[ingliz]

There are no perceptual errors. That is a misnomer.

You claim

a) A perfect God 'dreams' a perfect world into existence.

b) A mind-dependent world that is mind-independent of us, finite minds.

c) An objective world because God is unchanging.

and

d) As God doesn't lie, and "what is in my mind now, was first in His", there can be no perceptual errors.

So you are arguing, for the various reasons stated above, that in cases of perceptual relativity, of an object apparently appearing to have different qualities when experienced from a different perspective or under different conditions, there can be no misperceptions as each one of these various immediately experienced or given objects is an object itself - There is no experiential basis for choosing one out of any such set of related perceptual experiences as the one in which the 'object' is itself immediately experienced, they are all separate objects in the world.

Lex parsimoniae

Wouldn't it be simpler to admit the possibility of error.

[Victoribus Spolia]

@ingliz,

A-D are all generally correct, everything has nuance and your descriptions are somewhat imprecise, but they are true as far as they go.

So you are arguing that in cases of perceptual relativity, of an object apparently appearing to have different qualities when experienced from a different perspective or under different conditions, there can be no misperceptions as each one of these various immediately experienced or given objects is an object itself.......Wouldn't it be simpler to admit the possibility of error.

There are no mis-perceptions purely because what you perceive is what you are meant to perceive. For instance, regarding non-verdical images; the realist will argue that our perception is inaccurate when a boat oar appears to bend when placed into the water. Thus, there is a disconnect between what the boat oar "allegedly is in reality" and "what is perceived" (this being a central problem for both direct realist and representational views of perception). My position would argue that what you see is exactly what is in fact happening, the boat oar REALLY bends visually while remaining solid via tactile sensation (thus, even though the oar becomes visually bent, if you were to run your hand along the shaft into the water, it would still feel straight) [See, The Problem of Perception, John Foster].

There is no lie, what you visually perceive is what you visually perceive, what we commonly call perceptual errors are not actually errors, but discontinuities in the succession of phenomena (dreams, etc), discontinuities between intersubjective testimony (people seeing different things), or discontinuities between the various senses (as in the case of the oar). This is why "perceptual error" is a misnomer, not that discontinuities are not acknowledged, they are, but all "perceptual errors" can be explained by simple discontinuity NOT by recourse to a very problematic theory of "real objects" v. "perceived objects," for no real objects can be known but by perception, hence, no theory can explain how the real object is different from what is perceived in an absolute sense.

So in reality, Lex Parsimone is the foundation of this argument. No need to multiply ontological categories (which is the other half of Occam's razor or Lex Parsimone): Non sunt multiplicanda entia sine necessitate My position follows this rule consistently. After all, Bishop Berkeley was a nominalist like Occam himself.

[ingliz]

a very problematic theory

Yours is worse.

When a 'realist' Berkeley introduced an objective mind-independent world into his idealist theory of perception, he left you stuck with all the realist's problems and a few more besides.

On top of that you make problems for yourself.

You reject the Hume-Nietzschean concept of being when it suits you. What I mean is you allow yourself a certain degree of negative comparison in order to speak of being-for-others as well as being-for-yourself. If you do this, it is unclear why this sort of abstraction is permissible, but the similar abstraction to the being-in-itself of realism is not.

[Victoribus Spolia]

When a 'realist' Berkeley introduced an objective mind-independent world into his theory of perception, he left you stuck with all the realist's problems and a few more besides.

No, he left me with all the strengths of solipsism and skepticism with none of its absurdity.

You reject the Hume-Nietzschean concept of being when it suits you. What I mean is you allow yourself a certain degree of negative comparison in order to speak of being-for-others as well as being-for-yourself. If you do this, it is unclear why this sort of abstraction is permissible but the similar abstraction to the being-in-itself of realism is not permissible.

There is no inconsistency, this is but a phantasm of your own invention.

My position is really quite plain, Man is passive in regards to his experience of phenomena which are causally inert and not reflective of anything that is independent of any mind. The origination, connection-to-each-other, and continuity of such phenomena comes from God which serves as the sole possible explanation for such objectivity and constancy.

esse est percipi aut percipere

I don't know what you are referring to by being-in-itself in this context, so I cannot answer that specifically unless you explain yourself a bit better.

[ingliz]

I don't know what you are referring to by being-in-itself

Being-in-itself refers to objects in the external mind-independent world - a mode of existence that simply is.

[Victoribus Spolia]

Being-in-itself refers to objects in the external mind-independent world - a mode of existence that simply is.

So yeah, I have never used, assumed, or appealed to such a notion.

Thus your claim:

You reject the Hume-Nietzschean concept of being when it suits you. What I mean is you allow yourself a certain degree of negative comparison in order to speak of being-for-others as well as being-for-yourself. If you do this, it is unclear why this sort of abstraction is permissible, but the similar abstraction to the being-in-itself of realism is not.

.....is basically all bull-shit.

You would like to think I appeal to such because your mind is struggling to accept the idea that being-in-itself is unnecessary to explain causal origination of phenomena, perceptual constancy, and objectivity.

The fact is, I have shown that objectivity, constancy, and causal origination are all explainable, without error or fallacy, under the system of Phenomenal Idealism and such a system is likewise simpler Lex Parsimone.

I Win.

You Lose.

[ingliz]

all finite minds

According to both Hume and Nietzsche, our only notion of the self is that of this conglomerate of sensation-ideas which we have together with the self as it appears to us, and the only notion of being which we may have, or the only concrete notion, is the notion of 'being an idea for-me.'

You speak of being-for-others - "all finite minds" - as well as being-for-yourself. If you do this, it is unclear why this sort of abstraction is permissible, but the similar abstraction to the being-in-itself of realism is not.

[Victoribus Spolia]

According to both Hume and Nietzsche, our only notion of the self is that of this conglomerate of sensation-ideas which we have together with the self as it appears to us, and the only notion of being which we may have, or the only concrete notion, is the notion of 'being an idea for-me.'

Yeah, Hume was obviously wrong on this as no percept is intelligble apart from being mental content (which he didn't actually deny), in reality our knowledge of self is inferred from its own axiomatic necessity. Its denial is self-contradictory, thus why Hume was wrong. He was likewise wrong in his departure from Berkeley regarding God's existence and for even more dismissive and spurious reasons. He gave no systematic analysis on these points, which are the points that really separate Hume from Berkeley. Indeed, Hume could not refute the cogito and argued that it could not be refuted, This is because such is basically the same as a concrete notion of self rooted in necessary supposition.

You speak of being-for-others - "all finite minds" - as well as being-for-yourself. If you do this, it is unclear why this sort of abstraction is permissible, but the similar abstraction to the being-in-itself of realism is not.

The only abstraction permissible given this would be Percipere.


Not coincidentally, this is one of the only two ontological categories in my system.

Like I said, my system is pretty simple and plain. What sort of abstractions are "permissible" are quite obvious.

Either minds or mental content. The former is inferred by necessary inference, the latter is an object of awareness directly known.

Whats so hard about this?

[ingliz]

the latter is an object of awareness directly known.

This is where Berkeley screwed you. A mind-independent world cannot be directly known.

[Victoribus Spolia]

This is where Berkeley screwed you. A mind-independent world cannot be directly known.

Agreed.



Percepts are directly known because they are mind dependent.

Don't start deteriorating in your reading comprehension too. That is the only thing your hanging on by at this point.

[ingliz]

Percepts are directly known because they are mind dependent.

Define 'known'.

A) First, one has a sense datum.

B) When one has a sense datum, one is necessarily immediately and infallibly aware of that sense datum. This immediate awareness is known as “sensing” or “being acquainted with” the sense datum.

C) By virtue of this acquaintance, one is in a position to know that one has a sense datum of the kind that one in fact has.

D) One then makes inferences about the mind-independent world to explain the series of sense data that one has.

Epistemological objection.

Either the immediate awareness of a sense datum mentioned in (b) and (c) is propositional in form (that is, it is the awareness that the sense datum has F, where F is some property), or it is non-propositional. If the awareness is propositional then it requires the application of concepts. For instance, to be aware that a sense datum is red, one must first have the concept of redness. This is problematic, because it is generally thought that perceptual awareness ought to precede and be independent of concepts. On the other hand, if the awareness in step (b) is non-propositional, then it cannot give one the knowledge posited in step (c), because that knowledge is propositional — it involves the knowledge that one's sense datum is of a certain kind — and a non-propositional state cannot support a proposition. (Sellars 2000)

The objection is to the idea of any form of direct awareness providing us with knowledge, whether it be awareness of sense data, mind-independent objects (objects-in-the world), states of being appeared to, or anything else.

[Victoribus Spolia]

A) First, one has a sense datum.

B) When one has a sense datum, one is necessarily immediately and infallibly aware of that sense datum. This immediate awareness is known as “sensing” or “being acquainted with” the sense datum.

I would argue we are directly aware of percepts, not sense-datum, we extrapolate separate sense-datum from the phenomenal experience. We do not have "sensations" and then form a perceptual world out of them, that is Kantian silliness.

D) One then makes inferences about the mind-independent world to explain the series of sense data that one has.

Who does this? Not Phenomenal Idealists, retards and realists yes (same thing), but not Idealists.

Either the immediate awareness of a sense datum mentioned in (b) and (c) is propositional in form (that is, it is the awareness that the sense datum has F, where F is some property), or it is non-propositional. If the awareness is propositional then it requires the application of concepts. For instance, to be aware that a sense datum is red, one must first have the concept of redness. This is problematic, because it is generally thought that perceptual awareness ought to precede and be independent of concepts. On the other hand, if the awareness in step (b) is non-propositional, then it cannot give one the knowledge posited in step (c), because that knowledge is propositional — it involves the knowledge that one's sense datum is of a certain kind — and a non-propositional state cannot support a proposition. (Sellars 2000)

Excellent points here actually.

I do not deny secondary consciousness (Awareness of a more abstract variety) in contrast to primary consciousness (direct perception).

conceptual knowledge, being mental content, cannot originate from non-conceptual mental content, I agree with Sellars on this. Whether or not concepts are "perceived" is somewhat of a semantic debate and as a nominalist I obviously deny the notion of universalia ante rem or universalia in res.

Rather, all mental content; whether perceptual or propositional (which could be considered as in some way perceptual), originates from God.

This is why I prefer to describe my position, as I did in my original debate post, as the belief in minds and mental content even though I still will use perceivers and the perceived (the traditional Berkeleyan view) in spite of its imprecision.

The objection is to the idea of any form of direct awareness providing us with knowledge, whether it be awareness of sense data, mind-independent objects (objects-in-the world), states of being appeared to, or anything else.

Its a good point, except one would enter a vicious cycle if the constituent points of knowledge cannot themselves be said to be known being they are the basis of knowledge itself.

For instance, assuming Gettier was wrong, if knowledge is a justified true belief, can we know of pure "justification" if justification is itself a component part of knowledge? How can you know of something more epistemologically basic than knowledge itself? This is problematic.

without embracing Ayn Rand's error of ostensive definition, one should realize, as with qualia, that there are those things which are irreducibly basic components of subjective experience (sensations or what you might call sense-datum); but which are themselves only intelligible via communication through propositional reasoning, for propostions alone can be true or false. Redness is neither true nor false, even if its reality is an object of awareness even more basic to us than writing out propositions. Which is why, having an experience that cannot be identified in a proposition can be said to be unintelligible to us and rightfully so.

None of this debate though, implies realism or a mind-independent reality, only whether or not pure phenomena are knowledge, my stated position in my debate post can comprehend both sides of that debate without error, for both are still mental content and therefore can only exist in a mind.

[ingliz]

a mind-independent reality... Not Phenomenal Idealists

Don't be silly.

God's objective dreamt world independent of finite minds is a mind-independent world, independent of us.

Note:

A-D are all generally correct, everything has nuance and your descriptions are somewhat imprecise, but they are true as far as they go.

b) A mind-dependent world that is mind-independent of us, finite minds.

[Victoribus Spolia]

Don't be silly.

God's objective dreamt world independent of finite minds is a mind-independent world, independent of us.

Note:

False, everything you mentioned was either a mind (God, finite minds), or mental content (thoughts, percepts, etc.)

No mind-independent reality was mentioned by you.

Your confusion seems to stem from an elementary failure to distinguish between solipsism and idealism. Both views argue that there is no mind-independent reality, the difference between a solipsist and an idealist is not on that point, only on the point of whether there are more minds than their own. That is all.

b) A mind-dependent world that is mind-independent of us, finite minds.

Sure, and depending on what you mean, you are equivocating which is why I said my agreement was general because your use of terms were likely imprecise (knowing that you are a sophist required me to make such a qualification because you have shown yourself untrustworthy in debate to play honest, probably because of your denial of objective morals).

If the world is mind-dependent, it cannot be mind-independent in the sense of existing as neither a mind or mental content. However, such is mind-independent only if you mean independent of my own personal mind.

Assuming, perhaps too generously, that this is what you meant, is why I gave my general and qualified assent. If you mean something else, I will rescind my assent on that basis if needed.

[ingliz]

cannot be mind-independent

Unless you are arguing you have privileged access to God's mind, God's objective mind-dependent world is 'real' (mind-independent) for finite minds, and can be treated as such.

A mind-independent world cannot be known directly. Whether an object is 'in' the physical world or God's reality makes not a ha'porth of difference. Our perception of the object would be the same in both cases and the Problem of the External World is back.

[Victoribus Spolia]

Unless you are arguing you have privileged access to God's mind, God's objective mind-dependent world is 'real' (mind-independent) for finite minds, and can be treated as such.

We all have privileged access to the content of God's mind in regards to whatever perceptions we are currently having, as they originate necessarily in His.

If you are only speaking about perceptions we are not having, you are correct since we cannot know of things we have yet to know of.

However, that is not the problem of the external world that realists have, realists cannot justify the claim that perception corresponds to a mind-independent reality.

Idealists deny a mind-independent reality and so there is no "other" substance to which our perceptions correspond (and hence no problem of an external world).

So, your are confusing two separate matters. The one is unique to realists and can never apply to idealists, the other is technically a problem for everyone including idealists (except Idealists are actually honest about it), which is that the belief that we will continue to have perceptions into the future and that other perceptual places exist independent of me personally seeing them are manifestly not provable(even if being justifiable presuppositions given God's existence from a transcendental perspective).

[ingliz]

We all have privileged access to the content of God's mind

Berkeley disagrees.

God, not being an idea, is not knowable directly.

Not that I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate View

Principles 148

[Victoribus Spolia]

Berkeley disagrees.

God, not being an idea, is not knowable directly.

Not that I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate View

Principles 148

God is not directly perceived, that is correct.

Since I never claimed otherwise. You are wrong. Again (since I addressed already once before)

You Lose.

[ingliz]

Idealists deny a mind-independent reality

God's objective mind-dependent world is 'real' (mind-independent) for finite minds, and can be treated as such.

Can be treated as such...

If not, why not?

[Victoribus Spolia]

Can be treated as such...

This is an ambiguous remark, please clarify it.

Because I don't if you mean percepts we are currently having or ones we have yet to have (yet to experience).

For instance, are you saying that we ought to presume or act like we presume that there exists rooms in a house that I am not currently perceiving?

Or are you saying we ought to presume or act like we presume that percepts have a corresponding mind-independent reality?

If the former, sure. That would be justifiable given the presupposition of God's existence. The demonstration of such a presupposition would be transcendental.

If the latter, then no, I see no justification for that claim at all.

That is, the realist thesis that there exists a corresponding mind-independent "real object" for every perceptual object remains false even as a presupposition, so God's existence and His having all percepts in totality would still not give justification to such a claim.

However, if you are simply saying we should act as if we live on a planet with places that have some perceptual reality even when we are not presently experiencing them, that is justifiable as God is assumed to have all percepts in His own Mind anyway.