Rugoz wrote:Yes, Utilitarianism the ethical theory is the topic of this thread. See the OP.
Fine, if don't want to go down that path, I just think that the theory of utilitarianism most prominently expressed by Bentham is inconceivable outside of the developing economy of his time and to consider it independent of that is to leave the social basis of such a manner of thinking unremarked upon nor critically examined. Because such notions do not arrive simply from anywhere, but always come to people's mind as a reflection of the world even if they themselves have no sense of where because knowledge independent human relations is nonsensical as Kant's thing-in-itself.
In fact, in the concept ‘of a thing as it exists before and outside any possible experience’ there was included a bit of nonsense not noted by Kant: to say that the Ego was conscious of a thing outside consciousness was the same as to say that there was money in one’s pocket outside one’s pocket.
I think the point of saying how utilitarian ethics is derived from social relations organized by the mediation of exchange ie markets is a sound point to make, and also how many people do not act on the basis of such reasoning and can be presented as irrational by such a standard.
Rugoz wrote:Every ethical theory must somehow weigh consequences, even if it is not consequentalist.
Indeed, and I am skeptical of the manner in which deontological and consequentialist theories argue such a basis of judgment is founded.
In it's emphasis on duty, the right course of action, it flattens the complexity of actual life. I like the criticism from the point of view of 'virtue' ethics, where real life and the resolution of moral quandaries cannot be answered with certainty through the application of some rule system of action even if they can at times be quite useful.
https://epochemagazine.org/a-problem-based-reading-of-nussbaums-virtue-ethics-4cacfa3e74d6It is not enough for me, when this problem arises, to remind myself of the maxim ‘be generous’, which I then interpret to universally mean ‘give away the thing that I want’, because excellence of conduct vis-à-vis this problem in this situation may not call for ‘generosity’ to be interpreted in this way (for example, in the distribution of attention and time between multiple people). In fact, from this perspective, this style of rational deliberation is entirely back to front. ‘Generosity’ is not a form of conduct I consult to match with my action when I encounter a problem, the form of conduct to be called ‘generosity’ is engendered by my overcoming of this problem excellently (and only I and those involved here in this predicament ultimately know what this consists in exactly). I don’t need the name of the virtue, or what others or I believe it entails (though this may provide assistance), merely intuit, when greeted with a problem, that there is some maximally ideal solution (notice, not necessarily “perfect”), given the situation, and things and actors within it. And, such an intuition is cooked into the very idea of encountering a problem as problem in the first place.
This is why the principlist objection that virtue ethics does not give a clear indication of what to do in moral test cases misses the mark. Not only is it not offering simple principles of the kind “be virtuous, be generous”, but it rejects the feasibility of the moral test cases as ‘false problems’. These moral test cases, stripped of all particularity, and with their assumption there must be some, one, clear solution, seemingly conflates the kinds of problems worthy of moral consideration (the problems of life) with ‘problems’ in the sense of a ‘math problem’ set for homework. Furthermore, as Annas has pointed out (2013), ‘flattening out’ the problems of life to the simplicity of a math-like homework problem is in itself a kind of attitude or pattern of conduct that can be evaluated by a more holistic virtue ethical approach. Towards what problems and when and where is it an ‘excellent response’ to flatten out the issue itself in this way? And when is doing so a vice? What does a Utilitarian buy for their spouse on their birthday, for example?
https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/Virtue%20and%20Utopia.pdfThe point is that reflecting against abstract and implausible criteria while carrying out elaborate hypothetical calculations is just not how people actually make decisions. This is not surprising because it would be actually impossible to make decisions in that way and attempts to do so invariably lead to perverse outcomes. It is when two or more rules conflict and we are called upon to decide which rule to prioritize or have to find a creative via media that ethics comes into play at all, and neither consequentialism nor deontology can help us when facing these kind of quandaries. The richness of the vocabulary for virtues and vices – prudence, courage, self-respect, humility, intelligence, intuition, firmness, kindness, fairness, empathy, flexibility, consistency, …. versus carelessness, cowardice, hubris, insensitivity, … – evidences the complexity of the process of determining one’s course of action in difficult situations and the depth of personal character that is called upon to act wisely. For correct decisions we must rely upon the judgment of a person in command of the relevant virtues and is in possession of all the facts. This is why we have judges and juries and we do not simply appoint a clerk to look up the relevant legal provision and read off the verdict. It always requires judgment, and the virtues needed to make a good judgment and carry it through can only be acquired through a moral education in the relevant tradition. Aristotle called the wisdom entailed in knowing how to act in the face of complex and conflicting imperatives phronesis.
In exercising phronesis, a judge, for example, takes into account foreseeable consequences and the possible unforeseeable consequences of their decision, and attends to rules of conduct which ensure justice and fairness in acting. Judges are subject to a protracted education and training in the practice of the law in order to instill the appropriate virtues and develop the capacity for phronesis. There is no rulebook for this. But in every case, this judgment entails an indefinitely complex balancing which can never be definitively resolved by rules or a utilitarian calculus. It is the tradition of which the practice is a part and the self-concept of that practice itself which provides the resources for the exercise of phronesis, the various rules of conduct, concepts and narratives which the judge can call upon in determining what to do. And there is no substitute, no abstract set of procedural rules or decision guidelines which can substitute for the exercise of phronesis by virtuous actors, determining their action as participants along with others in the relevant practice.
It is virtue ethics therefore that offers a realistic study of the exercise of phronesis, but virtue ethics does not exclude the need for deontological and consequential considerations, but on the contrary attends realistically to their application.
A person could quite consistently apply the rules of a deontology or consequentialism and behave quite foolishly in their consistency, because good judgement isn't derived from a rational consistency.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essay3.htmin a dispute between a wise man and a fool, so long as the fool ‘correctly’ set out whatever ideas came into his head from God knew where, and however absurd and foolish they were. Its rules were such that it must logically justify any absurdity so long as the latter was not self-contradictory. A self-consistent stupidity must pass freely through the filter of general logic.
Kant especially stresses that ‘general logic contains, and can contain, no rules for judgment’, that is ‘the faculty of subsuming under the rules; that is, of distinguishing whether something does or does not stand under a given rule (casus datae legis)’. The firmest knowledge of the rules in general (including the rules of general logic) is therefore no guarantee of their faultless application. Since ‘deficiency in judgment is just what is ordinarily called stupidity’, and since ‘for such a failing there is no remedy’, general logic cannot serve either as an ‘organon’ (tool, instrument) of real knowledge or even as a ‘canon’ of it, i.e. as a criterion for testing ready-made knowledge.
So it seems to me at best, that utilitarianism is one-sided in its emphasis on the ends with a devaluing of the means whilst deontology devalues the ends and prioritizes the means when imagined universally.
As of yet, I don't have a proper grasp of the adequate balancing of means and ends within a particular situation.
But I think it is to be found in a partial form in what is already practiced in courts with the consideration of peoples actions which is inclusive of their intentions, their behavior and the means in which that action was realized with the responsibility for the foreseeable consequences. Although for an ethical theory rather than simply the judgment of an individual actions must be broader than the individual somewhat.
I think an ethical theory can be derived out of a theory of action that doesn't take the individual as the unit of consideration, but situates them within social practices so as to relate the purpose of their individual actions within the intentions of the whole practice. As projects are made up of many individual actions but considering only that unit, one would miss the meaning as to what those actions have and the implications of them within a particular project.
I quite like this summary of collaborative ethics in arguing the point that when individuals are considered in relation to one another without the mediation of some shared project, the question of ethics is nonsensical and too abstract for practical purposes.
https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/Collaborative%20Ethics.pdfI contend that Both Habermas and Rawls fail in their project because they do not take collaboration as the norm for interactions between individuals. Individuals being the author of unmediated actions they take against another individual is far from being the typical ethical relation in social life – in the jungle perhaps, but not in a modern social formation. Ethics needs to be based on a form of relationship which can function as a methodological ‘germ cell’ of a social formation, and one individual acting upon another fails as such a germ cell.
https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/works/subject-position.htmMoral discourse which is based around events, dilemmas or relationships in which the participants in the discourse are not participants in a relevant common project, is meaningless. What should the French government do about the hijab? What position should a socialist take in Iraq today? How can there be sensible answers to these questions for someone who is not French or not in Iraq?
https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/For%20Ethical%20Politics.pdf#page90
-For Ethical Politics