[ingliz]

efficacy is by definition NOT causally inert.

You are forgetting that abstracta by definition have no causally relevant properties and properties are abstract entities.

You lose.

for such cannot be the source of mental content.

Then obviously, He is not the source of mental content and Berkeley was wrong.

However, if God is shown as the necessary condition, source, or basis for an event...

You have not shown that God is the necessary condition, source, or basis for an event.

[Victoribus Spolia]

You are forgetting that abstracta by definition have no causally relevant properties.

You lose.

Thats the definition I was asking for genius.

IF that were so, then neither God nor properties in general could be abstracta.

Then obviously, He is not the source of mental content and Berkeley was wrong.

No, it means God isn't abstracta, Berkeley's argument was a necessary inference, the same one I used.

You have not shown that God is the necessary condition, source, or basis for an event.

In my original debate post, second half. Try reading it.



I love how when you get owned on a point, you just drop it and stop talking about and refuse to answer the questions I ask you.

This is why you are a troll and not a serious opponent. It makes me wonder why I waste my time with your crap.

[B0ycey]

You may not see it as it will be published under my actual name once I finish my Ph.D.

It will likely be a in small academic book written under the name Dr._________Ph.D., Th.M., B.A.

Plus, I plan on combining it with my moral argument in the other thread into one single argument. I was actually inspired by something said by Ingliz (I think) that showed me that I can actually start from a single axiom to infer both my moral and metaphysical position at the same time. I can't wait to get started on it. Its going to be epic.





Your highly-advanced professional opinion means so much to me, I just don't know how I can go on without your approval.

Perhaps I may never see it. You could of course use a pseudonym and tell people on PoFo who you are. But it if has any solid foundation to it, especially if it is logically sound as you claim, then perhaps I might. If you can prove the existence of God - even within logic, and your peers agree complicity, you will become famous VS. Think of that. Naturally if your peers think the things you claim to be fallacious are not fallacious and you are working on assumptions, less so I guess.

[Victoribus Spolia]

There will never be an academic consensus that God exists. No matter how good my argument is.

you will become famous VS. Think of that.

I try not to.

Naturally if your peers think the things you claim to be fallacious are not fallacious and you are working on assumptions, less so I guess.

There is no disagreement on the fallacies, the debate will be over the syllogistic structure etc, unstated premises (if any), etc.

That is usually how it goes.

[ingliz]

God isn't abstracta

Individuals are causally efficacious concreta whereas properties are causally impotent abstracta.

If God is a concrete individual and his nature (conceived perhaps as the conjunction of his omni-attributes) is an abstract property, then the general ontology rules out an identity of God with his nature. Any such identity would violate the separateness of the two realms. To identify an unexemplifiable concretum with an exemplifiable abstractum would amount to an ontological category mistake. (Vallicella 2015)

[Victoribus Spolia]

Individuals are causally efficacious concreta whereas properties are casually impotent abstracta.

I don't know of any individuals that are causally efficacious except God.

Please prove to me how an individual can cause anything. PLEASE.

If God is a concrete individual and his nature (conceived perhaps as the conjunction of his omni-attributes) is an abstract property, then the general ontology rules out an identity of God with his nature. Any such identity would violate the separateness of the two realms. To identify an unexemplifiable concretum with an exemplifiable abstractum would amount to an ontological category mistake. (Vallicella 2015)

He is both; The One and The Many (Bahnsen 1998) The Concrete Universal. (Van Til 1927)

[ingliz]

I don't know of any individuals that are causally efficacious.

Obviously acts, singly and collectively, have causal effect. Why would one bother to choose a particular path, to calculate the causal efficacy of ones actions in achieving specific goals, if they didn't?

[Victoribus Spolia]

singly and collectively, have causal effect.

How so? I see a lot of sequences and correlations, I don't see any causes.

Why would one have an ability to decide, to calculate the causal efficacy of ones actions in achieving specific goals, if they didn't?

Who knows, but the existence of such "calculations" is no proof of causal efficacy. Thats silly talk. You cannot infer actual causation from your belief that you are causally efficacious in your actions, such a conclusion cannot be inferred from that premise.

So, do you know of any individuals that are actually efficacious?

I don't see any.

[ingliz]

You cannot ...

What is good for the goose is good for the gander. You seem happy to infer a mind-dependent universe from your belief in a Christian god.

[Victoribus Spolia]

You seem happy to infer a mind-dependent universe from your belief in a Christian god.

Actually, if you read my argument, I inferred the existence of a mind independent reality from the Axiom of human mentality, and inferred the necessity of the Trinitarian God by the nature of this human mentality and reality itself.

What is good for the goose is good for the gander.

Tu Qoque regardless.

[ingliz]

the necessity of the Trinitarian God

A Trinitarian God does not cohere with Divine Simplicity. You arguing both is self-evidently incoherent.

[Victoribus Spolia]

A Trinitarian God does not cohere with Divine Simplicity. You arguing both is self-evidently incoherent.

False. the persons of the Trinity are not parts of God, thus Trinitarianism is not contradictory with doctrine of Divine simplicity.

The Trinity is inferred necessarily in my argument and all that can be known about it from plain reason independent of the Scriptures and teachings of the Fathers is expressed in that proof. I will say nothing more or less than that about it.

Here is some basics of Trinitarianism for you in a funny and easily digested way.

[ingliz]

Trinitarianism is not contradictory with doctrine of Divine simplicity

Trinitarianism says

(A) the Father is not identical with the Son

Divine Simplicity says

(B) the Father is identical to the divine essence;

and

(C) the Son is identical to the divine essence.

If these statements are accepted, then according to the law of identity, it follows that

(D) the Father is identical to the Son.

In other words, if someone asserts (B) and (C), then they must accept (D). But (D) directly contradicts (A), which completely undermines Trinitarian doctrine.

Thus, Divine Simplicity totally contradicts a basic tenet of the doctrine of the Trinity.

If I remember rightly you borrowed an argument from Dolezal in another thread. An argument founded on the distinction between univocal and analogical language for God. The Thomastic proposal: "while God’s personal relations are really distinct from each other, there is no real distinction between the personal relations and the divine substance" (Dolezal 2014), but Dolezal failed to solve the identity probem.

Saying that Father and Son are not identical because they are identical with their relations, Father is identical with paternity and Son is identical with filiation, doesn't help you if you do not deny that the Father, Son, and Spirit are identical with the divine essence - You are still stuck to the identity thesis.

[Victoribus Spolia]

Thus, Divine Simplicity totally contradicts a basic tenet of the doctrine of the Trinity.

Its not a violation of the Divine Simplicity so long as the persons of the Trinity are not parts.

St. Augustine posited two different ways of describing the relation contra the greek terms used at Nicaea (St. Augustine had a problem with the wording the greeks used).

Augustine argued that the better terms of relation would either be One Essentia and Three Substantia, or One Substantia and Three Personae....(I am going a bit off of memory here regarding his argument in De Trinitate.

His Psychological analogy was somewhat influential (indirectly) on my argument which was more closely based on Jonathan Edwards' work in his Unpublished Essay on the Trinity, as well as some notions from Zen philosophy, specifically the work of Masao Abe.

If you look at my actual argument, it establishes a common essence (or substance) and three distinct persons in a way that solves the issue you bring up and it does so by a chain of necessary inference. It is literally the last section of my original debate post and I would be happy to debate it with you.

If I remember rightly you borrowed an argument from Dolezal in another thread. An argument founded on the distinction between univocal and analogical language for God. The Thomastic proposal: "while God’s personal relations are really distinct from each other, there is no real distinction between the personal relations and the divine substance" (Dolezal 2014), but Dolezal failed to solve the identity probem.

If I did, it was purely coincidental, I don't think I actually read his work and I just checked and he did not contribute to my preferred go-to book on the philosophical-theology of the Trinity; https://www.amazon.com/Philosophical-Th ... 0199216215

Saying that Father and Son are not identical because they are identical with their relations, Father is identical with paternity and Son is identical with filiation, doesn't help you if you do not deny that the Father, Son, and Spirit are identical with the divine essence - You are still stuck to the identity thesis.

I don't think so, its the nature of paternity, filiation, and procession in regards to personae that matters. If these relations were purely verbal and could not establish distinct selves, sure I would agree, but my argument can establish not mere filiation-identity, but filiation-as-distinct-self with a common essence to paternity-as-distinct-self, and procession-as-distinct-self.

The problem with older approaches to Psychological arguments is that "self-reflection" or "love" could not be called "persons" but only relations. Hence, unitarianism was still a problem.

However, my argument overcomes this.

[annatar1914]

Its not a violation of the Divine Simplicity so long as the persons of the Trinity are not parts.

St. Augustine posited two different ways of describing the relation contra the greek terms used at Nicaea (St. Augustine had a problem with the wording the greeks used).

And therein lies a problem, once you confuse the Relations with the Hypostases and the common Essence of the Triune Godhead, which is unknowable. But we can discuss the Cappodocian Fathers, St. Photius the Great and his ''Mystogogy of the Holy Spirit'', the distinction between the Energies of God and His Essence, the ''procession of the Holy Spirit', etc... Some other time

[ingliz]

as [finite] minds have objects of satisfaction and God (as a mind) would fall by default under the same categorical requirements of any other mind.

Anthropomorphism!

God's mind is unknowable. (Romans 11:34)

"self-reflection" or "love"

Religious language is meaningless; all God-talk is reification of the ineffable. (Silouan 2014)

[Victoribus Spolia]

God's mind is unknowable.

But he is still a mind.

Hence there is a categorical reference, man is Imago Dei after all.

Besides, anthropomorphisms are used by God Himself to describe Himself in Scripture.

Religious language is meaningless; all God-talk is reification of the ineffable. (Silouan 2014)

Nonsense.

and therein lies a problem, once you confuse the Relations with the Hypostases and the common Essence of the Triune Godhead, which is unknowable.

Undoubtedly you would think so as an easterner. I believe St. Augustine, following St. Hilary, St. Ambrose, and Tertullian made important and cogent qualifications regarding Nicaea of which the latin fathers were not appropriately represented. Arianism and such heresies were not nearly as much of a problem in the west as in the east and the Latin fathers believed this was because of their understanding of the Trinity as they had always held and confessed. Not that there was a denial of Nicaea, it was accepted as "sufficient" in response to heretics, though its expansion was necessary in following synods and councils.

Had the Latin Fathers been the ones to pen it, no further controversies would have persisted and St. Athanasius never would have been banished by St. Constantine.

But we can discuss the Cappodocian Fathers, St. Photius the Great and his ''Mystogogy of the Holy Spirit'', the distinction between the Energies of God and His Essence, the ''procession of the Holy Spirit', etc... Some other time

No doubt. I would love to have this discussion. The middle name of my second son comes from one of the Cappodocian fathers. (I won't name him here for sake of anonymity).

[annatar1914]

Victoribus, you wrote;

Undoubtedly you would think so as an easterner.

Well, I am a Westerner, I just think that the east avoided some bad theological language which reared it's head in the West. I'm still a huge admirer of St. Augustine and the Western Orthodox Fathers, but I think the later Papist heresy used the language of these Fathers, much as the Monophysites did with St. Cyril's, to justify their apostasy. You will find for an example that after the final separation you have Anselm of Canterbury's work cherry picking the Western Fathers, and a very different Soteriology which obscures the fact that the Orthodox Fathers East and West are basically in agreement. It's not an ''East/West'' thing so much either; you had a school of thought among the Antiochene Fathers in Syria which was Orthodox but eventually by exaggeration produced Nestorianism, and a school of thought of the Fathers in Alexandria Egypt which was Orthodox but by exaggeration produced Monophysitism/Miaphysitism.

And so in the West you have Papism, likewise riddled with Trinitarian, Christological, and Ecclesiastical heresy.

I believe St. Augustine, following St. Hilary, St. Ambrose, and Tertullian made important and cogent qualifications regarding Nicaea of which the latin fathers were not appropriately represented.

I think that if we have a further discussion on this issue elsewhere, you would find that in the later Councils of Orthodoxy, the Canons and Anathemas of the Right-Believing Western Fathers are formally represented in some detail.

Arianism and such heresies were not nearly as much of a problem in the west as in the east and the Latin fathers believed this was because of their understanding of the Trinity as they had always held and confessed. Not that there was a denial of Nicaea, it was accepted as "sufficient" in response to heretics, though its expansion was necessary in following synods and councils.

At the particular time, yes, but later as the Patriachate in Old Rome got more and more uppity, that ''understanding'' blossomed into error with an unambiguous misunderstanding of the procession of the Holy Spirit in eternity as well as operation in time in the world

Had the Latin Fathers been the ones to pen it, no further controversies would have persisted and St. Athanasius never would have been banished by St. Constantine.

Lol, not sure about that, but I do think that one needs the balance afforded by all the Fathers; Alexandrian, Antiochene, Old Roman, New Roman, Moscovite, in their totality, not taking them in isolation. That's why you have Patriarchs like St. Cyril Lucaris who are so special and important to understand and not misinterpret, either.

No doubt. I would love to have this discussion. The middle name of my second son comes from one of the Cappodocian fathers. (I won't name him here for sake of anonymity).

God willing and the creek don't rise, we'll get around to it.

[ingliz]

Nonsense

God’s nature is taken to be both inconceivable and inexpressible. It follows from this that in saying, for example, "God is good", one does not succeed in representing God in either thought or language.

Also

We cannot say that God is "good" because God’s simplicity precludes his having the quality of goodness. Nor can we speak of any relation of similarity between God and creatures. Relations are accidental properties and God does not have accidental properties. So any relation between God and another thing must be denied of God.

Scripture.

The Bible regularly ascribes different qualities to God, so what?

[Victoribus Spolia]

As God’s nature is taken to be both inconceivable and inexpressible. We cannot say that God is "good" because God’s simplicity precludes his having the quality of goodness. Nor can we speak of any relation of similarity between God and creatures. Relations are accidental properties and God does not have accidental properties. So any relation between God and another thing must be denied of God.

That is not true. We can speak of God in the manner that speaks of Himself in Scripture, which is where the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity is ultimately derived as well.

Likewise, the doctrine of divine simplicity is a doctrine of clarification, thus, when speaking of the "decrees" of God, we are technically speaking of a single act, but speak of them separately out of human necessity and with good justification regarding God's own condescension in human language.

It follows from this that in saying, for example, "God is good", one does not succeed in representing God in either thought or language.

The doctrine that God cannot be spoke of is not an orthodox (atleast latin orthodox) doctrine. We can speak of God inasmuch as speaks of Himself and how such has been understood by the church catholic as guided by the Holy Spirit.

The Bible regularly ascribes different qualities to God, so what?

Thus anthropomorphic language is not ipso facto impious, as you insinuated.