[Victoribus Spolia]

Where?

All I see is an obfuscating tangle of pseudo-theological babble.

No argument then?

Good.

Thanks for clearing that up.

It just means a necessary being is metaphysically possible and on S5 if it's metaphysically possible then it exists. If you deny that it's metaphysically possible then you deny its existence. A theist can't deny the metaphysical possibility of God and still be a theist, that would be a contradiction. To say God is metaphysically possible shouldn't be taken as a metaphysical principle over and above God which makes his existence possible, God would still exist by the necessity of His own nature, it just means that there is no metaphysical principle which can prevent or preclude God's existence.

Was that was Ingliz was saying though?

It seems his premise one and three were equivocation on God's definition as "Great" in the sense that "Great" precluded the possibility of his non-existence by definition (one way he defined God), but then his whole case revolves around there being a possible world where such a "Great" being might not exist (thus contradicting the very definition of the Being he is purporting to prove as non-existent.)

If God is by definition necessarily existence (thus assuming such a definition as having been established), then there is no way you can prove his possible non-existence as a stepping stone to argue for absolute non-existence.

I might still be missing something, but possibility is contingency and contingency is the opposite of necessity, so I don't see how you can argue for a Being that is defined as necessarily existent as having a contingent existence at the same time. That seems ludicrous.

I see what you're saying and I agree that metaphysics and epistemology do, to certain extent, implicate each other, but still, it's possible for something to exist that we can't have direct knowledge of, that we can only know of by inference, and for us to have and idea of something that doesn't in fact exist.

Well, even though I do contend your conclusion, Like I said, I don't want to interrupt your debate with Ingliz; even though you clearly don't need any help with him.

[ingliz]

As was demonstrated above in the maxim and corollary to P1; the state of needing some object outside of oneself for satisfaction is a state of dependence, but God is only in an independent state. Since this is the case, God is never in need of some object outside of Himself for satisfaction; thus, God is His own object of satisfaction.

It must be kept in mind that it is impossible for any mind to comprehend pure-self (subject), for the thinking subject and object of thought are necessarily distinct (the subject-object distinction). That being said, an idea of one’s self (the object of thought) is still a reflection of one’s pure self (subject). Thus, it is true that an idea of one’s self is therefore the same and yet distinct from the pure self. Since this is the case, and He Himself must the Object of Satisfaction for God, it follows that God the Father’s idea of Himself (object of satisfaction) is the same and yet distinct from His pure self.

A wholly comprehensive idea (object of thought) of oneself, which reflects the pure-self (thinking subject), is necessarily a duplicate of the pure-self (thinking subject); however, God alone can have a wholly comprehensive idea of Himself due to his attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence (which have already been established). Thus, the Object of God’s self-satisfaction is fully God as God the Father (the thinking subject) is God, and is therefore the duplicated thinking subject of God, which shall now be referred to as the Son, being eternally generated and sharing a single essence. The Son is Therefore Eternally Begotten (Generated) of The Father.

Satisfaction in-and-of itself lacks any meaning apart from, and is therefore, in a sense, the same as the object of love or satisfaction, and yet this affection of satisfaction is distinct from the object of satisfaction (love) itself, in that love or satisfaction is not inseparably related to any particular object of love or satisfaction by reason of necessity. Hence, satisfaction or love is the same as, and yet distinct from, the object of love or satisfaction itself.

Since the Father and The Son share the same essence of independence which necessitates perfect self-satisfaction that can only be accomplished via having a perfect object of such, the Father and the Son (as the perfect thinking object of the Father’s thought) must share, by logical necessity, a mutual satisfaction (love) with each other, as each is the object of the other’s satisfaction. The mutual Love shared between the Father and the Son is the same, and yet distinct, from themselves (as was discussed in the previous paragraph); Thus, the Love of God is fully God as God the Father is God and God the Son is God, for to be the same as God is to share His essentia, but to be distinct is to be distinct in substantia or personae. The Love of God is the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is Eternally Proceeding from the Father and The Son.

for the thinking subject and object of thought are necessarily distinct (the subject-object distinction). That being said blah ... blah ..blah

The thinking subject being you and the object of thought, God.

Idealism destroys the subject-object relation. It's claims can be substantiated only provided it is true that to know is to generate the reality known. (Perry 1912)

God may owe his existence to the mind of man.


You lose.

"Great" precluded the possibility of his non-existence by definition

Why? I believe the opposite. The characteristics required of a maximally great being (as defined by you) cannot coexist in one being, thus such a being could not exist. (Himma 2001)

If God is by definition necessarily existen[t]

Why is a non-existent God necessarily existent ?

[B0ycey]

I don't want to degrade this debate as I am a firm believer that Immaterialism exists to some extent. But the argument for a supreme mind being required for our perception doesn't commute with reality - and more importantly VSs argument actually isn't an argument at all. It is just one large assumption with more assumptions layered on top of it.

Anyway, any damage to our brain alters our perception of the world around us, but in reality nothing changes to another perception from another mind. So if God creates perception, why does a functioning brain trump over that what God creates for our senses?

[ingliz]

VSs argument actually isn't an argument at all.

It's 'logic' - Crap in, crap out.

All such arguments are conditional upon the premises and axioms used. His is further flawed by its use of self-referential constructs.

[B0ycey]

...But they are not really axioms if they are not accepted as true. Just statements of purpose. I think Saekos first post pretty much highlights all the assumptions in this argument and kills if off straight away actually. Although really this whole debate is one big farce of believing one to be correct rather than proving that one is correct.

Nonetheless I do like the arrogance of VS claiming that the onus is on the opposition to disprove the claim rather than it being on the claimant to prove his claim. I wonder if the science community could get away with that notion when presenting one of their theories to the world?

[ingliz]

one big farce of believing one to be correct

Not guilty.

I am committed to a position of 'What is epistemically possible may be true, for all we know; it may not'. As to God's existence, I choose to think not (I may be wrong).

[Victoribus Spolia]

The thinking subject being you and the object of thought, God.

No, I am only referring to God here. Clearly you have reading issues.

dealism destroys the subject-object relation. It's claims can be substantiated only provided it is true that to know is to generate the reality known. (Perry 1912)

That is about as untrue of a statement as I ever heard in my life. The subject-object distinction is fundamental to idealism, and a finite mind does not generate its own mental content.

God may owe his existence to the mind of man.

I have shown the order of causality simply cannot work that way. Ridiculous and unsubstantiated claim.

Why? I believe the opposite. The characteristics required of a maximally great being (as defined by you) cannot coexist in one being, thus such a being could not exist. (Himma 2001)

This is obviously false as I have already proven that they can.

Why is a non-existent God necessarily existent ?

Petito Principii.

But the argument for a supreme mind being required for our perception doesn't commute with reality

As an Immaterialist; where do your perceptions come from?

more importantly VSs argument actually isn't an argument at all. It is just one large assumption with more assumptions layered on top of it.

How so? Where did I give an assumption that was not either an obvious axiom or a deductive argument.

After all, an assumption is not an axiom and is merely asserted without proof. Please show me where I did this.

Anyway, any damage to our brain alters our perception of the world around us, but in reality nothing changes to another perception from another mind. So if God creates perception, why does a functioning brain trump over that what God creates for our senses?

Cum Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc and/or Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc.

But they are not really axioms if they are not accepted as true.

That is obviously false, an axiom is an axiom if you must assume its truth to argue against it.

I think Saekos first post pretty much highlights all the assumptions in this argument and kills if off straight away actually.

Where is she again?

Also, feel free to defend her points so I can crush them again, its quite enjoyable actually.

Nonetheless I do like the arrogance of VS claiming that the onus is on the opposition to disprove the claim rather than it being on the claimant to prove his claim.

According to the Law Parsimony I am correct on this, especially when my opponent insists on something without proof. She assumes the existence of matter and material causation.

This is the whole irony and why your remarks here merely show your contempt for me and your understandable bias. My position is not only ontologically simpler, but I have laid down the clear framework that if you are going to claim to hold to a scientific worldview, but cannot prove the most fundamental aspect of that worldview (physical reality) without assuming my position, you must either drop the existence of mind-independent substance (and therefore accept my position) or prove the existence of mind-independent substance.

The former was refused and the latter cannot be done. This is the oldest argument of Phenomenal Idealism and Immaterialism coming straight from Berkeley, and it cannot be refuted.

You are free to try, but your shit-talking is nothing but that, shit-talking.

I admit, I have unpopular views that the godless heathen here on PoFo absolutely despise, but despise them all they want, they cannot be refuted.

I am taking all challengers.

[Saeko]

So basically the whole goal of the "LGBT Agenda" is to mention that gay people exist.

[Sivad]

I might still be missing something, but possibility is contingency and contingency is the opposite of necessity, so I don't see how you can argue for a Being that is defined as necessarily existent as having a contingent existence at the same time. That seems ludicrous.

Metaphysical possibility is distinct from contingency. Contingency is could have been otherwise, metaphysical possibility is just not metaphysically impossible. Possibly necessary just means that it's not impossible that God exists in all possible worlds, ie, it's not impossible that God exists necessarily. There is the Aristotelian definition of possibility as a nonessential, accidental property of a thing and that would be contingency, but in modal logic possibility is that which is not prevented by anything from existing or occurring.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjunctive_possibility

[B0ycey]

As an Immaterialist; where do your perceptions come from?

As I have already stated in other threads, I agree with the premise but not the conclusion in regards to immaterialism.

Nonetheless our perception comes from our minds, not God. The proof? A human body comes with all the tools for perception from eyes to see, ears to hear, fingers to touch, noses to smell and tougues to taste. If God creates perception over our own mind, why is it that the human body no longer perceives and the body loses consciousness if the brain loses oxygen if God is the driver of such phenomenon?

How so? Where did I give an assumption that was not either an obvious axiom or a deductive argument.

After all, an assumption is not an axiom and is merely asserted without proof. Please show me where I did this.

You want to know where you did this? Every single point you claim is an axiom.

From what I have read, people aren't arguing your axioms from a position of truth, but on a position that there is no truth to them - ie an assumption.

That is obviously false, an axiom is an axiom if you must assume its truth to argue against it.

But apart from you, who exactly is arguing from a position of truth to them? You know I disregard all your definitions and I certainly am not arguing from a position that there is any truth to your axioms either. Quite the opposite. I regard them as assumptions not facts.

Where is she again?

Also, feel free to defend her points so I can crush them again, its quite enjoyable actually.

There is no point in me arguing for them as I wasn't happy with the response you gave her to be frank. Do I really need to read babble again? She basically repeated her points in the second post btw and you claimed victory in your third without actually addressing them at all. What makes you think that I expect differently from you if I repeat her points to you?

According to the Law Parsimony I am correct on this, especially when my opponent insists on something without proof. She assumes the existence of matter and material causation.

This is the whole irony and why your remarks here merely show your contempt for me and your understandable bias. My position is not only ontologically simpler, but I have laid down the clear framework that if you are going to claim to hold to a scientific worldview, but cannot prove the most fundamental aspect of that worldview (physical reality) without assuming my position, you must either drop the existence of mind-independent substance (and therefore accept my position) or prove the existence of mind-independent substance.

The former was refused and the latter cannot be done. This is the oldest argument of Phenomenal Idealism and Immaterialism coming straight from Berkeley, and it cannot be refuted.

You are free to try, but your shit-talking is nothing but that, shit-talking.

I admit, I have unpopular views that the godless heathen here on PoFo absolutely despise, but despise them all they want, they cannot be refuted.

I am taking all challengers.

Spare me your tears VS. And sure believe what you like. But if you cannot prove your claim then it has as much 'truth' to it as myself claiming that pink unicorns live underground on the dark side of the Moon and who become invisible every time humans gaze on their presence. The onus of proof is on the claimant not the opponent to disprove the claim for that reason. After all, anyone can make a claim without proof. But proving the claim is the difference between a Nobel prize and global acceptance to dismission and obscurity. And this is Especially true in regards to something that requires faith and imagination to exist to begin with - in regards to intectual studies such as science and philosophy I mean. In other words, Parsimony Law is not applicable if the argument is an assumption to begin with as Occam requires as few of them as possible btw. Only faith requires no proof which is why we allow ourselves the possibility that God may exist in regards to existence of religion I guess.

[ingliz]

I am only referring to God here.

No.

It must be kept in mind that it is impossible for any mind to comprehend pure-self (subject), for the thinking subject and object of thought are necessarily distinct (the subject-object distinction)

The subject-object distinction is fundamental to idealism

Not all idealisms.

Heidegger rejects this distinction of subject-object.

In Husserl the notion of a divide between consciousness and world, between subjectivity and objectivity, between interiority and exteriority becomes highly questionable.

Kant's assertion, that the subject plays a role in structuring objects of experience.

Etc, etc.

a finite mind does not generate its own mental content... coming straight from Berkeley, and it cannot be refuted.

Berkeley offers no argument why the mental activity to which the existence of the whole universe is referred has to be a single mind or an infinite one. A committee of finite minds might seem a less palatable option, but nothing in his argument excludes it.

I have shown the order of causality simply cannot work that way.

Where?

This is obviously false as I have already proven that they can.

No, you have not.

God is omnipotent

[...]

Omniscience... all knowledge (including all true propositions) originate and are thereby known by God.

Your argument lacks coherence.

If God is omnipotent, then he should be able to create a being with free will; if he is omniscient, then he should know exactly what such a being will do (which may technically render them without free will). This analysis would render the ontological argument incoherent, as the characteristics required of a maximally great being cannot coexist in one being, thus such a being could not exist. (Himma 2001)

[Victoribus Spolia]

Metaphysical possibility is distinct from contingency. Contingency is could have been otherwise, metaphysical possibility is just not metaphysically impossible. Possibly necessary just means that it's not impossible that God exists in all possible worlds, ie, it's not impossible that God exists necessarily. There is the Aristotelian definition of possibility as a nonessential, accidental property of a thing and that would be contingency, but in modal logic possibility is that which is not prevented by anything from existing or occurring.

Cool. Thanks for the clarification, i'll admit i'm rusty on modal logic. I appreciate the clarification.

As a point of note, this is one more reason why I dislike modal reasoning.

I agree with the premise but not the conclusion in regards to immaterialism.

Correct, and I am going to challenge you on this.

Nonetheless our perception comes from our minds, not God. The proof?

If our perception originates in us, how come we don't know everything in advance?

A human body comes with all the tools for perception from eyes to see, ears to hear, fingers to touch, noses to smell and tougues to taste. If God creates perception over our own mind, why is it that the human body no longer perceives and the body loses consciousness if the brain loses oxygen if God is the driver of such phenomenon?

You see, its shit like this why people don't take you seriously in regards to philosophy and logic, it simply shows a lack of education. You committed the same fallacy 6-7 times in these two sentences alone:

1. To say that eyes see is a fallacy (cum hoc ergo propter hoc); for the experience of vision (P) happening and observable events taking place in the physical eye and visual organs (X) are correlations, to say that they are casually related is logically erroneous.

2. To say that ears hear is a fallacy (cum hoc ergo propter hoc); for the experience of hearing (P) and observable events taking place in the ear and auditory organs (X) are correlations, to say that they are casually related is logically erroneous.

3. To say that tactile sensation is cause by touch is a fallacy (cum hoc ergo propter hoc); for the experience of tactile sensation (P) and observable effects taking place in the finger and nervous system etc (X) are correlations; to say that they are casually related is logically erroneous.

4. To say that noses smell is fallacious (cum hoc ergo propter hoc); for the experience of scent (P) and observable events taking place in the olfactory organs (X) are correlations; to say that they are casually related is logically erroneous.

5. To say that tongues taste is fallacious (cum hoc ergo propter hoc); for the experience of taste (P) and the observable events taking place in the gustatory organs (X) are correlations, to say that they are casually related is logically erroneous.

6. To say that the brain is the cause of consciousness if fallacious (cum hoc ergo propter hoc); for the experience of perceptions (P) and the observable events taking place in human neurology (X) are correlations, to say that they are casually related is logically erroneous.

In SUM: It is quite irrelevant if you observe a correlation between certain observed phenomena and your mental states, for the physical reduction of these requires proof, for the inferring of relations is fallacious (as I just showed you).

So let me ask again, how do you explain the source (causal origination) of our perceptions?

Likewise, let me also point out that God being the source of perception is irrelevant to the fact that if I shoot you in the end you will die, as the source of perception He would likewise be the source of the pattern of correlation in which these perceptions operate. We describe these patterns with what might be called natural laws. Hence, it approximates a natural law to say that a lack of oxygen to the brain would result with the same person's experience of "blacking out," that is, God has determined that if we cut off someone's oxygen they will likely report "blacking out" as an experience. None of this has anything to do with the casual origination of those perceptions themselves.

You want to know where you did this? Every single point you claim is an axiom.

Please provide quotes where I claim multiples axioms in my original argument.

Thanks.

From what I have read, people aren't arguing your axioms from a position of truth, but on a position that there is no truth to them - ie an assumption.

You know I disregard all your definitions and I certainly am not arguing from a position that there is any truth to your axioms either. Quite the opposite. I regard them as assumptions not facts.

Well just repeating your claim that they are assumptions is not an argument, and what other people do or how they foolishly tried to argue are all quite irrelevant.

I claimed that Human mentality (consciousness and conscious-content) is axiomatic.

If this is not axiomatic, you should be able to deny it without assuming its truth (namely, by not being conscious or having any awareness at all).

Good luck.

you claimed victory in your third without actually addressing them at all.

Please quote the points that I did not address (According to your claims) and I will answer them for you.

What makes you think that I expect differently from you if I repeat her points to you?

I'm giving you a chance to simply quote those points, you don't even have to re-argue them, just quote them. I will respond to them; line-for-line by the standard of logic.

To be honest, I don't think you even know what you are talking about and I felt I was excessively thorough in my posts during the debate, indeed, my responding posts have all been almost twice as long as hers because I wanted to cover every base.

So I think your just posturing here, but I am willing to give you the benefit of the doubt.

quote the portions to which I did not respond and I will respond to it.

Thanks.

Spare me your tears VS. And sure believe what you like

Not an argument.

But if you cannot prove your claim then it has as much 'truth' to it as myself claiming that pink unicorns live underground on the dark side of the Moon and who become invisible every time humans gaze on their presence.

I did prove my claim, my claim is that you cannot reduce human mentality to a mind-independent physical reality. You cannot do this because all methods to do so would be fallacious if relying upon observation, or assume mind-dependence regarding the thing that must be mind-independent.

This has manifestly not been answered, my opponent argued that she is still free to believe in such even if no proof could be given. This was actually admitted, which is why I pointed out that would not be acceptable had a theist made that claim about God (namely, that there is no way to prove His existence, but I can believe in Him anyway).

The onus of proof is on the claimant not the opponent to disprove the claim for that reason

That aspect I proved, but my claim was negative if you remember, which was that human mentality was not reducible to physical reality; which IS WHY in face of my argument my opponent needed to give a counterexample of a non-fallaciously derived proof for mind-independent substance and physical reduction. My opponent admittedly did not attempt to do this and insisted on her right to believe in such anyway.

In other words, Parsimony Law is not applicable if the argument is an assumption to begin with as Occam requires as few of them as possible btw. Only faith requires no proof which is why we allow ourselves the possibility that God may exist in regards to existence of religion I guess.

You keep acting like this debate was about God's existence, when it wasn't. I never came to this debate, nor was the subject of the debate, the existence of God. Saeko challenged me to prove my claim that human mentality could not be physically reduced. That is all that I needed to do to win the debate. I only discussed God because she requested that I show the relationship between God's existence and my broader system.

However, regarding the terms of debate, I claimed that human mentality cannot be physically reduced and I gave my proof, a refutation of this claim requires for someone to prove a mind-independent substance without using a fallacious inference.

My system is the simplest, I only allow for awareness and the content thereof as ontological entities, my opponents cannot deny awareness or the content of awareness without absurdity, but then further insist on a third category (that which exists independent of awareness); hence they violate the law of parsimony.

That is why, once I demonstrated that human mentality is axiomatic (which I did), it is now incumbent upon my opponents to claim something beyond this when I claim nothing ontologically distinct form such; Hence, the burden of proof.

No.

It must be kept in mind that it is impossible for any mind to comprehend pure-self (subject), for the thinking subject and object of thought are necessarily distinct (the subject-object distinction)

How is that discussing me as the subject (which you claimed)? I am extrapolating the categorical law (subject-object distinction) to all minds as the basis of the inference. If God is a mind, then he is Himself subject to the distinction between subject (the one thinking) and object (that which is thought of). That is all.

It has nothing to do with me personally, this was a discussion of minds in general.

So, you are wrong again, and simply because of reading comprehension. Again.

Not all idealisms.

I'm not arguing for all Idealisms, I am obviously not a Hegelian!

I am arguing for Phenomenal Idealism which is predicated on the subject-object distinction; esse est percipi aut percipere

Heidegger rejects this distinction of subject-object.

Heidegger was NOT an idealist. He clearly and plainly rejects the idea that there is no mind-independent reality in his Introduction to Metaphysics.

In Husserl the notion of a divide between consciousness and world, between subjectivity and objectivity, between interiority and exteriority becomes highly questionable.

Similarly, I don't think you can count Husserl's system as Idealism either. Its more of a philosophic methodology and if Heidegger is taken as phenomenologist then it can be said quite confidently that Phenomenology was definitely not a type of Idealism per se.

Kant's assertion, that the subject plays a role in structuring objects of experience.

This is true, but that is still a distinction albeit a more synergistic one; however, all of this notwithstanding, I am not arguing for other idealisms, but Phenomenal Idealism only, so what obtains in critique of them may not and typically does not apply to Berkeley's system (or my variation of it).

Berkeley offers no argument why the mental activity to which the existence of the whole universe is referred has to be a single mind or an infinite one. A committee of finite minds might seem a less palatable option, but nothing in his argument excludes it.

Lex Parsimone;

Where?

God's place in the chain of causality is established by His existence being necessary for perceptual origination. This was clear in my actual proof for God's existence from the fact of human experience and what it logically requires.

No, you have not.

God is omnipotent

[...]

Omniscience... all knowledge (including all true propositions) originate and are thereby known by God.

Your argument lacks coherence.

This is not an argument, this is a claim.

I demonstrated omniscience and inferred from this omnipotence and omnipresence by a chain of reasoning.

If God is omnipotent, then he should be able to create a being with free will; if he is omniscient, then he should know exactly what such a being will do (which may technically render them without free will).

Where do you get this shit?

If God is Omnipotent, there is a sense in which man cannot have free will, because it would violate omnipotence, omnipotence was not defined by orthodox theology as the ability to violate His own nature, historic definitions directly opposed this as does my definition in the OP. If man has free-will, it is only inasmuch as our subjective experience seem to ourselves to be free; however, all events are pre-ordained. My system implies this. Besides, if God is omnipotent, it is not a violation of omnipotence for Him to create people with no free will even if he could do otherwise.

if he is omniscient, then he should know exactly what such a being will do (which may technically render them without free will).

Knowing that my son is going to hit his brother in the head would not imply that he did not freely do so, that conclusion does not follow and the author must have known he was grasping for straws when he said "technically."

This analysis would render the ontological argument incoherent, as the characteristics required of a maximally great being cannot coexist in one being, thus such a being could not exist.

I personally think the ontological argument is garbage and have never found it compelling. Rationalist silliness and sophistry.

Please beat up that strawman and I might join you, especially Platinga's modal version, I hate it the most.

Perhaps when we are done with him we could join forces and take a stab at William Lane Craig's Kalam Cosmological Argument?

That would be Great.

However, if you want to debate my argument, that is a separate matter now isn't it?

[ingliz]

me as the subject

You said, "any mind".

Are you now saying you are not a mind?

Phenomenal Idealism

An argument that addresses justification rather than knowledge. On the reasonable assumption that knowledge requires justification.

The Problem of the External World

1. Nothing is ever directly present to the mind in perception except perceptual appearances. (Indirectness Principle) Thus:

2. Without a good reason for thinking perceptual appearances are veridical, we are not justified in our perceptual beliefs. (Metaevidential Principle)

3. We have no good reason for thinking perceptual appearances are veridical. (Reasons Claim)

4. Therefore, we are not justified in our perceptual beliefs. (Lyons 2016)

Berkeley unsuccessfully attempts to get around the Indirectness Principle by positing that the objects of perception are mental constructs and it is these mental constructs, directly present to the mind, that are apprehended.

Hallucination and veridical perception.

In both cases the direct object of awareness is a collection of ideas. The standard view (Berkeley 1710) is that a hallucinatory table is a different sort of collection of ideas than a real table... But this reopens the gap between perceptual experiences and ordinary objects. Tables are not just experiences; they are larger entities of which experiences are parts, and those parts are shared by hallucinations. So what is directly present to the mind is something common to hallucination and veridical perception. So my perceptual experience would seem to be neutral with respect to whether I am seeing or hallucinating a table. So to be justified in believing there is a table in front of me, I will need some reason to think this particular experience is veridical, and 'the Problem of the External World' is back in business (Alston 1993, Greco 2000).

God's place

Consider the following proposition, which seems clearly true:

(1) Necessarily, x depends on y for its existence iff y were not to exist, neither would x.

Now, consider the number four. If it depends on God for its existence, then the truth of Four exists depends counterfactually on the truth of the proposition God exists; if God exists were false, then Four exists would be false. According to the widely-accepted Lewis (1973) semantics for counterfactuals, any proposition is counterfactually implied by a necessarily false proposition. However, It is false that four exists is necessarily false, and thus counterfactually implies any proposition. So, it's also true that if four didn't exist, neither would God, and by (1) God depends on four for God's existence. This dependence relationship is problematic; the dependence relation between God and abstracta should be asymmetrical if we are to understand the claim that God is the source of being for abstract objects. (Davidson 2013)

free will

God created humankind in the beginning, and he left them in the power of their own free choice.

(Ecclesiasticus 15:14)

The Book of Ecclesiasticus is accepted as part of the Christian biblical canons by Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and most of Oriental Orthodox.

[B0ycey]

If our perception originates in us, how come we don't know everything in advance?

Does your definition of perception require the ability to know all things in advance? Mine doesn't. Only the ability to be aware of something. I don't know why a God is ever required when our bodies have the tools to allow us to perceive btw. But perhaps that fact isn't taken seriously by you. Your mentality is that of a creationist so why would biology be worth anything to you I guess? Although I do enjoy the arrogance of yours that by declaring your interest in philosophy on here that you somehow consider that your assumptions have some value on PoFo. But what does it matter if a fallacy is in fashion btw? Or that everyone wants to consider me wrong? Is the opinion of internet personalities worth more than academics I wonder?

1. To say that eyes see is a fallacy (cum hoc ergo propter hoc); for the experience of vision (P) happening and observable events taking place in the physical eye and visual organs (X) are correlations, to say that they are casually related is logically erroneous.

2. To say that ears hear is a fallacy (cum hoc ergo propter hoc); for the experience of hearing (P) and observable events taking place in the ear and auditory organs (X) are correlations, to say that they are casually related is logically erroneous.

3. To say that tactile sensation is cause by touch is a fallacy (cum hoc ergo propter hoc); for the experience of tactile sensation (P) and observable effects taking place in the finger and nervous system etc (X) are correlations; to say that they are casually related is logically erroneous.

4. To say that noses smell is fallacious (cum hoc ergo propter hoc); for the experience of scent (P) and observable events taking place in the olfactory organs (X) are correlations; to say that they are casually related is logically erroneous.

5. To say that tongues taste is fallacious (cum hoc ergo propter hoc); for the experience of taste (P) and the observable events taking place in the gustatory organs (X) are correlations, to say that they are casually related is logically erroneous.

Is it really a fallacy to consider the removal of eyes would also remove the ability to see? Or ears to hear etc etc. Although that of course was not my point and you have taking your own tangent on this like usual. My point was that the removal of the brain would in fact remove the ability of the individual to experience perception - and if that was not the case, why can God not use the organs he created without the brain to create the phenomenon of perception if all that is required was his presence for perception to exist?

6. To say that the brain is the cause of consciousness if fallacious (cum hoc ergo propter hoc); for the experience of perceptions (P) and the observable events taking place in human neurology (X) are correlations, to say that they are casually related is logically erroneous.

If you consider this to be fallacious, then I can only assume that if you or a family member were diagnosed with a Brain Tumor, Parkinson's, Huntington's or Dementia, you wouldn't worry. Why would you? These are brain conditions that affect the individuals perception and ability to functions correctly, but according to you this cannot possibly happen right?

Nonetheless, science already knows what part of the brain affects the senses of an individual. As that is a fact, the correlation of the brain and the individuals senses isn't fiction but fact. Although you can make a distinction to whether what we perceive is indeed what exists. And that is where Berkeley comes into play in the form of Subjective idealism. Although I know this form of thinking isn't to your liking if it doesn't involve a supreme being.

Likewise, let me also point out that God being the source of perception is irrelevant to the fact that if I shoot you in the end you will die, as the source of perception He would likewise be the source of the pattern of correlation in which these perceptions operate. We describe these patterns with what might be called natural laws. Hence, it approximates a natural law to say that a lack of oxygen to the brain would result with the same person's experience of "blacking out," that is, God has determined that if we cut off someone's oxygen they will likely report "blacking out" as an experience. None of this has anything to do with the casual origination of those perceptions themselves.

I do like the use of 'Gods Will' as an argument for everything. Although this is a good argument for those of faith, it is only an assumption that has absolutely no foundation to it - and as such can just be dismissed as an Ad Hominem by myself. The fact you can remove oxygen to create a blackout means there is actually a tested method that someone can use to prove the correlation of oxygen, the brain and consciousness. This isn't a fallacy or assumption or anything else that you like to associate to my arguments but an actual fact.

Please provide quotes where I claim multiples axioms in my original argument.

Thanks.

Whatever POD. My claim in not that you claimed multiple axioms in your original argument. My claim is that what you consider Axioms are not actually axioms at all as it appears to me that users on here are not arguing from a position of truth with them but that they are arguing that there are no truth to them to begin with.

Please quote the points that I did not address (According to your claims) and I will answer them for you.

All of Saeko's arguments in her first two posts. But I may add, you did address them but didn't reply any of her points to my satisfaction and also didn't actually acknowledge your own contradictions either. But what do you care? My opinion isn't worth shit to you right? But perhaps your admiration for Saeko you would at least re-edit your third argument and actually address all the points she made instead of declared victory maybe? But according to you, you have addressed all her points right? So do you actually want me to copy and paste everything when you believe you have fulfilled your side anyway? Some things should just be left to opinion of the reader to decide.

I did prove my claim, my claim is that you cannot reduce human mentality to a mind-independent physical reality. You cannot do this because all methods to do so would be fallacious if relying upon observation, or assume mind-dependence regarding the thing that must be mind-independent.

And this is just an assumption actually. Where is your tested evidence?

This has manifestly not been answered, my opponent argued that she is still free to believe in such even if no proof could be given. This was actually admitted, which is why I pointed out that would not be acceptable had a theist made that claim about God (namely, that there is no way to prove His existence, but I can believe in Him anyway).

Well your opponent is correct. She is still free to believe in whatever she likes even if no proof can be given. The same principle can be applied to you and your belief. However theists don't actually agree do they? And neither do scientists. What they do is use Occam to reach a truth that may not even be a truth until proven otherwise. A hypothesis is just that. So while I will acknowledge your arguments and accept they are well presented as a claim that have a foundation to them, I will not accept that there is actually anything other than little evidence being presented by you - whether that be sources or logic. They are at best assumptions.

That aspect I proved, but my claim was negative if you remember, which was that human mentality was not reducible to physical reality; which IS WHY in face of my argument my opponent needed to give a counterexample of a non-fallaciously derived proof for mind-independent substance and physical reduction. My opponent admittedly did not attempt to do this and insisted on her right to believe in such anyway.

Well you are correct. Because she was attacking your points which she disagreed with rather than address her own argument which was not up for debate. The presentation of this argument needs to be improved on actually. Being that you wanted to use the Law of parsimony to declare which argument was stronger, perhaps you should have addressed your argument, then she presents hers, and then the pair of you sliced away the assumptions of the arguments leaving just the facts to declare a winner. I don't know. That is up to you and your opponent to decide. But being that you believe your arguments are strong enough to be published and given actual peer review, what does the opinion of a PoFo laymen matter to you anyway?

You keep acting like this debate was about God's existence, when it wasn't. I never came to this debate, nor was the subject of the debate, the existence of God. Saeko challenged me to prove my claim that human mentality could not be physically reduced. That is all that I needed to do to win the debate. I only discussed God because she requested that I show the relationship between God's existence and my broader system.

OK. I will accept that. So you are at least acknowledging that you did not prove the existence of God - which you actually didn't right? Only that Human mentality could not be physically reduced. Perhaps I agree with this statement. Although I would use the fact that Matter is 99.9% empty space, meaning that Human mentality must actually enhance Physical perception as evidence than take whatever approach you did. but I suspect you disagree with that statement too.

However, regarding the terms of debate, I claimed that human mentality cannot be physically reduced and I gave my proof, a refutation of this claim requires for someone to prove a mind-independent substance without using a fallacious inference.

My system is the simplest, I only allow for awareness and the content thereof as ontological entities, my opponents cannot deny awareness or the content of awareness without absurdity, but then further insist on a third category (that which exists independent of awareness); hence they violate the law of parsimony.

That is why, once I demonstrated that human mentality is axiomatic (which I did), it is now incumbent upon my opponents to claim something beyond this when I claim nothing ontologically distinct form such; Hence, the burden of proof.

Where is this so called evidence that I can test? This is just more assumption btw. For this very reason, in my opinion, the burden of proof is still with you.

[Victoribus Spolia]

You said, "any mind".

Are you now saying you are not a mind?

No. That doesn't follow at all, I was arguing from the class to members of the class.

An argument that addresses justification rather than knowledge. On the reasonable assumption that knowledge requires justification.

What are you responding to with this remark.

1. Nothing is ever directly present to the mind in perception except perceptual appearances. (Indirectness Principle) Thus:

Define perceptual appearances.

2. Without a good reason for thinking perceptual appearances are veridical, we are not justified in our perceptual beliefs. (Metaevidential Principle)

3. We have no good reason for thinking perceptual appearances are veridical. (Reasons Claim)

4. Therefore, we are not justified in our perceptual beliefs. (Lyons 2016)

The problem of verdical and non-verdical images was addressed by later phenomenal idealists such as John Foster (The Problem of Perception, 2000).

In sum, the Phenomenal Idealist rejects the distinction as meaningless. We have no problem saying that a boat oar visually bends when dipped in water while remaining straight via tactile sensation, etc. The perceptions are what they are after all.

Hallucinations and dreams are likewise perceptually real inasmuch as they are experienced, thus, if you see a pink elephant after dropping acid, you really see a pink elephant, the visual percept is valid.

So how do we know the differences between hallucinations and dreams from reality? only by correlation, continuity, and clarity. Which is indeed the only meaningful perceptual difference in point of fact.

Your case above attempts to create a problem where none exists.

Consider the following proposition, which seems clearly true:

(1) Necessarily, x depends on y for its existence iff y were not to exist, neither would x.

Now, consider the number four. If it depends on God for its existence, then the truth of Four exists depends counterfactually on the truth of the proposition God exists; if God exists were false, then Four exists would be false. According to the widely-accepted Lewis (1973) semantics for counterfactuals, any proposition is counterfactually implied by a necessarily false proposition. However, It is false that four exists is necessarily false, and thus counterfactually implies any proposition. So, it's also true that if four didn't exist, neither would God, and by (1) God depends on four for God's existence. This dependence relationship is problematic; the dependence relation between God and abstracta should be asymmetrical if we are to understand the claim that God is the source of being for abstract objects. (Davidson 2013)

This is all nonsense and accepts a rather strange theory regarding counterfactuals, for the argument you are attempting to critique could be expressed via modus tollens or via a transcendental argument, which are both valid forms of argumentation.

God created humankind in the beginning, and he left them in the power of their own free choice.

(Ecclesiasticus 15:14)

The Book of Ecclesiasticus is accepted as part of the Christian biblical canons by Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, and most of Oriental Orthodox.

But no one would interpret that phrase without commentary in those traditions, that would be pelagianism after all.

Besides, I'm a Lutheran anyway and do not accept ecclesiasticus as Scripture.

Does your definition of perception require the ability to know all things in advance?

Of course not, for humans are perceiving agents but they do not know all things in advance, but that is the point. If they don't know all percepts in advance, then they cannot be the source of their own perceptions (mental content).

Perceptual origination must include this, for percepts are mental content known to an awareness, so when they are not in your awareness, then they must be known somewhere else. Something cannot give what itself does not have, which means only a mind can have and give mental content, so if the percepts cannot come from your own mind without you first being aware of them, then they must come from some other mind.

That is the point.

If percepts originate from your own mind, you would have to know them in advance by definition, because percepts are objects of awareness by every definition for a percept given by any philosopher.

I don't know why a God is ever required when our bodies have the tools to allow us to perceive btw.

Because these tools cannot be proven, logically, to have an causal relationship with our perception; likewise, is the eye the source of images under your view (Decompositionalism), or does the eye merely "apprehend" what is "out there" (Realism) How does one know that one's sense accurately represents the external world, or is it unknowable (Kant); or perhaps you view certain aspects of perception to be dependent on your own mind like colors and tastes (secondary qualities) while extension and mass are "in the objects" as primary qualities (Locke)?

So which is it? What is your view?? Do you have a position or not?

If you want to know the Immaterialist answer to these dilemmas I can help you get there, but you have to be willing to have a conversation first.

Your mentality is that of a creationist so why would biology be worth anything to you I guess? Although I do enjoy the arrogance of yours that by declaring your interest in philosophy on here that you somehow consider that your assumptions have some value on PoFo.

Ad-Hominems, why do you want to attack me personally instead of discussing my arguments?

But what does it matter if a fallacy is in fashion btw? Or that everyone wants to consider me wrong? Is the opinion of internet personalities worth more than academics I wonder?

I don't even know what you are saying or who you are addressing here.

Is it really a fallacy to consider the removal of eyes would also remove the ability to see?

Yes, without qualification, it would be a fallacy.

You could say that there is a correlation between the absence of eyes and claims to continual visual experience, but that is about it (that is not even completely true, as people who've lost their eyes often can still "see" images, memories, dreams, etc. So is "visual" experience really dependent on eyes even under that argument?).

Regardless, it is fallacious, as a necessary or absolute knowledge of such a proposition would require omniscience to prove a causal relationship.

My point was that the removal of the brain would in fact remove the ability of the individual to experience perception

How do you know this?

and if that was not the case, why can God not use the organs he created without the brain to create the phenomenon of perception if all that is required was his presence for perception to exist?

Perhaps He could, He could also make it rain chocolate syrup. Whats your point and how is this not a red-herring? I don't make any claims regarding any of this and have no need to, I only claim what I can directly perceive or necessarily infer (logically). The only claims about God in my argument are the ones I made, nothing else. What God "could" do or "would" do are all irrelevant.

I have only pointed out that inferring causation from correlation or sequence is logically fallacious, which is true.

If you consider this to be fallacious,

I don't "consider" it fallacious, it IS fallacious.

Because unless you have lived in all times and all places and have a direct awareness of every instance of a person's subjective state in correlation or sequence to brain-death, you cannot say that there is a necessary or absolute relationship between the brain's activities as we observe them and the subjective state of the one with said brain. This is why its a fallacy.

then I can only assume that if you or a family member were diagnosed with a Brain Tumor, Parkinson's, Huntington's or Dementia, you wouldn't worry.

That doesn't follow at all, that you cannot infer a necessary (causal) relationship from observed correlations and sequences, doesn't mean you cannot recognize correlations and sequences as having patterns.

For instance, it is logically true that you cannot say that coldness is the cause of water freezing. I affirm this truth as the opposite would be a fallacy (the same ones I pointed out to you); however, I still acknowledge and recognize that when its is cold outside, water will typically freeze. That is an observed correlation and its one that I experience so often and with such regularity that I would even take preparations in advance to salt my driveway if I knew it was wet and the temperature was going to drop below 32 degrees Fahrenheit or 0 degrees Celsius.

The issue is not that we have sequential or correlative experiences regarding perceptual reality, the issue is inferring a causal relationship from these observations in order to conjure up a metaphysical system that makes absolute claims regarding the nature of reality. If such inferences are fallacious, as they are with physicalism, they must be dismissed.

I do like the use of 'Gods Will' as an argument for everything. Although this is a good argument for those of faith, it is only an assumption that has absolutely no foundation to it -

You asked me about my belief, so I told you. I didn't ask you to believe it and nor did I intend to give proof for this as it was not part of my argument nor is it necessary to it.

nd as such can just be dismissed as an Ad Hominem by myself.

Ad-Hominem? Do you even know your fallacies bro? An Ad-Hominem is an argument attacking someone personally, I don't see that happening in your quoted section.

Nonetheless, science already knows what part of the brain affects the senses of an individual. As that is a fact, the correlation of the brain and the individuals senses isn't fiction but fact.

Ah, here comes the science.

Most science is fallacious, logically speaking. The entire scientific method is technically fallacious (the hypothetical deductive method asserts the consequent, which is fallacy); Likewise, inductive inferences are fallacious (composition fallacy) and are used constantly in science, plus scientists constantly commit cum hoc and post hoc fallacies.

For instance (regarding those latter two fallacies again):

Science does not know that the brain is the cause of certain sensations, at best it can only record a correlation between certain portions of the brain doing something (as observed) and the testimony regarding persons pertaining to their sense-experiences.

Even if experiments recorded this 100% of the time among 100 million people, it still would be fallacy to claim that the brain is the cause of sensation. It is logically erroneous, thus you can never claim the brain to be the cause of perception.

Although you can make a distinction to whether what we perceive is indeed what exists. And that is where Berkeley comes into play in the form of Subjective idealism. Although I know this form of thinking isn't to your liking if it doesn't involve a supreme being.

Why do you keep bringing the Supreme Being back into this, none of this discussion here has anything to do with it at all whatsoever. You knowing that I believe in God is tainting you ability to have this discussion i'm afraid.

The fact you can remove oxygen to create a blackout means there is actually a tested method that someone can use to prove the correlation of oxygen, the brain and consciousness. This isn't a fallacy or assumption or anything else that you like to associate to my arguments but an actual fact.

If by fact you mean a correlation, then I agree, but that does not prove causation nor does it prove that there is no conscious experience occurring independent of the brain, it just means that every time a person's brain was killed off or denied oxygen, the subject stopped reporting via testimony of having a continual sense-experience.

To say more than this is fallacious, which is the whole point, for those trying to construct a scientific worldview, they must deny the authority of logic, but doing that is even more problematic and self-refuting.

Well your opponent is correct. She is still free to believe in whatever she likes even if no proof can be given.

Well I don't deny this, I am not trying to make someone change their views at gunpoint, i'm just saying that if you are going to claim to hold to a worldview where matter is demonstrably true, then you should give demonstration. She is free to hold to her unproven and improvable position, but its inconsistent with the definition she accepted for her position and its not convincing in a debate.

So while I will acknowledge your arguments and accept they are well presented as a claim that have a foundation to them, I will not accept that there is actually anything other than little evidence being presented by you - whether that be sources or logic. They are at best assumptions.

Well, it seems you have made up your mind and don't really have an interest in being convinced. So be it.

Well you are correct. Because she was attacking your points which she disagreed with rather than address her own argument which was not up for debate. The presentation of this argument needs to be improved on actually. Being that you wanted to use the Law of parsimony to declare which argument was stronger, perhaps you should have addressed your argument, then she presents hers, and then the pair of you sliced away the assumptions of the arguments leaving just the facts to declare a winner. I don't know. That is up to you and your opponent to decide. But being that you believe your arguments are strong enough to be published and given actual peer review, what does the opinion of a PoFo laymen matter to you anyway?

You may be right that a different format could have been done, but keep in mind I was accepting a challenge, so I could only adjust the format so much within the parameters of what my opponent requested of me to demonstrate.

As for placing my arguments up elsewhere for peer review as an academic and posting them on PoFo, I do not think that everyone on PoFo is completely lay; indeed, I have found that some of the most helpful and brilliant critiques i have ever encountered for philosophical arguments have come from regular joes, students, etc., on the internet. I believe that my arguments get stronger through testing them, refining them, et al.

This is a test run of an argument that I have used online and in public debate on several occasions already, and in this environment i tested it again in the best form I have ever given it and again I have gained some valuable information for refining it even further in the future.

Indeed, whether you know it or not (probably not because I never told you), your critique of contraception argument in the contraception thread was the best critique given of it of everyone on there in spite of the fact that I have not considered you as particularly philosophical, but you managed to find a spot that I needed to strengthen in my argument's presentation (which I did in its re-presentation in my objective morality debate post).

No one else, included several who were likely more educated than you, presented anything even close as you had. So kudos.

So, like I said, I find these debates quite valuable. Academia can be an echo-chamber, but ideas are best tested in the wild, not in the lab, so-to-speak.

OK. I will accept that.

Good, because the debate was not about God, that was not the main topic, I only added my proof to make Saeko happy because she wanted to see it.

So you are at least acknowledging that you did not prove the existence of God - which you actually didn't right?

I would say that the proof I gave is only valid if the rest of the system is valid. Hence, there is no sense in discussing my proof for God's existence until the first three parts of my argument regarding human mentality and the nature of reality are discussed.

For instance, my proof for the Trinitarian God's existence assumes the truth of phenomenal idealism (immaterialism), phenomenal idealism assumes the truth of the claim human mentality is not physical reducible, and the claim that human mentality is not physically reducible is dependent on the notion that there is such a thing a human mentality.

If you notice, this is the reverse order of my argument. My argument started with an axiom of human mentality (establishing that there is such a thing and its undeniable), then I argued that such cannot be physically reduced, then I argued that ALL was mental (Immaterialism), and then i argued that this mental reality required that there be a God which is necessarily Trinitarian in nature.

So my point is, if you want to discuss my belief that the existence of God as rational, you are going to first have to discuss with me the nature of human mentality and the nature of reality.

Although I would use the fact that Matter is 99.9% empty space, meaning that Human mentality must actually enhance Physical perception as evidence than take whatever approach you did. but I suspect you disagree with that statement too.

I would probably disagree with this too, but remember that atoms and matter are not necessarily the same thing in philosophy. The existence of material reality is only the claim that reality exists independent of being perceived by anyone and that it is causally related to what is perceived.

If atoms can be perceived in some sense, even with the use of instruments, my system will allow for their existence.

This is important because there is a lot of confusion regarding what Immaterialists are actually claiming. Immaterialists are not denying solidity, mass, objectivity (in the sense of things existing independent of my own personal mind), or molecules, etc.

Immaterialists only deny that such things can exist independent of anyone or anything perceiving them. We only claim for two types of thing to exist; minds and mental content (percepts being mental content).

Where is this so called evidence that I can test? This is just more assumption btw. For this very reason, in my opinion, the burden of proof is still with you.

This is easy.

Anything you can possibly test, ANYTHING, is something that you must be aware of when testing it.

If you weren't aware of it, you couldn't test it.

My opponent has claimed that something exists that can never be tested or presented as evidence because it exists independent of awareness. (by definition not-testable).

So tell me now, how is my position the one with the burden of proof? Please explain.

Any test you do, will assume my position as true, that there are objects of awareness (physical stuff, what you might call evidence) and someone doing the test (an awareness).

I have only claimed that this is all that can be shown to exist. My opponent claims that something can exist beyond testability, beyond anyone being able to be aware of it or study it.

You tell me how the burden of proof is with me? I showed that any argument, any evidence, any test, requires someone to be aware of the argument, evidence, or test. she claims there to be more than this, she has the burden of proof.

I was only asked to show that no physical reduction exists for human mentality, I did this by showing that every single criteria for establishing a reduction was fallacious. EVERY. SINGLE. ONE, or that it depended on human mentality itself (circular argument)

I have never more clearly satisfied a debate requirement in my entire life.

That is why I claimed victory, because I fulfilled what was asked of me.

[ingliz]

What are you responding to with this remark.

I was pointing out that Lyons' argument addresses justification rather than knowledge - I thought you needed a little help.

Define perceptual appearances

The difference between the external and the internal mind-dependent appearance of a thing.

only by correlation, continuity, and clarity

Sellarsian dilemma

1. Let us say that a state is “cognitive” just in case it has conceptual and propositional content, and assertive force; it is “noncognitive” otherwise.

2. If an experience is noncognitive, then it cannot justify a perceptual belief.

3. If an experience is cognitive, then it cannot justify any beliefs unless it is itself justified.

4. Therefore, in neither case can an experience confer justification without being itself justified.

This is all nonsense

I have noticed that is your default position when you are stuck.

We may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second. Or, in other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed. (Hume 1748, Section VII).

[Victoribus Spolia]

The difference between the external and the internal mind-dependent appearance of a thing.

There is no such distinction in Phenomenal Idealism.

Sellarsian dilemma

1. Let us say that a state is “cognitive” just in case it has conceptual and propositional content, and assertive force; it is “noncognitive” otherwise.

2. If an experience is noncognitive, then it cannot justify a perceptual belief.

3. If an experience is cognitive, then it cannot justify any beliefs unless it is itself justified.

4. Therefore, in neither case can an experience confer justification without being itself justified.

I deny such a distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive. There is only conscious content, primary consciousness and secondary consciousness.

Likewise, I don't know what this attempts to prove? No one denies that percepts themselves cannot justify anything without explanation; indeed, the whole point of the idealism v. realism debate is in regards of how to understand and justify experiences (what you call the non-cognitive) themselves.

Sometimes I wonder if you are debating me or someone imaginary. I really don't get it.

I have noticed that is your default position when you are stuck.

Is that so? Well I've noticed you just stop responding to arguments you can't handle, like when you just dropped the discussion of verdical images after I addressed your silly claims

We may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second. Or, in other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed. (Hume 1748, Section VII).

Yes, causation follows a particular order, whats your point?

Because the order of causation and the manner of proving that order are not necessarily the same.

For instance, I am arguing for an order of causation that starts with God, by starting with man. How can this be done?

By valid inferences, like modus tollens or modus pollens, or a transcendental argument.

What you posted against this was speculative nonsense from a minority delusion regarding the nature of counterfactuals.

I just called it what it is: nonsense.

[B0ycey]

Of course not, for humans are perceiving agents but they do not know all things in advance, but that is the point. If they don't know all percepts in advance, then they cannot be the source of their own perceptions (mental content).

The source of perception is energy and time. When humans interact with energy in the form of say light photons or sound waves, our eyes and ears receive the information and send it to our brains. Neurons within the brain then interpret the information into something we can understand. So although I agree our bodies are not the source of our own perceptions, our surroundings within the spacetime and not God is.

Perceptual origination must include this, for percepts are mental content known to an awareness, so when they are not in your awareness, then they must be known somewhere else. Something cannot give what itself does not have, which means only a mind can have and give mental content, so if the percepts cannot come from your own mind without you first being aware of them, then they must come from some other mind.

That is the point.

If percepts originate from your own mind, you would have to know them in advance by definition, because percepts are objects of awareness by every definition for a percept given by any philosopher.

Of course. Perception is not dependent on just the human body. It must interact with external sources in order to perceive. Does anyone disagree with this?

But while you think the source of perception is another mind, I believe it is energy.

Because these tools cannot be proven, logically, to have an causal relationship with our perception; likewise, is the eye the source of images under your view (Decompositionalism), or does the eye merely "apprehend" what is "out there" (Realism) How does one know that one's sense accurately represents the external world, or is it unknowable (Kant); or perhaps you view certain aspects of perception to be dependent on your own mind like colors and tastes (secondary qualities) while extension and mass are "in the objects" as primary qualities (Locke)?

So which is it? What is your view?? Do you have a position or not?

Primarily Kant, but in reality none of the above. What I believe perception is would need to be a topic on its own and I know no one on PoFo would take it seriously (which is why I don't publish my opinions on philosophy on PoFo any more). You likewise are having the same problem today. Your opinion on this subject perhaps has a foundation to it - as Berkeley was a great thinker. But convincing sceptics of God to accept faith as a source without proving evidence that can be tested will always give you opponents.

Yes, without qualification, it would be a fallacy.

You could say that there is a correlation between the absence of eyes and claims to continual visual experience, but that is about it (that is not even completely true, as people who've lost their eyes often can still "see" images, memories, dreams, etc. So is "visual" experience really dependent on eyes even under that argument?).

Regardless, it is fallacious, as a necessary or absolute knowledge of such a proposition would require omniscience to prove a causal relationship.

I agree with you here, but that is not what I said. I said was is it really a fallacy to say that eyes are required to see? But I may add eyes are not the source of vision but a tool used by an individual to see.

How do you know this?

Because it can be tested. Remove a brain from its host and monitor its activity after.

I don't "consider" it fallacious, it IS fallacious.

Because unless you have lived in all times and all places and have a direct awareness of every instance of a person's subjective state in correlation or sequence to brain-death, you cannot say that there is a necessary or absolute relationship between the brain's activities as we observe them and the subjective state of the one with said brain. This is why its a fallacy.

Ok. I don't mind you stating your opinion on a faith based foundation. As long as you acknowledge that it is based on faith and as such can not be absolute unless you also accept that God exists.

The rest of your post I don't have time to address now. Scanning through the remainer of it, it appears we are mostly arguing on interpretation anyway. If there are any points that you would like me to address that I haven't, just ask me again in another post.

[ingliz]

verdical images

True to what, though?

You now agree that idealism destroys the subject-object relation - "There is no such distinction".

So how do you arrive at a truth when it is you who is generating your known reality?

If the 'truth' is just what "by correlation, continuity, and clarity" tallies with your hallucination/reality, that way lies epistemic relativism. For you cannot deny me (a separate mind) a separate internal reality, my known reality, where a God may owe his existence to the mind of man.

I deny such a distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive.

Berkeley's 'I can conceive of X existing unconceived' is self-contradictory.

When we imagine a tree standing alone in a forest, we (arguably) conceive of an unthought-of object, though of course we must employ a thought in order to accomplish this feat. Thus, this argument fails. (Tipton 1974)

a minority delusion

Who is deluded?

Idealism has few contemporary defenders. Almost all philosophers working today have endorsed some kind of realism, insisting that ordinary objects are indeed mind-independent.

[Victoribus Spolia]

The source of perception is energy and time.

Do you have proof for this claim? What is energy and how do you know of it?

When humans interact with energy in the form of say light photons or sound waves, our eyes and ears receive the information and send it to our brains.

Fallacy. Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc.

Just because the experience of sound "follows-in-sequence" the observable phenomena of sound-waves does not mean that such is the cause of the perceptual experience of sound.

I am listening to a song that is "stuck-in-my-head" right now, even though no sound waves are around me for that particular song.

Neurons within the brain then interpret the information into something we can understand.

No they don't. This is an inference based on observation and is an assumption.

For instance, if I told you that I am looking at my wife's tits and you could look at my brain and see certain neurological activity via a device, including the firing of certain synapses. You still could not say that these synapses or neurons were doing anything in relation to thought. At best, you could argue that there is a correlation or sequence to what you observed me doing (looking at a nice pair of tits) and what you observe regarding brain activity; however, you cannot say that the neurons are "interpreting" anything. This cannot be logically demonstrated, at best you can say that neurons do stuff while I claim to be doing other stuff, but that proves pretty much nothing.

So although I agree our bodies are not the source of our own perceptions, our surroundings within the spacetime and not God is.

Spacetime is not a mind, so it cannot be the source of percepts (mental content), for that would violate the law of reasoning that something cannot give what itself does not have (ex nihil, nihil fit).

Does anyone disagree with this?

I Do.

Of course. Perception is not dependent on just the human body.

I am not talking about the body at all in this section you are responding to, I am only talking about minds. Whether the mind is related in any way to the body is a separate discussion at this point, for we are only discussing percepts. Percepts don't "exist" in the body, brain, waves, atoms, etc. Percepts are objects of awareness of conscious (mental) content.

We are discussing where such come from on this. If something is defined as mental-content, as percepts are, that means that they are ontologically mental-content. IF something is not a mind, then it cannot have mental-content. Thus, if you have mental content and it did not come from your mind (because otherwise you would have to be preaware of all future precepts); then you must explain what other mind these percepts came from.

I said was is it really a fallacy to say that eyes are required to see?

Yes. if by a requirement you mean that eyes are logically necessary. This is simply improvable.

Likewise, we right now have good reason to question this for the same reasons I mentioned; that people who lost their eyes have "visual experience" or report of having them.

But while you think the source of perception is another mind, I believe it is energy.

How can energy have mental content if its not a mind? Only a mind can have mental content by definition. Percepts are mental-content by definition as objects of awareness.

Likewise, what proof do you have for your claim anyway?

Also, how do you know of energy? did you perceive such energy?

Because it can be tested. Remove a brain from its host and monitor its activity after.

How do you know that the mind of such a person is not still having conscious experience in spite of you not being able to monitor it?

Also, have you monitored all people in all times and places to know if this experience has held universally? If not, how do you know for certain there has been no exceptions or never will be any?

Thats the issue. You cannot logically say there is any necessary (causal) relationship between the brain and awareness, to say otherwise is fallacious. There is only a correlative or sequential relationship.

Ok. I don't mind you stating your opinion on a faith based foundation. As long as you acknowledge that it is based on faith and as such can not be absolute unless you also accept that God exists.

Nothing in my original debate post was faith-based, and neither was this. These are all arguments based on reason.

The rest of your post I don't have time to address now. Scanning through the remainer of it, it appears we are mostly arguing on interpretation anyway. If there are any points that you would like me to address that I haven't, just ask me again in another post.

I would still like you to address them or discuss them.

You now agree that idealism destroys the subject-object relation - "There is no such distinction".

No I didn't, please quote where i made this claim.

Likewise, verdical images don't have to do with the subject-object distinction, all percepts, whether verdical or non-veridal are still only ever objects of thought experienced by a distinct perceiving subject.

Your presumption that this would destroy the subject-object distinction presumes that our relative experience of certain objects acting differently when you, lets say, eat shrooms, is somehow caused by something in the subject, that is the thing being denied by Idealists.

Perception is passive in Phenomenal Idealism, thus your experience of eating shrooms and your consequent experience of objects being squiggly that were formerly straight, and only after ingesting shrooms, are nothing but disparate perceptions separated in correlation to your further perception of ingesting the shrooms. Simple as that.

This has nothing to do the subject-object distinction whatsoever.

So how do you arrive at a truth when it is you who is generating your known reality?

Is the 'truth' just what "by correlation, continuity, and clarity" tallies with your hallucination/reality.

I don't claim that my perceptions are generated by me BTW. I deny this vehemently, my mind cannot be the source of my perceptual experience or else I would have to be pre-aware of them and therefore be omniscient. Since this is true, my perceptual experience must come from some other Mind.

You should know this already about my position.

That way lies epistemic relativism for you cannot deny me (a separate mind) a separate internal reality, my known reality, where a God may owe his existence to the mind of man.

Two Things:

1. This way isn't epistemic relativism, but noetic relativism; which is different. For instance, I cannot have access to your subjective states, this I cannot know for 100% certainty by simple analysis of you (the hard problem of consciousness/ the problem of other minds); however, this is not epistemic relativism, for epistemic relativism is refutable by reducio ad absurdem; if knowledge is relative, then you could deny logic and then we have a self-refuting position. What this implies is that, though I cannot know that you have a mind in the way that I know I have a mind, I can know that all minds, including yours (if you have one), must follow the same epistemic laws for intelligibility to be possible in the first place.

2. Though I have said that, in general, the problem of others minds (because of the hard-problem of consciousness) is insolvable on the face, it is provisionally solvable in the act of disputation, as no arguer can deny human mentality in the course of debate without assuming its existence. Though this does not solve the fact that I do not have access to your mental states as requisite to definitively confirm them as my own, your inability to deny the axiom in debate is provisionally sufficient to establish the necessary presumption and mutual recognition of other minds, which must all follow the same epistemic laws to be intelligible (see #1 above, contra epistemic relativism).

My axiom for human argumentation in my objective morality thread is quite similar on this to my axiom of human mentality, so you have just inspired me to try to merge them in a future version.....which is quite exciting. So thanks by the way. I love simplicity and synthesis and if I could argue the core of my worldview from plain reason in a single argument, I would be able to die a happy man the instant I completed its publication.

Berkeley's 'I can conceive of X existing unconceived' is self-contradictory.

When we imagine a tree standing alone in a forest, we (arguably) conceive of an unthought-of object, though of course we must employ a thought in order to accomplish this feat. Thus, this argument fails. (Tipton 1974)

I would like to see the exact quote from Berkeley in its context before I could make a judgment, but if he said this then I disagree with him (note: I am a Berkeleyan, but not slavishly so).

However, I don't see how this relates to the the point I made regarding a denial of the distinction between the non-cognitive and the cognitive, for you were defining percepts as non-cognitive (passive?) and higher/abstract thought as cognitive (active)? I argued that this distinction is merely the categorical distinction of members in a class (primary v. secondary consciousness), but not separate categorical classes as you attempted to argue. If they were separate classes you many have a point, but they are not. mental content is all equally mental content and share the same fundamental ontological characteristics.

This is why your argument did not obtain.

Who is deluded?

Idealism has few contemporary defenders. Almost all philosophers working today have endorsed some kind of realism, insisting that ordinary objects are indeed mind-independent.

People endorse all kinds of dumb-shit. This is both argumentum ad populum and an appeal to authority fallacy btw.

But to your point, Phenomenal Idealism has never been popular, and yet, it has been recognized over the years for its formidible strength nonetheless.

Hume himself quipped that Berkeley's arguments "know of no answer" (irrefutable), "but produce not conviction" (fail to create adherents).

Its a sad truth I suppose, but the way is narrow after all.