Europe itself after Napoleonic wars.

You could argue that was largely because of French decline and the fact that the balance of power was quite stable.

It is a certainly a relative decline from the norm. That is, France being the terror of Europe. France in 1850 was obviously a better country in absolute terms than in 1750 in terms of wealth, infrastructure, quality of life etc.

Absolute decline is surely when sons are worse off than their fathers etc. Places like modern Afghanistan, Somalia.

[Thompson_NCL]

Only in Europe. And except for Prussia and later Germany (and Italy) none of the countries were actually expanding into Europe itself after Napoleonic wars.

French colonialism post-Waterloo was not significant enough to reverse it's decline. It was still a great power, but it did not enjoy anything similar to the power of the pre-Napoleon era.

This is primarily because the best slices of the world had already been taken by the British, Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese. This and the fact Europe was relatively settled in the 19th century (Pax Britannica) meant that it was difficult for France to regain it's former glory.

I'm struggling to think of the right words here: but in short France's colonial expansions were limited by the European peace. If you cannot steal another colonials powers colonies in the 19th century, you're mostly left with unwanted slices of land. The scramble for Africa was the last chance to stake our a decent empire. Even there, the other powers frustrated French aspirations.

[Potemkin]

Their attitudes are not much different to those of British, German and Dutch aristocracy then. The industrial revolution had very little to do with the nobility.

This is not correct. Many of the first industrialists in Britain in the late 18th century were aristocrats, for example Francis Egerton, 3rd Duke of Bridgewater.

Karl Marx hypothesised that the unusual interest of British aristocrats in productive labour was ultimately due to the Wars of the Roses, which devastated the aristocracy of late medieval England and led to the titles being inherited by third or fourth sons, or by cadet branches of the aristocratic lineage, people who (because of primogeniture) had been expected to inherit nothing and to make their own way in the world. This gave the British aristocracy of the early modern period a certain hard-headed realism and an insatiable desire to make money as well as to spend it.

[Thompson_NCL]

This is not correct. Many of the first industrialists in Britain in the late 18th century were aristocrats, for example Francis Egerton, 3rd Duke of Bridgewater.

Karl Marx hypothesised that the unusual interest of British aristocrats in productive labour was ultimately due to the Wars of the Roses, which devastated the aristocracy of late medieval England and led to the titles being inherited by third or fourth sons, or by cadet branches of the aristocratic lineage, people who (because of primogeniture) had been expected to inherit nothing and to make their own way in the world. This gave the British aristocracy of the early modern period a certain hard-headed realism and an insatiable desire to make money as well as to spend it.

Perhaps, but then you have something like the Corn Laws which shows the interests of the land-holders and manufacturers being opposed to one another. It was the manufacturers who were the biggest advocates for their repeal.

[Potemkin]

Perhaps, but then you have something like the Corn Laws which shows the interests of the land-holders and manufacturers being opposed to one another. It was the manufacturers who were the biggest advocates for their repeal.

Indeed, the land-owning aristocracy were opposed to the repeal of the Corn Laws, as it would further undermine their own economic position. However, it was becoming increasingly obvious to everyone that there was a damn sight more money to be made from industrial capitalism than from rent-collection from tenant farmers. The smart members of the aristocracy therefore began investing their capital in industry and trade, while the non-so-smart ones stuck with the old ways. There is, after all, a reason why the Corn Laws were successfully repealed, despite the overwhelming political and social dominance of the aristocracy at that time in British history.

[Ombrageux]

Can you imagine if the population of France had kept up with Germany? There would be about 150 million Frenchmen today. 200 million if we take the UK as the benchmark. Napoleon's defeat would have been irrelevant to the French's general cultural-political primacy in Europe. The latter had not required a French Empire and had been largely continuous from Saint Louis to the Revolution. Prusso-German hegemony on the Continent would have been inconceivable. (Then again, would a demographically explosive France have been a lot poorer?)

I have not seen any evidence that defeat the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars caused the collapse in French fertility, although it may have played a role. In fact, the drop slightly predates these developments, having become apparent from the second half of the 18th Century. French peasants were apparently practicing a bourgeois Malthusianism, refraining from having children even within marriage, very sensible from the point of view of family inheritance, the environment and land-scarcity, but bad if your neighbors don't follow suit.

Its hard to say that France really declined when they were the number one winners of world I, although they couldn't have done it without Russia, Britain or the United States and probably not without Italy.

There was a huge relative decline, albeit from a very high level, so France remained a great power and a major military, naval, economic, colonial and cultural power.

But victory in the Great War came at a huge cost and was largely squandered. In previous times, after France won a war against a German power it would annex or vassalize huge parts of the country. After World War I, Poincaré tried to do that, but France was far too dependent (in all spheres) on the Anglo-American powers, who didn't want Germany to be excessively punished.

Unfortunately, the mix of the "vindictive" French and the "generous" Anglo approaches meant Germany was injured enough to be vengeful but not weakened enough to be harmless.

Had France not declined so much, it might well have been able to go it alone rather than outsource its foreign policy to the British.

That arrogance is mirrored in today's debate about the sovereignty of EU members which completely ignores the technological and industrial realities of the world as if sovereignty and nationalism were enough to make a nation great.

Here is an, I think, excellent piece on why too crude attempts by "backward" countries to imitate "modern" countries tend to backfire.

France didn't come out of WWI a winner in any material sense. France declined as a result of the event of 1812-1815. Once Napoleon was defeated, French expansion was checked.

Indeed, "grandeur et misère," it was called…

Potemkin - How many children did British aristocrats have? The French ones, despite having few children, tend to be impoverished because of the legal requirement to split their estates equally between sons. So generally the eldest inherited the château but lost the lands required to maintain its upkeep.

[Potemkin]

Potemkin - How many children did British aristocrats have?

Usually a lot. After all, why not? Only the first-born son would inherit anything - the others would be given sufficient education as children to be able to make their own way in the world as doctors, churchmen or lawyers (if they were clever) or army officers (if they were not-so-clever). Estates were therefore kept intact over centuries. The British aristocracy therefore remained a relatively small, compact elite, unlike in France where, as they British witticism had it, "everyone's a Count, but nobody counts for much".

The French ones, despite having few children, tend to be impoverished because of the legal requirement to split their estates equally between sons. So generally the eldest inherited the château but lost the lands required to maintain its upkeep.

The Salic law of inheritance has been a curse on France ever since the time of Charles Martel. It's what caused the collapse of the Carolingian Empire. Utter lunacy.