[Albert]

But what about natural laws, is not that immaterial?

[Sivad]

VII. Eliminative Materialism

In its most sophisticated version, eliminative materialism argued as follows: our commonsense beliefs about the mind constitute a kind of primitive theory, a "folk psychology." But as with any theory, the entities postulated by the theory can only be justified to the extent that the theory is true. Just as the failure of the phlogiston theory of combustion removed any justification for believing in the existence of phlogiston, so the failure of folk psychology removes the rationale for folk psychological entities. Thus, if it turns out that folk psychology is false, then we would be unjustified in believing in the existence of beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, etc. According to the eliminative materialists, it seems very likely that folk psychology will turn out to be false. It seems likely that a "mature cognitive science" will show that most of our commonsense beliefs about mental states are completely unjustified. This result would have the consequence that the entities that we have always supposed to exist, our ordinary mental entities, do not really exist. And therefore, we have at long last a theory of mind that simply eliminates the mind. Hence, the expression "eliminative materialism."

A related argument used in favor of "eliminative materialism" seems to me so breathtakingly bad that I fear I must be misunderstanding it. As near as I can tell, here is how it goes:

Imagine that we had a perfect science of neurobiology. Imagine that we had a theory that really explained how the brain worked. Such a theory would cover the same domain as folk psychology, but would be much more powerful. Furthermore, it seems very unlikely that our ordinary folk psychological concepts, such as belief and desire, hope, fear, depression, elation, pain, etc., would exactly match or even remotely match the taxonomy provided by our imagined perfect science of neurobiology. In all probability there would be no place in this neurobiology for expressions like "belief," "fear," "hope" and "desire," and no smooth reduction of these supposed phenomena would be possible.

[p47]

That is the premise. Here is the conclusion: Therefore, the entities purportedly named by the expressions of folk psychology, beliefs, hopes, fears, desires, etc., do not really exist.

To see how bad this argument really is, just imagine a parallel argument from physics:

Consider our existing science of theoretical physics. Here we have a theory that explains how physical reality works, and is vastly superior to our commonsense theories by all the usual criteria. Physical theory covers the same domain as our commonsense theories of golf clubs, tennis rackets, Chevrolet station wagons, and split‑level ranch houses. Furthermore, our ordinary folk physical concepts such as "golf club," "tennis racket," "Chevrolet station wagon," and "split‑level ranch house" do not exactly, or even remotely, match the taxonomy of theoretical physics. There simply is no use in theoretical physics for any of these expressions and no smooth type reductions of these phenomena is possible. The way that an ideal physics - indeed the way that our actual physics ‑ taxonomizes reality is really quite different from the way our ordinary folk physics taxonomizes reality.

Therefore, split‑level ranch houses, tennis rackets, golf clubs, Chevrolet station wagons, etc., do not really exist.

I have not seen this mistake discussed in the literature. Perhaps it is so egregious that it has simply been ignored. It rests on the obviously false premise that for any empirical theory and corresponding taxonomy, unless there is a type-type reduction of the entities taxonomized to the entities of better theories of basic science, the entities do not exist. If you have any doubts that this premise is false, just try it out on anything you see around you ‑ or on yourself!

From:

Searle, John, R. (1992). The Resdiscovery of the Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Chapter 2: The Recent History of Materialism: The Same Mistake Over and Over

http://www.ict.griffith.edu.au/~johnt/1 ... 27-57.html

[Saeko]

But what about natural laws, is not that immaterial?

It doesn't matter as natural laws are not phenomena.

[ingliz]

physicalism is the view that every phenomenon can be explained by physical stuff obeying natural laws.

It has been shown experimentally that the posterior medial frontal cortex mediates adjustments in adherence to political and religious ideologies.

We presented participants with a reminder of death and a critique of their in-group ostensibly written by a member of an out-group, then experimentally decreased both avowed belief in God and out-group derogation by downregulating pMFC activity via transcranial magnetic stimulation. The results provide the first evidence that group prejudice and religious belief are susceptible to targeted neuromodulation, and point to a shared cognitive mechanism underlying concrete and abstract decision processes.

[Sivad]

Russell on Berkeley
http://www.ditext.com/russell/rus4.html

[Sivad]

"but is there any reason to suppose that the thing apprehended is in any sense mental?"

[Victoribus Spolia]

you defined it as "A State of Being Dependent on Nothing Outside of Oneself". Wouldn't that be aseity rather than omnipotence?

I had modified that definition in my preliminary discussion of definitions with her, I do believe the modified definition is superior:

1. Omnipotence: A State of Being Dependent on Nothing Outside of Oneself [however, as to preclude any notion of an inert or isolated being it shall be added:] With All Beings, All Reality, and All Actions Outside Of The One Holding This State Being Likewise Dependent For Their Continued and Actual Existence Upon The Express, Active, and Willful Determination of The One Having This State. [ By way of clarification, If it is further acknowledged here, that this definition may possibly be at variance with some common constructions of this term; however, this qualification notwithstanding, the definition is affirmed as being consistent with an orthodox school of thought within the broader catholic and reformation Christian theological traditions]

Note the italicized above.

VII. Eliminative Materialism

I think the real question is whether all materialism MUST be eliminative materialisms. I would say yes.

Jaegwon Kim basically came to this conclusion in his article "The Many Problems of Mental Causation."

The gist is that one cannot account for mental causation at all in a non-reductivist schema because there is no way to explain the causal origination of such or their interrelation to physical states. His point is that the position is basically a misnomer, they must either embrace an eliminative materialism acknowledging its problems (as Kim does), or accept a Cartesian dualism. Its really interesting.

[I can't find a PDF online for it, but it probably exists, I have it my book; "Philosophy of Mind; Classical and Contemporary Readings."

Which is an excellent resource that everyone should own.

FYI; Searle is probably my #5 favorite philosopher of mind, especially his critique of functionalism and the chinese room.

"but is there any reason to suppose that the thing apprehended is in any sense mental?"

If its an object of awareness, yes. To assume otherwise is the problem.

It has been shown experimentally that the posterior medial frontal cortex mediates adjustments in adherence to political and religious ideologies.

So what? There is a correlation between some meat in your head and what you claim to believe.

To press this claim further is cum hoc.

But what about natural laws, is not that immaterial?

It doesn't matter as natural laws are not phenomena.

Albert, Saeko is correct.

Natural laws are mere tentative descriptions of phenomenal events, not an account of the phenomena themselves regarding their metaphysical nature, which is really what this debate has been about.

The question is whether the chair you are sitting on can exist independent of any mind perceiving it. Physicalism (materialism) and Idealism (immaterialism) answer this question differently. Natural laws are not capable of dealing with this question.

However, I do think I know what you were trying to do, you were trying to give an example of something immaterial (or that must be presupposed as immaterial); let me just say that there are better things you can point to if attempting to make that argument.

[Victoribus Spolia]

delete

[Victoribus Spolia]

delete

[Sivad]

Note the italicized above.

You still seem to be describing factual necessity, not omnipotence.

I think the real question is whether all materialism MUST be eliminative materialisms. I would say yes.

Have you seen any of the 2014 Greenland conference? The Churchlands take a good beating from a lot of thoroughgoing physicalists on that boat.

Here's the full playlist, check it out -

they must either embrace an eliminative materialism acknowledging its problems (as Kim does),

Kim is a epiphenomenal property dualist, he's not an eliminativist.

or accept a Cartesian dualism.

Those aren't the only live options, panpsychism and neutral monism are two strong contenders.

FYI; Searle is probably my #5 favorite philosopher of mind, especially his critique of functionalism and the chinese room.

Yeah, I like Searle a lot, he's honest and he's got good horse sense.

If its an object of awareness, yes. To assume otherwise is the problem.

To assume either way is the problem. We can't rule out a physical reality just because we aren't able to conclusively demonstrate its existence, that would be absurdly fallacious.

[Victoribus Spolia]

You still seem to be describing factual necessity, not omnipotence.

I don't know what you mean, elucidate please.

Kim is a epiphenomenal property dualist, he's not an eliminativist.

I didn't say he was an eliminativist, I said that he has argued for a form of materialism that admists of its own problems (something eliminativists manifestly do not do).

That was the whole point of his book; Physicalism, or Something Near Enough

https://www.amazon.com/Physicalism-Some ... 0691133859

Those aren't the only live options, panpsychism and neutral monism are two strong contenders.

That wasn't Kim's argument though, even if I agree with you.

Yeah, I like Searle a lot, he's honest and he's got good horse sense.

I agree.

To assume either way is the problem. We can't rule out a physical reality just because we aren't able to conclusively demonstrate it's existence, that would be absurdly fallacious.

Not really, I don't assume anything about the content of my awareness other than that its the content of my awareness. I assume only the given of perception, nothing more.

By contrast, physicalists assert their criteria to be objective evidence and likewise claim that such a content of awareness is more than simply the content of awareness.

Thus, to claim for something to exist beyond this requires a non-reductive proof (that is, not reductive to awareness), and then the question arises how something that is claimed to be independent of awareness can even be described or argued at all (I would argue that it can't, because it would unintelligible).

There is a bit of double standard on this as well I think.

Physicalists who get into this corner when it comes to the hard problem of consciousness want to be "permitted" their system in a debate on the grounds that its non-existence cannot be demonstrated; however, they are not nearly so gracious to most theists who get cornered when making the same dumb remarks: "well we can'r rule out God just because we aren't able to conclusively demonstrate His existence"

Technically, its even worse for the physicalist because the physicalist cannot even begin to approximate a mind-independent substance without circularly decribing such with mind-dependnet terms and concepts.

So a better analogy would be if a theist said in argument:

"We can't rule out God just because we aren't able to conclusively demonstrate His existence, and no method of demonstration of His existence can even be conceived without engaging in circular reasoning."

Now, lets assume you concede that this is a perfectly acceptable position to hold in a debate......

We are still left discussing what is the more reasonably philosophical position, and the person who claims that there position cannot be demonstrated and that even the potential method of demonstration for such a position cannot be determined, cannot be said to have a stronger metaphysical stance than their opponent which has put them in such a corner and has likewise given reasonable proofs for the establishment of their own system.

We have metaphysics backwards in the west. Physicalism is worse than superstition at this point and in reality we have the philosophy of mind to thank for this development.

[Victoribus Spolia]

Have you seen any of the 2014 Greenland conference? The Churchlands take a good beating from a lot of thoroughgoing physicalists on that boat.

Here's the full playlist, check it out -

I have not. Thanks for the link.

[Sivad]

I don't know what you mean, elucidate please.

Aseity is basically what Swinburne calls factual necessity, it's self-existence. A factually necessary being doesn't depend on any other being for its existence and the existence of all other beings depend on it. Omnipotence is the ability to bring about any logically possible state. I can see how the two would be related but there is a distinction, and your definition seems to refer to aseity rather than omnipotence.

Not really, I don't assume anything about the content of my awareness other than that its the content of my awareness. I assume only the given of perception, nothing more.

You're assuming that the world you're perceiving is nonphysical, there's no more justification for that than assuming that it's physical.

By contrast, physicalists assert their criteria to be objective evidence and likewise claim that such a content of awareness is more than simply the content of awareness.

The world does appear to be physical and does appear to exist independent of our perception, there is no fallacy in inferring a physical, mind-independent reality from the appearances. The problem with physicalism is that it goes much further than that, it claims that there is only a physical world and any good skeptic will tell you that there's nothing to support that claim.

Thus, to claim for something to exist beyond this requires a non-reductive proof

No it doesn't, it's a warranted inference. Claiming certainty would be fallacious but there is good evidence for it and we should always proportion our beliefs to the evidence.

[Victoribus Spolia]

Aseity is basically what Swinburne calls factual necessity, it's self-existence. A factually necessary being doesn't depend on any other being for its existence and the existence of all other beings depend on it. Omnipotence is the ability to bring about any logically possible state. I can see how the two would be related but there is a distinction, and your definition seems to refer to aseity rather than omnipotence.

I would deny the definition of omnipotence you have given though as it seems to see omnipotence in terms of potentiality, not actuality; however, the orthodox understanding of God's essence is that He exists as actus purus; hence, discussing omnipotence in terms of potentiality is erroneous regarding theological categories, atleast the ones I am using, Indeed, open theism and other sects which are unorthodox are the only ones who restrict the notion of omnipotence to God's potential.

Likewise, my definition which insisted on a strictly traditional understanding was meant to also preclude the understanding of folk theology where omnipotence is merely God being "all-powerful" in an ambiguous sense, which leads to silly contradictions upon examination.

God's attributes in theology proper are considered to be categories by which we describe His unified nature, hence omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence tend to describe the same thing, in this case the self-existence and perfections of God.

God's aseity is tied to the notion that He is likewise the only True Substance, a notion held by many theologians in that he lacks all contingency, a claim grounded in the notion that nothing dependent could be the grounds of reality (this seems to have been Aristotle's understanding of the term as well). This is why matter was so important in the enlightenment (and why it became self-existent and eternal in Newtonian thought), it was meant to replace God as the ultimate causal grounds of the perceived universe.

Thus, my modified definition indeed assumes God's Aseity and my original definition spoke only of his Aseity (which is why the modification was necessary), but my modified definition asserts the connection given the doctrine of actus purus. Are the categories technically seperable? You may be right, but in a purely academic sense, the purpose of my argument and system required the definition to be broad enough to preclude any misunderstanding that would come from a notion of omnipotence that did not assume aseity and actus purus.

Indeed, I will not concede such a definition of omnipotence without it accounting for said aseity and God as pure act, that would be to walk into a trap that was avoidable since such a disparate definition is neither necessary, nor sound (technically speaking).

You're assuming that the world you're perceiving is nonphysical, there's no more justification for that than assuming that it's physical.

Thats simply not true, I am only assuming perceptual entities as object of awareness, mental content. It is from that point of the given that I then ask about whether such percepts have any existence without a mind.

My denial of them being physical (as an Idealist) is due only to the fact that given the definition of physicalism/materialism (and realism for that matter), the claim of percepts having a mind-independent reality requires proof and I have yet seen any adequate demonstration for such and I likewise do not see how such a demonstration could even begin in all honesty.

Feel free to change my mind; however, assuming what I am aware of as simply something I am aware of is merely stating a given, an axiomatic proposition.

Whether these objects are anything more than that, requires some sort of proof, in the absence of such proof, the idealist position basically remains unchallenged.

The world does appear to be physical and does appear to exist independent of our perception.

the phrase: "appear to exist independent of our perception" is a contradiction, or at least an oxymoron. After all, if something "appears" then it exists in perception, so something cannot "appear" to be independent of appearing (perception) .....otherwise it couldn't say it was an appearance at all.

there is no fallacy in inferring a physical, mind-independent reality from the appearances.

Please show me this inference, for I would contend this claim as stated.

The problem with physicalism is that it goes much further than that, it claims that there is only a physical world and any good skeptic will tell you that there's nothing to support that claim.

Well, Daniel Dennett fancies himself a grand-skeptic (he was even a leader of the New Atheists movement) and this is exactly the claim he would make; especially in his work Quining Qualia.

No it doesn't, it's a warranted inference.

Show me the inference and we can assess its warrant by the standards of logic.

Claiming certainty would be fallacious but there is good evidence for it and we should always proportion our beliefs to the evidence.

Good evidence for what? a physical reality?

If you think so, please provide it.

I contend such a claim, of course.

@Sivad,

What position do you ascribe to? (just curious).

Cartesian Dualism based on Common-Sense Realism?

Epiphenomenalism?

HMMMM?

[ingliz]

To press this claim further is cum hoc.

No interest in pressing it further.

I find it amusing that it is possible to destroy a believer's Faith, and presumably your desire to argue theology, through the judicious application of magnetism to some meat in your head.

[Victoribus Spolia]

I find it amusing that it is possible to destroy a believer's Faith, and presumably your desire to argue theology, through the judicious application of magnetism to some meat in your head

You may find it amusing, but its the same concept as demonic possession, its no longer their agency at work, or at least there is no way to prove it either way. Which was my point.

[Sivad]

I would deny the definition of omnipotence you have given though as it seems to see omnipotence in terms of potentiality, not actuality; however, the orthodox understanding of God's essence is that He exists as actus purus; hence, discussing omnipotence in terms of potentiality is erroneous regarding theological categories, atleast the ones I am using, Indeed, open theism and other sects which are unorthodox are the only ones who restrict the notion of omnipotence to God's potential.

Unless you're a modal realist I think you're restricting the notion of omnipotence by limiting it to aseity. Essentially that would mean that God has fully exhausted his power in creating and sustaining the actual world, not even open theists go that far.

That's simply not true, I am only assuming perceptual entities as object of awareness, mental content. It is from that point of the given that I then ask about whether such percepts have any existence without a mind.

That question assumes idealism as the default, it's not an honest question.

My denial of them being physical (as an Idealist) is due only to the fact that given the definition of physicalism/materialism (and realism for that matter), the claim of percepts having a mind-independent reality requires proof and I have yet seen any adequate demonstration for such and I likewise do not see how such a demonstration could even begin in all honesty.

A demonstration isn't necessary, the mere possibility is enough to call idealism into question. You could argue that idealism is more likely due to the fact that we know for certain that mind exists while the experience of matter has only ever been mediated through mind but that wouldn't warrant a strong commitment to idealism. The fact is we don't know what the fundamental ontology of the world is and a strong commitment either way is unwarranted.

assuming what I am aware of as simply something I am aware of is merely stating a given, an axiomatic proposition.

That doesn't give you any insight into the fundamental nature of the objects of your perception. How do you get from awareness to idealism? It's not enough to just to say a physical reality can't be proven, you have to provide a positive argument for idealism and I haven't seen that.

Whether these objects are anything more than that, requires some sort of proof, in the absence of such proof, the idealist position basically remains unchallenged.

The idealist position also requires some sort of proof. Skepticism is the default, not idealism.

the phrase: "appear to exist independent of our perception" is a contradiction, or at least an oxymoron. After all, if something "appears" then it exists in perception, so something cannot "appear" to be independent of appearing (perception) .....otherwise it couldn't say it was an appearance at all.

Unless you're a solipsist you accept that reality exists independent of your perception, that's not at question here. The only question is the nature of that independent reality and so far you haven't provided any reason for thinking it's mental rather than physical. That it appears to be physical is excellent reason for suspecting that it may in fact be physical.

Well, Daniel Dennett fancies himself a grand-skeptic (he was even a leader of the New Atheists movement) and this is exactly the claim he would make; especially in his work Quining Qualia.

Dennett doesn't claim to be a philosophical skeptic, he's an avowed physicalist.

@Sivad,

What position do you ascribe to? (just curious).

Cartesian Dualism based on Common-Sense Realism?

Epiphenomenalism?

HMMMM?

I lean toward neutral monism, but really I'm agnostic.

[Victoribus Spolia]

Unless you're a modal realist I think you're restricting the notion of omnipotence by limiting it to aseity

Once again, I think my modified definition is broader than that and includes what I would consider as omnipotence while still explicitly maintaining aseity and actus purus as part of the definition; however, I would agree with you that my original definition erred by restricting omnipotence to aseity.

No open theist would claim that every thought and action in created beings and every entity and cause in reality was utterly dependent on the acts of God for both their existence and continued existence. That is the exact opposite of open theism, thats occasionalism.

That question assumes idealism as the default, it's not an honest question.

Technically a solipsist would agree with this default as well, in which case the burden of proof would be on the Idealist to prove to the solipsist that there is more minds than just their own. Solipsists and Idealists would simply have the high ground against someone who claims the existence of a reality beyond the given of awareness, which would necessitate proof.

but that wouldn't warrant a strong commitment to idealism.

But it would warrant a commitment nonetheless, just as is if someone were an atheist had a warranted basis if there were no way to prove the existence of God by his opponent.

You might say that atheism/naturalism does not warrant a strong commitment because there is still the possibility of God's existence in spite of no proof being conceivable, but that does not negate the fact that under such conditions, naturalism had a basic or default warrant; whereas, theism had little to none.

Same thing here, the given of awareness gives prima facie justification for mental monisms leaving the burden of proof on those claiming something more;Non sunt multiplicanda entia sine necessitate.

That doesn't give you any insight into the fundamental nature of the objects of your perception. How do you get from awareness to idealism? It's not enough to just to say a physical reality can't be proven, you have to provide a positive argument for idealism and I haven't seen that.

Actually, the better question is how does one get from solipsism to idealism; that is where my theistic argument comes in, or atleast proof that the solipsism is self-contradictory (I actually gave this argument to Saeko when she attempted to argue that minds are the source of their own percepts).

The idealist position also requires some sort of proof. Skepticism is the default, not idealism.

Skepticism is not the default because skepticism would deny the given of awareness, which is a performative contradiction.

some sort of variant of mental monism would be the default, of which idealism is a species.

Thus, if any burden of proof is on the idealist, it would be in a debate with a solipsist, not a materialist. A materialist has the burden of proof against an idealist unless he can demonstrate that human mentality is reducible to the non-mental without describing/arguing this non-mental reality in terms of the mental (as that would be circular reasoning/begging the question).

That it appears to be physical is excellent reason for suspecting that it may in fact be physical.

As I said earlier, I can't make sense of this statement.

For if you mean by "physical" that something is mind-independent, then it does not make sense to say that something "appears" mind-independent, that is contradictory.

"appearence" is a phenomenal event, so if something appears like something, that means it looks like something else that has likewise been looked upon.

but what you are basically saying here is that something you see/observe looks like something that is unseen and unobservable, which is nonsense.

The sentence is nonsensical and is devoid of meaning and so I don't know how it can be good reason to believe in anything at all.

Unless you're a solipsist you accept that reality exists independent of your perception, that's not at question here. The only question is the nature of that independent reality and so far you haven't provided any reason for thinking it's mental rather than physical.

I would agree that in the context of what we are discussing my starting point would be solipsist if I was only theorizing by myself, as I am starting from the axiom of human mentality (a subjective given); however, in the context of a debate, the assumption of mutual agency is an aspect of debate with neither myself nor my opponent being able to deny such an axiom without assuming its validity (otherwise there would be little reason to debate).

Hence, in a sense, some variant of mental monism is the default given the fundamental and axiomatic nature of awareness (human mentality).

I do not deny that this cannot alone represent my entire position, and in my first debate post I clearly argue for more than this (and you can certainly read those parts if you like), but in the context of our conversation it would not be beneficial to go beyond this basic point of contention.

I am claiming given the fundamental nature of human awareness, in regards to a debate between a mental monist (of any stripe) and a physicalist, the latter's claim of a non-mental reality has the burden of proof in a debate.

BUT, in a debate between different mental monists, the one with the more complex position is required to give demonstration, either negatively or positively.

Interestingly enough, the neutral monist has arguably the most complex position of all the systems just mentioned and even more so than even dualists.

They seem to violate the law of excluded-middle in my opinion, but then again, if you are a neutral monist you would be the first one I ever encountered in a discussion/debate.

[Sivad]

the given of awareness gives prima facie justification for mental monisms leaving the burden of proof on those claiming something more

No, it doesn't. You do have to account for the appearance of an external physical world, you can't just dismiss it, at least not rationally anyway.

Skepticism is not the default because skepticism would deny the given of awareness, which is a performative contradiction.

So you're saying that idealism can't be rationally doubted? That's a bold claim.

As I said earlier, I can't make sense of this statement.

For if you mean by "physical" that something is mind-independent, then it does not make sense to say that something "appears" mind-independent, that is contradictory.

"appearence" is a phenomenal event, so if something appears like something, that means it looks like something else that has likewise been looked upon.

but what you are basically saying here is that something you see/observe looks like something that is unseen and unobservable, which is nonsense.

What? It doesn't "appear like something", it appears to be external, independent of my perceptions, and physical.

Hence, in a sense, some variant of mental monism is the default given the fundamental and axiomatic nature of awareness (human mentality).

You can claim that but it doesn't make a lick of sense. You're cheating at philosophy.

I am claiming given the fundamental nature of human awareness, in regards to a debate between a mental monist (of any stripe) and a physicalist, the latter's claim of a non-mental reality has the burden of proof in a debate.

We'd all like to shift the burden of proof onto our opponents, but that's not rational discourse.

[Victoribus Spolia]

No, it doesn't

Sure it does.

You do have to account for the appearance of an external physical world, you can't just dismiss it, at least not rationally anyway.

I don't dismiss it, I say what it is, an appearance, something perceived, objects of awareness. As a mental monist I infer from this that all of reality is mental, because no non-mental reality is known and any attempt to describe such would be unintelligible (as it would have to appeal to something outside of human intelligibility).

If you disagree, show me the error of my ways. Why should I believe in something outside of awareness or appearance? Something that is neither a mind nor mental content?

I see no reason.

So you're saying that idealism can't be rationally doubted? That's a bold claim.

Indeed.

Though I would probably rephrase your remark and say that my system can be, by all means, doubted. It just can't be refuted.

I say this because I legitimately believe it to be irrefutable.

You can claim that but it doesn't make a lick of sense. You're cheating at philosophy.

No need to jab my friend, I have quite enjoyed this conversation.

If there is something about my claim that doesn't make sense to you, I will gladly try to clarify.

I think its simple really, objects exist in our awareness as a given, mental monists say based on this that "reality seems to exist in awareness."

Physicalists will then say; "there is something outside of awareness." the monist then asks, and rightfully so, "How do you know of such, can you show me?"

and you are rebutting, for the physicalist: "NO! you show me!"

Thats not how it works, one system is clearly operating consistently based on the given of awareness, the other is not, the other needs to prove their claim which is contrary to the content of our experience. Its pretty simple.

We'd all like to shift the burden of proof onto our opponents, but that's not rational discourse.

I have explained, quite plainly, why the burden is the way it is. I am following the lex parsimoniae standard for determining such as has always been done in philosophical debate.